

# **Ecosystem-Based Adaptation and Mitigation in Botswana's Communal Rangelands**

ANNEX 28: Evaluation of Ipelegeng Programme



## **FINAL REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF IPELEGENG PROGRAMME**

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# REVIEW OF IPELEGENG PROGRAMME

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## ACRONYMS

<b>AIDS</b>	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>ARAP</b>	Arable Rain-fed Agricultural Programme
<b>BCWIS</b>	Botswana Core Welfare Indicators Survey
<b>BPC</b>	Botswana Power Corporation
<b>BIDPA</b>	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
<b>CAB MEMO</b>	Cabinet Memorandum
<b>CBOs</b>	Community Based Organizations
<b>CEDA</b>	Citizen Economic Development Agency
<b>CHBC</b>	Community Home Based Care
<b>CSO</b>	Central Statistics Office
<b>DD</b>	Difference in Difference
<b>DP</b>	Destitute Programme
<b>EPRI</b>	Economic Policy Research Institute
<b>FAP</b>	Financial Assistance Policy
<b>FGDs</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>FSG</b>	Food Studies Group
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GoB</b>	Government of Botswana
<b>HIES</b>	Household Income & Expenditure Survey
<b>HIV</b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>IP</b>	Ipelegeng Programme
<b>ISPAAD</b>	Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agricultural Development
<b>JC</b>	Junior Certificate
<b>LBDRP</b>	Labour Based Drought Relief Programme

<b>LBPW</b>	Labour Based Public Works
<b>LEA</b>	Local Enterprise Agency
<b>LIMID</b>	Livestock Management & Infrastructure Development
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MEGS</b>	Maharashtra State Employment Scheme
<b>MLG</b>	Ministry of Local Government
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>NAMPAADD</b>	National Master Plan for Arable Agriculture & Dairy Development
<b>NDP</b>	National Development Plan
<b>NGOs</b>	Non Governmental Organizations
<b>NSPR</b>	National Strategy for Poverty Reduction
<b>OAP</b>	Old Age Pension
<b>OFSP</b>	Other Food Security Programme
<b>OP</b>	Office of the President
<b>PDL</b>	Poverty Datum Line
<b>PDPs</b>	Performance Development Plans
<b>PSNP</b>	Productive Safety Net Programme
<b>PWPs</b>	Public Works Programmes
<b>RADs</b>	Remote Area Dwellers
<b>RAs</b>	Research Assistants
<b>RNPRD</b>	Revised National Policy on Rural Development
<b>S&amp;CD</b>	Social and Community Development
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
<b>SWOT</b>	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework



<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>VDCs</b>	Village Development Committees
<b>WWII</b>	World War II

## **Executive Summary**

The Government of Botswana and UNICEF initiated a process that sought to evaluate the Public Works Programme commonly known as Ipelegeng. The stated objectives of the evaluation were:

1. To make recommendations on measures that will ensure viability and sustainability of the programme
2. To put together a report outlining the effectiveness and efficiency, relevance, success and draw backs of the Ipelegeng activities with regards to poverty alleviation
3. To provide an outline of strategies to determine future manpower needs
4. To make recommendations on the way forward for Ipelegeng within the context of a broader social development framework
5. To make recommendations on cost effective enhancement

The Terms of Reference were stated as follows:

ToR 1: Assess and explain the relevance of the Ipelegeng Programme (IP). To what extent is it an appropriate strategy for poverty reduction within the social development of Botswana?

ToR 2: Assess and explain the effectiveness of the Ipelegeng Programme

ToR 3: Assess and explain the efficiency of the Ipelegeng programme and the capacities of agencies responsible for it.

ToR 4: Assess and explain the impact of the Ipelegeng Programme, its implementation modalities, in relation to other government programmes or initiatives

ToR 5: On the basis of the findings, make and justify recommendations and adjustments to the programme and to policy, institutional, planning, budgeting and implementation arrangements that delivers it

ToR 6: Make and justify recommendations on alternative strategies that would be more effective and efficient in achieving the poverty reduction objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme

ToR 7: Provide plans, budgets and timelines for the recommended actions

The review of Ipelegeng employed both the quantitative and qualitative research designs. An interviewer administered survey questionnaire was administered on 500 Ipelegeng participants whose ages ranged from 18 years and upwards in all the selected research sites. The survey provided quantitative information regarding household socioeconomic status and relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability aspects of the Ipelegeng Programme.. In addition, semi-structured key informant and focus group discussions (FGDs) guides were utilized for qualitative data collection. These methods were used to collect data from both the key

informants and the beneficiaries of Ipelegeng. In-depth interviews and FGDs were used to solicit views, opinions and perceptions regarding the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Ipelegeng Programme. Other methods included observations, document review, (districts and national quarterly and annual reports on the Ipelegeng Programme, budget as well as regional and international literature on Public Works Programmes) and any other relevant material obtained from the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and Office of the President (OP) such as directives and savingrams.

Literature review on Public Works Programmes (PwPs) revealed that the best feature of a well-designed Public Works Programme like Ipelegeng should be based on:

- 1) Self-selection: That the programme wage should be set such that only those who deserve and meet the Ipelegeng requirements apply and the well-off do not have the incentive to apply. The reason being that rationing Public Works Programme has high administrative costs
- 2) Projects undertaken under such programmes should be of a high quality such that they add high value to national assets and have the potential to generate second round effects on employment benefits
- 3) Such projects should have high labour intensity in order for cost effectiveness to be achieved
- 4) Targeting the poor should be central to the implementation of such programmes
- 5) Public Works Programmes on their own do not have much impact on poverty and unemployment. Their impact is better felt when such programmes are linked to other economic empowerment programmes targeting the poor.

## **Main Research Findings**

### **Household Issues**

Overall, the IP households are headed by females than males. The households are characterized by higher household sizes which may have negative impacts on the poverty status of such households. The IP household size is much higher than the national average household size of 4, averaging 6 and ranged from 1 to 28 dependents. Again, the IP household heads were characterized by low educational attainments, with the majority having primary or less education. About 45 percent of the household heads were single, while about 21 percent were living together (cohabiting). The survey results showed that IP was dominated by females with a ratio of 80:20 in favor of females. Therefore IP serves as a good safety net for females as it provides them with access to a direct wage employment, and thus protecting them from loss of income. In addition, a woman's participation in the labour force and her control over resources is associated with substantial improvements in child welfare and women's health as well as thier status in the society.

The results also show that IP attracts the youth with a participation rate of 35 percent. The results also show that there are some elders aged 65 and above participating in IP.

With regard to income, the majority of the households indicated that they spent most of their income on food followed by clothing. This is consistent with other studies, where it was found that low value transfers by contrast, are mainly consumed, in the form of food and clothes. Most of the households own small assets and when using cattle as a proxy for wealth, the majority of the households who own cattle, kept between 1 to 9 head of cattle.

## **Relevance Issues**

Based on Ipelegeng beneficiaries' responses to the survey investigations, views and perceptions from the focus group discussions (FGDs) and in-depth interviews with key informants, this study concludes that:

### **A.) The Ipelegeng Programme is relevant to addressing the plight of the poor.**

- (i) Data analysis from the survey, in-depth interviews and FGDs provides the evidence that underscores the relevance of the Ipelegeng Programme in poverty relief and by extension poverty eradication
- (ii) An overwhelming 82 per cent of the respondents felt that the programme had assisted them improve their welfare. Only 18 per cent felt that the programme had not improved their welfare.
- (iii) The majority of the respondents 63.8% percent affirmed that Ipelegeng had given them skills that prepare them for the formal job market.
- (iv) An overwhelming majority of the respondents 85 percent of the respondents confirmed that they felt that Ipelegeng gave them some dignity.

Focus group discussions and in-depth interview with key informants have corroborated the view that Ipelegeng is a relevant programme for poverty eradication by stating the following reasons:

- i) IP beneficiaries are able to buy food for themselves without depending heavily on relatives and the Government
- ii) IP beneficiaries like others in the community are recognized as workers by small shop owners (Dimausu) as credit worthy. Put differently, IP beneficiaries have access to credit from small shops (Semausu)
- iii) IP beneficiaries' dignity has been enhanced through their participation in Ipelegeng
- iv) In somewhat unstructured manner the participants have gained some skills by observing work being done. This suggests that a structured training component within Ipelegeng has

the potential to add value to the realization of broader IP objectives of employment creation.

**B.) Ipelegeng is weak as an Entrepreneurial vehicle.**

The notion that Ipelegeng could be used as a vehicle for entrepreneurial skills and small business development was rejected by 62.6 per cent of the respondents and endorsed by only 37.4 per cent. The main reason cited for the rejection was lack of savings generated from Ipelegeng to warrant any business venture. Focus Group Discussions and Key Informants interviews have buttressed this by pointing out that in addition to the temporary and rotational nature of Ipelegeng, the programme lacks a strong structured training component. This was illustrated by the analogy, *Ipelegeng gives people fish without teaching them how to fish*. Some argued that with proper training and education Ipelegeng participants can actually make more money from collecting and recycling litter than they are making from the P400 wage per month.

**C.) The stated objectives of Ipelegeng are not consistent with the current Government policy pronouncement on poverty eradication.**

The official Ipelegeng guidelines talk about providing “relief” while the official Government position is to achieve poverty eradication. Relief can make an improvement to ones poverty situation without necessarily taking the individual across the poverty line. These two positions have to be streamlined.

**D.) The beneficiaries of Ipelegeng and Key Informants expect the Botswana Government to be the sole sponsor of the programme and deliver on the following: increase Ipelegeng wages, increase the employment duration and employ participants on a permanent basis i.e. IP should cease to employ people on a rotational basis.**

**E.) Urban areas, in particularly have shown a higher percentage of Ipelegeng participants who can only afford to buy food with their Ipelegeng wages.** The percentage for urban areas stands at 41.1 while the next geographical region is at 25.3 percent. The only plausible explanation for this is that urban areas have high participation costs such as transport and payment of rentals which most likely leave the beneficiaries with a limited residual wage. Interviews with the Gaborone City Council have shown that the city is unable to fill its quota and it has to recruit from surrounding villages.

**F.) Remote settlements are very different from the rest of the regions as demonstrated by the fact that in virtually all conclusions in this section they are either opposite to the norm or are outliers. In most cases these exception portray them as a much tougher terrain to fight poverty with the common ammunition.**

**G.) Some districts still pay participants using cheques and this has had the bearing of increasing participation costs to the beneficiaries thereby reducing their net benefits.**

**H.) The rural and remote area dwellers (RADs) do not seem to know the objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme, yet this is a poverty eradication programme that they interface with on a daily basis.**

In terms of the knowledge of the Ipelegeng objectives 64 per cent of remote area Ipelegeng participants and 44 percent of rural areas participants claimed they did not know the objectives and intention of the Ipelegeng Programme. FGD and key informants (KI) interviews further showed that across districts these objectives were known and understood differently. These groups felt that this lack of common understanding of these objectives adversely affects the implementation of the project. Particular concern was expressed regarding the participant's failure to understand that they are expected to graduate from the programme.

### ***Recommendations***

***Recommendation 1:*** Ipelegeng objectives must be revised and be aligned to the national objective of poverty eradication. Such an alignment should portray the programme only as a part of a process that seeks to achieve poverty eradication since on its own it cannot achieve that. Such an objective should therefore place emphasis on coordinating and linking the programme with other government programmes with the view to draw maximum synergies with such programmes.

***Recommendation 2:*** Ipelegeng must be redesigned to be result-based to introduce flexible working schedules where beneficiaries will be assigned work and will work at their own time and pace and be paid on work done instead of time spent at work. Such a change should be done with the view to enable participants to get involved in other productive activities in the spirit of recommendation 12 below. Piece rate and task- based remuneration system as well as flexi-time should be introduced where feasible.

***Recommendation 3:*** Ipelegeng must introduce a well-structured capacity building component that arms participants with production skills as well as survival skills. Such skills will assist the participants to graduate to better paying jobs

***Recommendation 4:*** A strong and clear Communication, Education and Public Awareness Strategy for Ipelegeng must be designed. Such a strategy should place emphasis on ensuring that

*the programme objectives are clearly known and understood by all stakeholders. The need for participants to graduate must form a central core for such a strategy.*

***Recommendation 5:*** *A cost benefit analysis of using a single national Ipelegeng wage rate to achieve self-selection must be undertaken with the view to establish whether different regional factors can be taken into account and hence vary the wage rate regionally.*

***Recommendation 6:*** *The Ministry of Local Government should investigate the reasons for Remote areas having displayed very different results from the rest of the groups regarding Ipelegeng Issues. Based on the outcome of this investigation the Ministry will determine if a special Ipelegeng Programme targeting Remote area should be designed and implemented.*

## **Effectiveness Issues**

### ***Main Findings and Recommendations***

The answer to the question on whether Ipelegeng has effectively addressed the objective of poverty eradication and relief is that there has been more relief than poverty eradication. The high sustenance ratings that the project has received from the evaluation indicate that the project has provided the required relief to the poor. However, as seen in other sections of the report, low savings associated with this project means that no asset base is being built to fight poverty. Furthermore, even though hiring appears to be non-corrupt, targeting, particularly of women, seems to be weak. The seemingly poor quality of Ipelegeng activities renders this programme's effectiveness incomplete. This is because effectiveness also relates to the quality of assets that the PWPs are producing.

Qualitative data also arrived at similar conclusions that Ipelegeng has been generally rendered ineffective because unlike other "regular" government programmes, it would appear the programme is given preference over others because it was initiated by the state President. In terms of the manner in which it is implemented, this programme appears to be very popular among the poor people, especially those living in the rural and remote areas. In-depth interview with key informants (civil servants) revealed a number of factors that hinder the effectiveness of IP. These include among others: (i) the top-down approach, which has come to characterize the relationship between the MLG and Local Authorities charged with the implementation of IP. In-depth interviews conducted with civil servants suggest that as implementers on the ground, their ability to contribute to the rationale and design of some aspects of Ipelegeng is limited because they cannot make decision on the ground. They always have to wait for decisions coming from Headquarters. (ii) Pressure to deliver the programme has over powered the need to properly plan and execute Ipelegeng systematically and more professionally. To this end, it is suggested that a more bottom- up approach accompanied by broad consultation and alertness to delivery is

needed in order to boost IP effectiveness. This approach would avoid, as one civil servant puts it “*the numbers game ... not a poverty eradication strategy*” that characterizes the current approach to the implementation of IP. It is believed this approach will deliver increased welfare to benefit the poor. That way targeting will be enhanced and implementation improved.

### **Recommendations**

**Recommendation 7:** *The IP project selection should be based on the following key criteria: i ) a genuine bottom - up consultative process where community’s wishes on Ipelegeng projects to be implemented will be headed to.*

*ii) the environment, natural resource endowment and skills base for the concerned areas.*

*iii) high quality projects with second round employment generation effects and the crowding-in effect on the private sector*

**Recommendation 8:** *Ipelegeng should be redesigned to take on board gender, age, health status and different group specific issues. Such a re-design would look, for example, at the needs of women in terms of their mothering and nursing roles as well as their household responsibilities. Consideration should be given to providing relevant facilities that are complementary to women’s responsibilities. Work schedules would also have to consider minimizing the participation costs that both gender groups face. Use of piece-rate and task based payment must be explored where feasible.*

**Recommendation 9:** *Ipelegeng should review and upgrade its Health and Safety guidelines.*

### **Efficiency Issues**

In terms of IP efficiency, it is not possible to conclude that the Ipelegeng resources have been efficiently deployed and utilized for the following reasons:

- 1) Human input in the form of labour is the major resource for Ipelegeng. However, Ipelegeng does not seem to take into account the special circumstances of the different participants in assigning them work. For example, women have special needs, the elderly have special needs and the same applies to the youth. Treating them as identical groups does not only increase costs to the individuals but also to the Programme.
- 2) There is a major problem with health and safety issues pertaining particularly to females in this programme e.g. lack of protective clothing
- 3) Focus Group Discussions and Key Informants interviews have revealed that the absence of IP clear Guidelines has led to too much use of discretion which has in turn resulted in major variations on how the programme is implemented across districts. This has



frustrated proper implementation of the programme.

- 4) There is evidence of improper use of time through late reporting for duty, shirking and absenteeism. Equipment abuse seems to be existent in the programme.
- 5) Lack of clear objectives, existence of negative attitudes towards the programme, inadequate staffing and weak institutional arrangement have led to weak implementation of the programme as well as bad supervision of projects rendering the programme inefficient and unable to deliver value for money that Government spends on this programme.

### ***Recommendations***

***Recommendation 10:*** Government must undertake a cost benefit analysis of engaging the Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations to supervise the design and implementation of some Ipelegeng projects.

***Recommendation 11*** New comprehensive guidelines for the programme should be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, including Ipelegeng beneficiaries

### **Impact Issues**

#### ***Main Findings***

When all the evidence is considered, this evaluation process concludes that Ipelegeng has had both negative and positive impacts, some of them intended and some unintended. This conclusion is based on the followings findings:

1. Response from IP beneficiaries regarding the programme's effect on poverty alleviation is that there has been some positive effect on welfare. The beneficiaries were able to confirm that they were aware of people who had benefited from IP and are now better off. They also testified that they were aware of de-registered able bodied people from the destitute programme who now work for Ipelegeng. This notwithstanding, complimentary information from FGDs shows that this achievement has only been in terms of relief and not on poverty eradication per se.
2. IP beneficiaries do not seem to believe that the introduction of IP in the urban centres has led to increased rural urban migration but instead believe that the permanent nature of the programme has ameliorated the movement of people from rural to urban centres.

3. The Ipelegeng programme has created a positive environment for economic growth in the rural economy. This has been confirmed by both programme beneficiaries and key informants.
4. While IP beneficiaries are of the view that Ipelegeng has not killed the spirit of self-reliance, FGDs and key informants interviews are of the view that IP has significantly harmed this spirit. Ever increasing numbers of applicant for the programme seem to bear testimony to increased dependency on the programme at the expense of other economic activities. For example, arable agriculture and livestock farming seem to have suffered from this effect most.
5. There is complete concurrence among all stakeholders that Ipelegeng has led to the reduction of both crime and alcoholism. Now that the formerly unemployed are working, shebeens no longer open in the morning but only open toward late afternoon. Community policing has also boosted crime monitoring.

### **Recommendation**

**Recommendation 12:** *Re-design Ipelegeng in a manner that enhances complementarity between this programme and other programmes and other Economic Activities. In a properly designed Ipelegeng, Agriculture should not compete with Ipelegeng for labour. Proper time scheduling for Ipelegeng should make it possible for labour to be shared between economic activities and these sectors.*

### **Sustainability Issues**

#### **Main findings**

The sustainability of the benefits so far derived from the Ipelegeng Programme is highly questionable especially if Government support for the programme was to decline. This conclusion is premised on the following findings from the study.

- 1) It is not apparent that Ipelegeng programme design had in it the implicit and not explicit intention that beneficiaries should graduate from the programme and move to high income earning activities. Information from the participants indicates that not many of them have graduation among their objectives
- 2) The fact that not many of these beneficiaries are combining participation in IP with other income generating activities makes potential for graduation very much unlikely.
- 3) The participant's appetite for getting involved in other economic empowerment programmes seems to be very low as can be read from the high knowledge about these

programmes but very few participation in terms of applications for funding from these programmes and schemes.

### ***Recommendation***

***Recommendation 13:*** Government should consider involving the private sector in the funding and execution of the IP. Not only will this reduce the burden on the fiscus but it will also enhance the quality and usefulness of project activity selection and implementation. For example, in urban areas partnership with the private sector to run kindergartens or play schools might be attractive to the industrial sector. Such moves will no doubt crowd -in the private sector while at the same time lessening pressure on the fiscus.

## **IP Institutional Issues**

### **Main findings**

The fragmented and disjointed nature of Ipelegeng activities (i.e. scattered all over the different government ministries and departments, local authorities and the private sector), makes it virtually impossible for MLG to monitor and coordinate IP effectively. Failure of the Ipelegeng projects is attributed to fragmentation where there is lack of inter-sectoral collaboration or a holistic approach to poverty eradication.

In the light of the above finding, the main recommendation is that, the Government should re-design Ipelegeng in a manner that enhances complementarity between this programme and other programmes and other economic activities. In a properly designed Ipelegeng Agriculture should not compete with Ipelegeng for labour. Proper time scheduling for Ipelegeng should make it possible for labour to be shared between economic activities and sectors.

### ***Recommendations***

***Recommendation 14:*** Re-locate the Ipelegeng function to the Department of Community Development at district level. This will enable the Programme to be properly staffed with permanent staff that will provide institutional memory, capacity building in both programme planning, design and execution. This will also make it possible to establish a Monitoring and Evaluation function in the programme.

***Recommendation 15:*** The Ministry of Local Government should draw a Strategic Plan as well as an Operational Plan for the programme. The process of drawing such a plan will assist IP

*management understand why some of the best practice PWP requirements are necessary and how they can be operationalized through programme design and implementation*

***Recommendation 16:*** *All line ministries and departments responsible for poverty eradication should have included in their budgets Ipelegeng votes. That will not only improve the coordination of IP activities but it will also increase the departments' commitment and accountability for IP implementation.*

***Recommendation 17:*** *As a strategic, nationally important project, the Ipelegeng budget must be drawn along standard district lines and not along constituency boundaries as is currently the case. This will reduce the unnecessary expenses incurred in some regions.*

## **PART A**

### **Section 1: Background and Introduction**

#### **1.1 Purpose of the Review**

The Government of Botswana and UNICEF initiated a process that sought to evaluate the Public Works Programme currently known as Ipelegeng. This is a programme whose origins date as far back as the 1960s. It has evolved from being a drought relief and emergency programme to a permanent programme. It has changed from payment in food items to monetary terms. It has over the years changed to being a predominately rural based programme to be both rural and urban based. The need for this evaluation was triggered by the review of the Social Policy Development Frame Work exercise which recommended that Ipelegeng must be evaluated and accordingly the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) was requested to do so. The same recommendation was made by the Rural Development Council in 2010 following the general complaints from the public that Ipelegeng wages were too low.

The stated objectives of the evaluation were the following:

- To make recommendations on measures that will ensure viability and sustainability of the programme
- To put together a report outlining the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, success and draw backs of the Ipelegeng activities with regards to poverty alleviation
- To provide an outline of strategies to determine future manpower needs
- To make recommendations on the way forward for Ipelegeng within the context of a broader social development framework
- To make recommendations on cost effective enhancement

The Terms of Reference for the study were as follows:

ToR 1: Assess and explain the relevance of the Ipelegeng Programme. To what extent is it an appropriate strategy for poverty reduction within the social development of Botswana?

ToR 2: Assess and explain the effectiveness of the Ipelegeng Programme

ToR 3: Assess and explain the efficiency of the Ipelegeng programme and the capacities of agencies responsible for it.

ToR 4: Assess and explain the impact of the Ipelegeng Programme, its implementation modalities, in relation to other government programmes or initiatives

ToR 5: On the basis of the findings, make and justify recommendations and adjustments to the programme and to policy, institutional, planning, budgeting and implementation arrangements that delivers it

ToR 6: Make and justify recommendations on alternative strategies that would be more effective and efficient in achieving the poverty reduction objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme

ToR 7: Provide plans, budgets and timelines for the recommended actions

## 1.2 Approach used

The Review of Ipelegeng Programme study was a national study. The following geographic areas were represented in the sample:

Table 1. 1: Sample areas according to Urban, Urban Village, Rural and Remote areas

<b>District</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Urban Village</b>	<b>Rural Areas</b>	<b>Remote</b>
Central				
Tutume Sub			Nata	
Boteti			Letlhakane	Xere
Selibe Phikwe	Selibe Phikwe		Sefhophe	
Mahalapye		Mahalapye	Dibete	
Chobe		Kasane	Kazungula lesoma	
North-West		Maun	Shorobe Toteng	
Ghanzi		Gantsi		Dkar West Hanahai
Kgalagadi			Kang	Phuduhudu
Gaborone	Gaborone			
Kgatleng		Mochudi	Bokaa	
Kweneng			Letlhakeng	Serinane

## **Research Team and Localities**

BIDPA recruited six (6) research assistants and three (3) data entry clerks. Two teams were then formed each consisting of two (2) research supervisors and three (3) enumerators. Team A covered the following areas: Nata, Kasane, Kazungula, Lesoma, Selibe Phikwe, Sefhophe, Mahalapye and Dibete. Team B went to Letlhakane, Xere, Maun, Toteng, Shorobe, D'kar, Gantsi, West Hanahai, Kang and Phuduhudu. Interviews in Gaborone, Mochudi, Bokaa, Letlhakeng and Serinane were conducted by both teams.

## **Field Work/ Data Collection**

Prior to going to the field, the research team conducted a one day training for both the research supervisors and research assistants. The purpose of the training was to familiarize the field work team with the data collection tools and also to provide them with an opportunity to practice with the data collection tool before field work. The tools were then pre-tested in Mogoditshane prior to the actual study. The purpose of the pre-test was to prepare for the full-scale study by refining interview skills and improving the quality of the interview instrument. Results from the pre-test assisted the research team in refining the questionnaire and interview guides as well as resolve other issues that arose during the pre-test..

Data collection started shortly after the training. Once in the field, the research assistants worked closely with their supervisors, IP coordinators and the Regional IP Coordinators. Data collection instruments were the questionnaire for the quantitative survey and an interview guide for qualitative (i.e. in-depth interviews with key informants and focus group discussions). Fieldwork took place between 15<sup>th</sup> November and 26<sup>th</sup> December 2011. Secondary research comprised of extensive review of international, regional and local literature on Public Works Programmes (PWPs) national and districts reports on the Ipelegeng Programme, Poverty Reduction documents, National Policies, Vision 2016, and other relevant literature and research reports.

## **1.3 Organisation of the Report**

The report is organized in two parts. Part A deals with the background to the study, conceptual framework and research methodologies used in the study. Part B deals with data analysis. Part A has four sections organized as follows: Section 1 is the Background and Introduction of the review covering the purpose, objectives and approach of the review. Section 2 gives the literature Review on Poverty Alleviation programmes and Ipelegeng related programmes and their reviews and assessments. Section 3 provides the theoretical and conceptual positioning of the study. Using Public Works Programmes (PWPs) best practices as a framework, the study examines the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability of IP as a strategy for poverty eradication in Botswana. The conceptual Framework will guide and inform all the

recommendations for the revised or “new” Ipelegeng. Section 4 provides a detailed outline of the methodology that was used by the study.

Part B starts with Section 5 which analyses and reports on household data. Section 6 analyses data on Relevance while Section 7 uses field data to evaluate Ipelegeng’s effectiveness. Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability of Ipelegeng are evaluated in section 8, 9 and 10 respectively. Section 11 looks at program design and institutional issues and Section 12 gives a summary of recommendations for the revised ipelegeng program and the implementation strategy. Section 13 is the indicative plan, essentially informed by the recommendations emerging from the data.



## **Section 2: Literature Review on Poverty Alleviation Programmes and IP related Programmes and their Reviews and Assessments**

### **2.1 Botswana Economic Situation: A brief overview**

When viewed from the continental and regional perspective, Botswana's economic situation continues to be impressive, although declining in recent years as the slow down in the world economy affects mineral exports, in particular diamonds. The transformation of the Botswana's economy from one of the poorest economies in the world to a middle income country with an enviable per capita GDP record has been attributed to fiscal discipline and sound economic management of mineral revenues, in which diamonds are predominant. Available data shows that over the past several decades, the economy grew by an estimated annual growth rate of about 8 percent. Diamond mining has fueled much of the expansion and currently accounts for more than one-third of the GDP. Much of the mineral wealth has been invested in social and physical infrastructure as well as services leading to a great progression in terms of social development indicators (See Vision 2016: Botswana Performance Report 2009; Botswana Millennium Development Goals Status Report, 2010). Provision of basic social services such as education, health, housing, water and sanitation has had a tremendous impact on poverty reduction. Data from successive Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) shows that the percentage of households and individuals with incomes below the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) has continued to decline. Using the measure of those who lived on less than US \$1 per day, in 2002/03 about 30.6 percent of the population was defined as living below the PDL while in 2009/2010 the figure further declined to 20.7 percent (CSO, 2008; Statistics Botswana, 2011). This means that Botswana strategy of re-investing the proceeds from economic development into social development has so far been successful.

### **2.2 Economic Growth, Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality**

However, the above achievements notwithstanding, poverty, unemployment and inequality still remain very high and therefore a challenge for the country. With respect to poverty, data obtained from the Central Statistics Office shows that poverty in Botswana is still deep and responds slowly to growth. Available data shows that poverty figures have gone down from the high of 59% in 1985/86; to 47% in 1993/94 and 30.6% in 2002/2003 (CSO, 2008a). Recent estimates from the Botswana Core Welfare Indicators (Poverty) Survey report 2009/10 put the number of Botswana below the poverty datum line at about 20.7 percent in 2009/10 (Statistics Botswana, 2011). While there is evidence from available data to suggest that poverty in Botswana has been on the decline over the years, poverty rates are still relatively high when Botswana is compared to countries of similar economic status such as Tunisia.

Poverty in Botswana is concentrated mostly in the remote areas of the country, especially in the western parts of Botswana, including; Western Kweneng, Ghanzi, Kgalagadi and Ngamiland districts (CSO, 2008a). The groups identified as highly affected are the remote areas dwellers (RADs), the youth, the elderly, orphans, people living with disability and female-headed households.

Given the persistence of poverty, a number of studies have been conducted over the past several decades to find out the root causes of poverty (BIDPA, 1996/7; RNPRD, 2002; NSPR, 2003, Vision, 2016, UNDP, 2007). Several factors have been identified as the root causes of poverty in Botswana, namely:

1. Harsh climatic conditions
2. Lack of employment opportunities
3. Lack of vocational and entrepreneurial skills
4. HIV and AIDS
5. Inappropriate targeting of development programmes and assistance policies

Related to the above, BIDPA 1997, identified the following causes of poverty, including; drought, lack of education and skills, lack of productive assets, policy failure and inappropriate targeting of programmes, the decline of traditional support mechanisms such as extended family and *mafisa*, and problems related to market access and low producer prices (BIDPA, 1997: 65).

Whilst it is true that poverty declined in towns, cities and large villages, the level of poverty remains very high in small rural and remote villages. The poverty map produced by the Central Statistics Office (2008) revealed poverty levels of between 40-60% in some small and remote villages in the western and north-western parts of Botswana. Poverty was also found to be high among women particularly female-headed households and the youth.

Inequality is still very high as reflected by a huge gap between the rich and poor which continue to widen. This means that the benefits of rapid economic growth have not been spread evenly across the population. The disparities exist between the different income groups with the highest incomes (i.e. those in the formal sector accruing more benefits than those engaged in the informal sector and agricultural activities, or unemployed. They have remained poor over the years and their quality of life has continued to decline. Low incomes accompanied by high poverty levels are concentrated in the rural areas which have stagnated for many years (UN Systems, 2007).

In terms of unemployment, it has remained high particularly amongst the youth and in the rural areas. According to the Botswana Labour Force Survey (2005/06), unemployment rate has been high at 17 per cent. (CSO, 2008b). Further, the Botswana Labor Force Survey revealed that the

level of unemployment is high particularly when discouraged job seekers are taken into consideration. It shows that out of 248 812 people that are unemployed, more than 50 percent (134 770) have stopped looking for employment. The Survey indicates that women are overrepresented in the low paying informal sector. Unemployment has been found to be more acute in remote settlements, where employment opportunities are almost non-existent resulting in widespread cases of joblessness, marginalization, anguish and social deviance. Since 2009, the *Ipelegeng* programme has sought to respond to the problems of joblessness on a more permanent basis. *Ipelegeng* is seen as a strategy that provides employment opportunities for able bodied low skilled workers in both rural and urban communities especially for women, orphans and remote area dwellers.

### 2.3 Response to poverty

Poverty has been the subject of discussion in Botswana's development agenda since Independence. Poverty is a complex phenomena, it has many dimensions and manifest itself in different ways. For this reason, responses to poverty are many and varied. To the extent that poverty is a complex phenomenon, its reduction, alleviation and eradication has always assumed centrality in the Botswana Government policy objectives.

Response to poverty has been articulated in a variety of national strategic documents, including: All National Development Plans (NDP 1 – 10); National Policy on Rural Development (1972 & 1973) – revised (2002); Remote Area Development Programme (1978); The National Policy on Agricultural Development (1991); Community-Based Strategy for Rural Development (1997); Vision 2016 (1997); National Master Plan for Arable Agriculture and Dairy Development (NAMPAAD, 2002); the National Destitute Policy (1980 Revised, 2002); The National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (2003); Community-Based Natural Resource Management (2007); Strategic Framework for Community Development (2010) and the Social Development Policy Framework for Botswana (2011); United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2010 – 2015), Botswana Millennium Development Goals Status Report, 2010 and Economic Diversification Drive (2010).

Among the above strategic documents, **one of the core** strategies laid down by the Botswana Government to respond to poverty in all its manifestations is the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR, 2003)

The overall thrust of the NSPR was to link and harmonise all anti-poverty reduction initiatives, provide opportunities for people to have sustainable livelihoods through expansion of employment opportunities and improved access to social investment, and to monitor progress against poverty. The strategy provides the policy and implementation framework for the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets and the Vision 2016 aspirations and seeks to achieve the objectives of the national planning principle of social justice.

The overall strategic focus of NSPR was to:

1. Provide opportunities for sustainable livelihood
2. Enhance the capabilities of the poor through social investment in services and infrastructure (schools, clinics, water and roads)
3. Provision of social safety nets for those unable to take advantage of expanded employment opportunities, government undertakes to provide well targeted social safety nets to prevent people facing specific risks and vulnerabilities from falling into abject poverty
4. Promoting participation of the poor through strengthening their organization and delivery capacity, enabling them to influence local government and hold it accountable and to influence policy making
5. Strengthening institutional capacity at both central and local government level, to formulate policy and effectively manage anti-poverty initiatives

Through the policies, programmes and strategies referred to above, the Government of Botswana sought to provide a wide range of economic empowerment schemes, welfare programmes, and safety nets with a view to mitigate, minimize and reduce (and lately eradicate) the poverty on vulnerable households. One of the most effective approaches to poverty eradication is the creation of employment opportunities for Botswana.

The central thrust of poverty reduction is therefore the facilitation of employment growth sufficient to provide viable, sustainable livelihoods for those members of the working age population who wish to work, whether in wage employment or self-employment. This is a clear recognition that in Botswana, unemployment is the main cause of poverty. Addressing the problem requires (i) high rates of economic growth and (ii) that growth to be reasonably labor intensive.

The above notwithstanding, it is important to point out that the above responses have yet to bear fruit. Persistent efforts have been made over the years but poverty continue to be illusive i.e. the results from the above strategies have generally been disappointing. To this end, there is need to continue to develop robust poverty reduction strategies. In the light of the above, the current administration has committed to confront extreme/chronic poverty head-on by targeting and providing employment opportunities for the poor unskilled workers through the Ipelegeng programme.

## **2.4 Ipelegeng Programme**

The Botswana Government has, since independence, pursued poverty reduction as one of its development strategies. Concerted efforts to reduce poverty have been expressed in a number of

strategic policy documents referred to above. In recent years, in particular since 2008, a number of measures have been initiated geared towards poverty reduction, one such measure which has been pursued with vigor and enthusiasm is Ipelegeng.

#### **2.4.1 Historical perspectives: Evolution of the Ipelegeng Programme**

Historically, the notion of *Ipelegeng* is premised on the spirit of self-help, self-reliance and people centred development. The three concepts have been an integral part of the culture and traditions of the Botswana society since from time immemorial. Broadly, *Ipelegeng* seeks to promote people-centered development i.e. the promotion of citizen participation in a decentralized and needs oriented programme planning and decision-making. *Ipelegeng* as a formal policy and/or programme approach to poverty reduction and employment creation in the rural areas was popularized by Botswana's founding President Sir Seretse Khama immediately after the country attained independence in 1966. At the time, Botswana was experiencing what was termed "the worst drought in living memory" and hence the urgent need for an effective national response to address the debilitating drought situation. Drought relief support measures were provided by the World Food Programme to assist the poor and vulnerable households. In exchange for food, the able bodied Batswana were expected to work on community development projects. This arrangement, commonly referred to as the "Food for Work" became a rallying strategy for community self-development, translated literally to mean "*Ipelegeng*".

#### **Labour Based Drought Relief Program (LBDRP)**

The purpose of LBDRP was to alleviate the effects of drought among Batswana living in the rural areas. Labour Based Drought Relief projects benefited all the able bodied in the rural areas that had lost their source of livelihoods because of drought. No means testing was used to select participants. However, a rota system was developed to ensure that there was maximum participation of the intended beneficiaries. Available figures reveal that during the 1980's, 296,000 job opportunities were created under this program, employing 20% of the rural working population, 80% being women. During the 1992/93 drought, over 400,000 people received food aid and about 100,000 people were employed in the reactivated drought relief projects. The 1995/96 drought on the other hand, created a total of 38,558 jobs involving 61,693 workers. The cumulative number of people employed under the 2003/04 was 121,599 workers comprising of 98,968 females and 22,631 males against a total of 1362 projects (Republic of Botswana, 2005). A daily rate of P10.00 was given to each participant. Supervisors on the other hand received P16.00. These amounts were adjustable given the cost of living index in a given period.

In his foreword to the National Development Plan 1 (NDP, 1) (1968-73), Sir Seretse Khama captured the spirit of *Ipelegeng* thus:

At village level the spirit of self-reliance will be fostered by the creation of Village Development Committees (VDCs) working closely with District Councils and Central Government. The time has come for everyone to realize that immediate improvements in living standards can be delivered through individual effort and initiative rather than through the charity of others. The National Development Plan set out in detail the tasks to be tackled. Every Motswana must play his part.

The relative success of *Ipelegeng* in the late 1960s led to a shift from “food for work” to a strategy that is geared towards increasing rural incomes, employment creation and strengthening the rural economy in order to reduce poverty and improve rural livelihoods. These initiatives were contained in the White Paper No 1 of 1972 and No 2 of 1973 (The Rural Development Policy, 1972/73). The major thrust of the policy was to create productive employment opportunities in order to reduce the number of people with no visible means of support. To achieve this noble objective, a number of policies were initiated, including; Financial Assistance Policy (FAP, 1982); National Policy on Agricultural Development (1991); Communal First Development Programme (1982) and the introduction of the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme (LG 38) or *Namola Leuba* during NDP 4 (1976-81) and NDP5 (1979-85).

The long drought period which ravaged the country from 1981-1987 saw a further consolidation of initiatives to improve the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme? New initiatives were evident during NDP 6 (1985-1991), NDP 7 (1991-1997), NDP8 (1997-2003), and NDP 9 (2003-09) where the programme was split into two components, namely: The Permanent Labour Intensive Public Works Programme and the Temporary Programme. The permanent programme was meant to provide a permanent solution to the ever increasing problems of unemployment in both the rural and urban centers of Botswana while the temporary one was meant to respond to emergencies occasioned by drought and other natural disasters. *LBD RP* was intended to provide short- term employment support for citizens during the drought years and as such the wages were set low so as not to attract the skilled labour but to sustain the poor. *LBRP* engaged the unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the construction and maintenance of public facilities. (Seleka et al 2007). *LG 117*- had the same set up as the *LBD RP* except that it was funded during non drought years and operated at a very low key covering both rural and urban districts. Even though drought relief was implemented by all districts, it was confined to rural districts where it was intended to provide short-term employment support for citizens during the drought years.

## **2.5 Previous Reviews of Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes**

As indicated above, the Government of Botswana formally introduced Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes in the 1960s as a chief strategy to respond to the effects of the debilitating and recurring drought in the country, particularly as it affected the poor and vulnerable households in the rural and remote areas. Subsequent programs with more or less similar

objectives were introduced in the early 1982, 1990s, 2000 and beyond. The Government in introducing Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes, gave several reasons for this move. First, the programmes were to provide relief to those badly afflicted by drought i.e. relieve human suffering to avoid loss of life. Second, it was to provide employment opportunities by engaging people in local development projects (to provide income support through working and earning rather than receiving handouts). A third benefit for the programme is that it provided a focal point for targeted social development assistance (social protection).

The major advantage is that the programs have brought obvious relief from hunger and malnutrition to the poor and vulnerable in the rural and remote settlements. It has brought infrastructural developments in the form of rural roads, construction of school houses, dams and above all, it has created employment opportunities and provided the much needed income for the poor households in the rural areas (GoB/UNDP, 2002).

However, it became clear over the years that the objectives of the Drought Relief and Drought Recovery Programmes have not been totally achieved. There were concerns that these programmes had failed to improve the quality of life of the intended beneficiaries but instead made the poor rural households highly dependent on the government to provide employment (a source of cash income) under the drought public works programme. Unfortunately, the situation was worsened by the fact that, like many other government programmes Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes were transmitted in a “top down” non-consultative and paternalistic manner that often took the form of directives that effectively disempowers the intended beneficiaries.

It was perhaps against this background that the Government of Botswana has over past decades undertaken several evaluations of the Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes. The most notable evaluations undertaken were:

1. Evaluation of Labor Related Projects in Drought Relief and Development (1981)
2. Evaluation of the Drought Relief and Recovery Programme, 1982-90. (1990)
3. Review of Labour Based Public Works (1996)
4. Review of Anti-Poverty Initiatives in Botswana: Lessons for a National Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002)

The overall objectives of the evaluations were to determine the extent to which drought relief and recovery programmes were working and able to deliver on their mandates, in particular to mitigate the impact of drought through provision of drought relief (food) and labor intensive public works projects. Put differently, the evaluations sought to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and to some extent the sustainability of these programmes.

Although the evaluations carried over the years acknowledged that some achievements have been made, particularly in terms of the numbers of poor people that were engaged in the projects and that no one died from hunger or malnutrition, the Drought Relief and Recovery programmes have been unable to satisfactorily achieve the objectives of reducing poverty, improving incomes and employment and general quality of life. While these objectives remain of critical importance, there is an urgent need to determine more effective ways that can make them realizable. Information gleaned from the evaluations cited above reveal that the short comings of the Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes far out-weigh their successes and that there is a gap between programme objectives and the translation of these objectives into action. For example, the 1981 evaluation of labor related projects in drought relief and development (Toby Gooch & John MacDonald, 1981) found that implementation of Labour Intensive Public Works (LG 38) was said not to be successful and would never be successful in its current form as it was largely confused with drought relief projects and lacked technical, managerial and supervisory staff to plan and implement it.

Perhaps the most comprehensive evaluation of the Drought Relief and Recovery programme was the one undertaken by the Oxford Food Studies Group (FSG, 1982-90). The study sought to capture the lessons learned during the implementation of drought relief programs in the 1980s, locate drought preparedness and response within the context of rural economic development. Further, the study assessed the impact of numerous drought relief and recovery packages introduced overtime (a period of 6 years) such as destumping, livestock assistance, water supplies, food, drought power and supplementary feeding.

The evaluation identified a number of challenges faced by LBRP which revolved mainly around implementation and logistics. The challenges included; (i) little or no incentives to work hard and increase productivity (ii) Farmers decried shortage of laborers as more able bodied people leave the land to work for Namola Leuba.

During the 1990s yet another review was conducted. This time around, the focus was on the Labor Based Public Works Programme. The review was conducted by BIDPA as part of the broader study on Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Botswana (BIDPA, 1996/97). The objective of the review was to examine the performance of the Labour Based Drought Relief Programmes and Labour Based Road Programme LG117 (as an example of a more permanent programme) to draw lessons learned and use them to guide and inform the implementation of a national labour intensive scheme, de-linked from drought relief.

Like the Oxford Food Study, the evaluation was comprehensive in nature and sought to investigate a number of issues that were to lead to an improvement of the existing LBDR programmes. The issues investigated included among others; targeting; employment creation (creating source of income for the poor, infrastructure development, drought relief, revamping the spirit of *Ipelegeng* and above all establishment of institutional arrangements for initiating, managing, funding and coordinating national LBPW programmes.



The overall findings of the BIDPA evaluation, like others before it, was that while the program had been successful in creating employment opportunities through construction of rural roads and provided income to poor rural households, there was limited impact on poverty reduction and quality of life has not improved. The critical question was whether employment creation and income accruing from such had alleviated or reduced poverty among the poor. Unfortunately, the answer was no. Lack of success was attributed to LBRP flawed design and lack of supervision for those engaged in the projects.

The review of the Anti-Poverty Initiatives in Botswana of 2002 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offers yet another milestone in Government efforts to understand the nature and causes of relentless and sustained poverty with a view to identify effective solutions to the problem. The study identifies a number of weaknesses that militate against efforts to deliver effectively on LBDR programmes. The challenges include among others; (i) lack of implementation capacity resulting in under utilization of available finance; (ii) high material and supervisory costs relative to the benefits accruing to the participants; (iii) lack of supervision and control has led to poor workmanship in some projects; (iv) political pressure and expediency compromise quality of projects; and (v) drought relief programmes have a tendency of creating dependency syndrome and the creation of ‘artificial’ (subsidized) jobs at the expense of productivity and efficiency.

Furthermore, the study found that the creation of many jobs under the programme does not only lead to low productivity but also result in low quality infrastructure being provided in the rural communities.

In the light of the above findings, a number of recommendations were made to the Government of Botswana in terms of how the programmes under review could be improved. Some of the recommendations are stated below:

1. That LG 38 be improved by having only two programmes: relief works and labor intensive development projects (1981 study)
2. To review the design and conduct of Rural Sector Programmes to ensure that they continue to drought proof the rural economy (1980-1992)
3. To review the role of the private sector and assist the private sector overcome start-up difficulties (1980-1992)
4. To prepare drought standby projects (1980-1992)
5. To prepare a manual on project implementation under drought conditions (1980-1992)
6. To promote small holder arable agriculture (1980-1992)
7. To expand rural public works (1980-1992)

8. To expand rural works programme during drought (1980-1992)
9. To develop a flexible response income support system (1980-1992)
10. To review progress in implementation, monitoring and policy refinement (1980-1992)
11. To consolidate existing committees (1982-1990)
12. Those activities undertaken under the labour intensive public works programme should be biased towards implementation and maintenance activities rather than infrastructure construction (BIDPA, 1996).
13. That the emphasis and priority should be on high labor intensive projects which absorbs a high number of unskilled labor such as de-bushing (BIDPA, 1996).
14. That there should be commitment by the administration arm of Government for LBPW programmes to have a lasting and sustained impact. LBPW programmes should be integrated into recurrent activity and not be isolated and divorced from on-going development, delivery and maintenance of services and infrastructure. Also for the LBPW programmes to succeed there has to be a strong, long term political support and commitment (BIDPA, 1996).
15. That a minimum of 6 hours work day for the beneficiaries be set and implemented (BIDPA, 1996).
16. That there is need to adopt the Statutory Minimum Wage (in construction sector) as a means for establishing the wage rate under a national labour intensive public works programme (BIDPA, 1996).
17. That employees under this scheme should be designated as employees for the purposes of employment legislation and enjoy the full benefits contained therein (BIDPA, 1996).
18. That LBPW be extended to the urban areas (BIDPA, 1996).
19. That wherever possible labour based schemes should be designed to maximize potential use of private supervisory and technical skills (BIDPA, 1996).

It is important to point out that the above recommendations have implications for the present review of the Ipelegeng Programme because they provide guidance on what was recommended in the past and whether that was accepted or rejected. Also if accepted were the recommendations followed through and implemented and with what challenges and shortcomings.

It is important to point out that most of the recommendations made during the review of the Drought Relief and Recovery Programmes were fully supported and only a few were rejected

(See Government Response to the Report on the Evaluation of the Drought Relief and Recovery Programme 1982-1990. Government White Paper No.2 of 1992). However, it is not clear whether those that were accepted were fully implemented.

The review of the Drought Relief and Recovery programmes has in many ways provided a solid foundation to launch the current Ipelegeng Programme. Clearly, there are challenges hence an urgent need to determine how these challenges could be addressed. Essentially, in order to be relevant, Ipelegeng should draw lessons from the general failures of the programmes discussed above and build on their strengths. The main argument is that it is necessary to develop social protection programs for the poor and vulnerable members of society with a view to cushion them against any natural or man made shocks.

Unlike drought, poverty was recognized to be prevalent in both rural and urban areas. The main objective of the programme is to provide relief and at the same time carry out essential development projects that have been identified and prioritized through the normal development planning process. The programme is coordinated at Ministerial level by the Ministry of Local Government and District level by District/Urban Drought Committees. Selection of beneficiaries is conducted by the VDCs (Department of Local Government Development Planning 2009). Ipelegeng targets everyone who is 18 years and above. According to Presidential Directive CAB 43(A)/2010, IP wages were increased from P360 and P528 to the current P400 and P534 for laborers and supervisors respectively. The number of working days is 20 in a month.

Since then *Ipelegeng* became a permanent feature in Botswana's development planning until to date. Currently, there is a growing appreciation that the prospects for strengthening the rural and urban economy and improving livelihoods depend upon giving communities more responsibilities for their own development. Lately, this thinking has been expressed by His Excellency, President Ian Khama Seretse Khama in his emphasis on the need to promote people-centered development (See State of the Nation Address, November, 2010). It has been established that the most prevalent form of poverty in Botswana was income poverty. *Ipelegeng* was designed to expand economic activity for the unemployed and reduce poverty.

## **2.6 Recent Developments – Context of the evaluation**

Concerns about poverty and its debilitating effects have been expressed in numerous strategic policy documents referred to above. The introduction of the *Ipelegeng* programme recognizes the shortcomings of some of these strategies and builds on their strengths. Ipelegeng seeks to confront poverty head-on by targeting the poor unskilled workers and providing them with employment opportunities.

Government established *Ipelegeng* (formerly Drought Relief and later Labor Intensive Public Works Programme (LG 1107) in 2009 on a permanent basis with a view to create employment opportunities for the able bodied poor in both rural and urban areas. The programme had the same set up as the Drought Relief Programme except that it is funded during non drought years covering both rural and urban districts. Ipelegeng has become one of the most preferred strategies for poverty reduction/eradication at household level. In recent years, *Ipelegeng* has taken centre stage and seeks to achieve some of the aspirations articulated by President Seretse Khama Ian Khama 5 Ds development strategy, in particular the 3 Ds of “development” “dignity” and “delivery”.

When President Seretse Khama Ian Khama took over office in 2008, he pronounced that during his term in office, the major focus will be on: (i) poverty eradication and (ii) citizen economic empowerment. The *Ipelegeng* programme was seen as one of the strategies through which such objectives could be realized.

Furthermore, the State of the Nation address delivered by President Khama in November 2010, also underscore the primacy of *Ipelegeng* and its potential to contribute significantly to poverty eradication. In his address to the nation recently, His Excellency, President Khama reported that the *Ipelegeng* programme has hitherto created approximately 50,000 jobs to the low income households in both the rural and urban centres. The President has since made poverty eradication a priority for his administration. He has moved the coordination of poverty policies and programmes to his office, placed poverty high on the priorities of the Economic Committee of Cabinet, and demanded policy and programme reforms to give added impetus to the quest to eradicate poverty (Botswana MDG Status Report 2010) Among the top priority anti-poverty initiatives is the *Ipelegeng* Programme.

The previous sections (sections 1 and 2) have provided an anchor to the IP study. Section one provided the background and approach to the study. Section 2 provided a historical anchor to the study. It reviews the literature on poverty alleviation in Botswana, including Ipelegeng. This section is important because it documents the history of IP as a development concept (that belongs to the family of public works programmes) and a poverty alleviation initiative and how it has found its way into the current debates on the search for robust poverty eradication initiatives. The conclusion reached is that as currently constituted Ipelegeng has all the features of a well designed public works programme (see section 12) for details relating to compliance. The difficulties are experienced at implementation level and this is what IP has to work on seriously.

The next section, section 3, provides a conceptual framework for the study. This section reviews the literature on Public Works Programmes in the different regions and countries of the world, including India, Latin America, Ethiopia and South Africa. Through this section, the study has identified the best features of well designed Public Works Programmes. The features, so identified will be used throughout the study to guide and inform emerging recommendations

from the data analysis. The recommendations will guide the design and implementation of a “new” Ipelegeng Programme in Botswana. Further, a comparison is made between IP and other PWPs in other countries to determine the extent to which IP has incorporated what is internationally considered to be the best features of a well designed PWPs.

## **Section 3: Conceptual Framework and Different Country Experiences**

### **3.0 Introduction**

The main purpose of this section is to review the literature on PWPs and draw from the same the best practice features of Public Works Programmes (PWPs). These are the features that the review will use to assess the current features of Ipelegeng in terms of how they relate to best practice in Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and sustainability. The section seeks to answer the question: For a PWPs intervention to be judged as relevant, what is the primary criterion that such a programme should meet? The same question goes for Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability. Furthermore, the wisdom drawn from the conceptual framework section will be used to guide and inform the formulation of recommendations on how Ipelegeng should be redesigned with a view to incorporate all the features of well designed PWPs.

### **3.1 What are Public Works Programmes (PWPs)?**

Subbarao (2003) has described Public Works Programmes as those that typically provide short term employment at low wages for the unskilled and semiskilled people on labour intensive projects. They provide income support to the poor at critical times. They are therefore an instrument for mitigating the negative effects of adverse climatic changes and systemic risks for the poor farmers. They also serve as a waiting room for unskilled and semi-skilled workers who may have been adversely affected by shifts or stagnations in the formal labour markets. Lal et al (2010) concurs with this view by referring to these projects as serving as shock absorbers “without being too little too late while at the same time strengthening the State’s capacity to provide support to livelihood strategies”. When properly designed these projects address both transient poverty and chronic poverty unlike cash transfer programs that by nature only address chronic poverty.

There is a broad consensus in the literature that when properly designed, in addition to addressing poverty issues, PWPs can be used to provide critical public goods and service shortages thereby creating second round effects in employment creation and economic growth.

McCords (2000) provide four types of PWPs. These are briefly stated below:

**Type A:** A single short-term episode of employment.

**Type B:** Large scale Government employment programmes that may offer some form of employment guarantee.

**Type C:** Promotes the labour intensification of Government Infrastructure spending.

**Type D:** Programs that enhance employability.

Although PWP are crisis based in that they target short term problems, literature indicates that there is an increased tendency for these projects to move towards being more comprehensive and long term in orientation. McCord (Ibid) has called this “A gradual shift in a system dominated by emergency humanitarianism to production of safety nets via a multi-year framework”. This move is motivated by the State’s need to build capacity and flexibility to deliver such programmes through well thought out and planned programmes.

One other pertinent feature of PWDs is that they provide universal coverage in employment and are self targeting in that they are supposed to provide work to every willing adult willing to work and is able to work at a determined wage rate. It is in this regard that some have called the PWDs Employers of the Last Resort (ELR). Invariably, resource limitation will necessitate targeting and rationing. The self-targeting concept will be further elucidated later in subsequent sections.

The main providers of PWPs as indicated in the literature are small private sector contractors, Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Social Investment Funds. These groups involvement provides a channel through which PWPs generate second round effects on employment creation.

In conclusion, it can be stated that while PWDs are mainly designed to address systemic crises, they can be short or long term in nature, and they preoccupy themselves with both poverty and employment issues and may have multi-faceted objectives that are both social and economic.

An close look at the design of the present IP is that it has almost all the features of a well designed PWPs. For example, IP provide short term employment, is labor intensive and focuses on the poor who join the programme through self-selection. Its major short coming is that at the level of implementation IP fails to incorporate these features.

### **3.2 Public Works Programmes Rationale**

Subbarao (2003) identify five common reasons for the establishment of PWPs.. **First**, the programmes serve as insurance for the poor by providing income transfers at critical times. **Second**, they provide consumption smoothing for the poor when there is draught or crop failure. In that way human tragedy through starvation is avoided. **Third**, when these programs are well designed they provide useful infrastructure and services that have the potential to generate second round employment creation and economic growth. **Fourth**, that they can be targeted to specific regions in the country that are faced with high unemployment or poverty levels makes

these programmes a useful tool for both social and economic development. *Fifth*, their dependence on small scale private contractors has the potential to boost private sector growth.

Literature has strongly argued that when they are properly designed these pro-poor stabilization programmes are not only good for the poor but are also good for the economy at large for the following reasons:

- i) They can easily be phased in and be made cost-effective through proper design.
- ii) They can be made to be self-targeting thereby reducing their administrative costs.
- iii) Because they address both aggregate supply and aggregate demand aspects of the economy they are less inflationary.
- iv) They can be a source of new growth especially when they are funded through external resources.
- v) They protect or reduce the depreciation of human capital through long term strategies that are forward looking with some inbuilt skills development components.
- vi) Because labour markets do not work for the poor, unskilled and underemployed, these programmes attempt to play the role of integrating this group into the main labour markets through ultimate graduation.

Phillips (2004) has further argued that when properly designed PWPs can also provide:

- a boost to much needed infrastructure and public services
- temporary increase in the income of the poor
- increase in the dignity of the poor and reduction in their alienation
- work experience and can build a skills pool.

Other indirect effects that can be added to the above lists are:

- The strengthening of local government and community institutions by directly involving them in the implementation of these projects.
- Women and youth empowerment can be achieved through a deliberate and purposeful design of these programmes.
- An environment that supports small scale private enterprises can be created by involving them in the implementation of these programmes.

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that the rationale for PWPs goes beyond consumption smoothing and the provision of survival insurance to the poor as it also anchors on economic growth. However, the achievement of these benefits greatly depends on the design of these programmes.

The next section now focuses on the features of a well designed Public Works Program.



### **3.3 Features of a Well Designed Public Works Programme**

Evidence from available literature suggests that the best performing Public Works Programmes design should pay particular attention to the following factors:

- 1) The relation between the PWP wage rate with the minimum wage rate.
- 2) The mode of wage payment
- 3) The quality of projects undertaken under the programmes.
- 4) Labour Intensity of the programmes
- 5) Project Selection, and targeting.
- 6) The complementarity that exists between these programmes and other private sector projects
- 7) Strong institutional arrangements.

#### **3.3.1 Self –Selection by PWP beneficiaries**

The fixing of the PWPs wage rate in relation to that of the labour market is an important policy instrument. When the PWPs wage rate is fixed higher than the market clearing wage rate for unskilled labour, both the poor and non poor will flock to the PWPs to seek employment and this will necessitate job rationing which by nature has high administrative costs. If, on the other hand, the PWPs wage is set below the market rate only the poor will opt to join the PWPs and the non-poor will opt out. This is what self selection means – it assumes that only those who are poor will participate in the Public Works Programmes. Such an approach will minimise administrative costs of the PWPs as there will be no need for any rationing

Related to this is the concept of Transfer Benefits to the PWPs beneficiaries. By definition Transfer Benefits are equal to the PWPs wage minus the cost of participating in the PWP including the opportunity cost of participating in the PWPs. For example, Bus fare for travelling to work constitutes the cost of participating in the PWPs. The remuneration foregone from leaving a job to join PWPs work constitutes the opportunity cost of taking up this job. Similarly, corruption costs by way of having to pay bribes in order to get employed will also constitute part of the participation costs.

The level of transfer benefits will determine whether the intended PWPs beneficiary will ultimately participate in the PWPs or not. When the magnitude of the transfer benefits is too low the intended beneficiary will decide not to participate in the PWPs. When it is lower than the labour market wage rate but reasonably high in terms of the individuals judgement the intended beneficiary will participate. From the PWPs design point of view, the project should set its wage level lower than the market rate to avoid the need for job rationing. Further to that, to ensure that

the programme beneficiaries obtain the maximum possible benefits their participation costs must be kept at their minimum. It is for this reason that PWPs normally recruit from within localities where they are based. Opportunity costs can be minimised through appropriate scheduling of the work timetable. A Public Works Programme that forces beneficiaries to choose between working on their agricultural project and participating in it will have a lower transfer benefit than one that makes it possible for the beneficiary to combine the two.

Empirical evidence has shown that setting PWPs wages lower than the economy market wage rate in order to achieve self selection is not very easy in practice. This approach seems to work only when the official minimum wage is identical to the market clearing wage for the unskilled labour. However, in instances where the minimum wage is higher than the market clearing wage for the unskilled labour, self-selection will fail. This is because when minimum wage is high the likelihood of the PWPs wage being higher than the unskilled market clearing wage will be high. When PWPs wages are higher than the unskilled labour market wage rate, rationing becomes necessary and thus self-selection fails.

Subbarao (2003) cites the Kenyan example where the program rate was set equal to minimum wage which was typically above the unskilled labour market wage. For the Philippines the programme was not only set equal to the minimum wage but in-kind benefits were also accorded the beneficiaries. In both cases substantial numbers of non-poor were attracted to the programs. Examples drawn from Chile, where the programme wage rate was 70 percent of the minimum wage rate indicate success in self-selection. Similar examples have been drawn for the famous Maharashtra State Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) in India. In this respect, it was found that where the wage was doubled with the doubling of the minimum wage in the end the MEGS had to lay off a large number of people.)

### **3.3.2 Mode of Wage Payment**

Mode of payment is another design dimension that has a bearing on self-selection and magnitude of benefit transfer to the poor. Programme participants can be paid in cash or in kind. Subbarao (2003) argues that while in kind payment are more direct to the needs of the poor and are self-targeting they are however cumbersome in that they need costly transport, storage and handling and require considerable supervision attention. Cash payments are the most preferred as they accord the user the opportunity to optimally allocate it to what they need most.

A related dimension is whether participants should be paid a daily rate or piece rate basis or task based. The conventional working day based payment is very demanding on administrative and supervisory requirements. The piece rate approach seems not to favour small groups as they may need more time to deliver the required output and as Subbarao puts it, they may have to exclude themselves from participation. Task based payment methods however are best suited for women

in that this mode of payment gives them a flexible schedule that enables them to perform their multiple tasks.

### **3.3.3 Quality of Projects undertaken under PWP**

When PWPs are financed through the Central fiscus there are trade-offs on projects that Government could have undertaken. It follows from this that assets generated from this expenditure should generate sufficient benefits to offset these trade-offs. It stands to reason that properly designed PWPs should therefore produce high quality assets that also have the potential to generate second round effects. A useful long term impact through PWP projects can be achieved by identifying projects with developmental priorities and forward looking investment that promotes high productive jobs and economic opportunities. Such projects should have high multiplier effects on the growth of the economy. When properly designed, PWPs projects can stimulate and crowd in private sector investment. Their design should thus aim at creating assets and infrastructure that helps increase productivity and competitiveness of the private sector.

### **3.3.4 Labour Intensity**

labour intensity is defined as the proportion of total wages to total cost of the project. The higher the labour cost component as part of total costs of the project, the more the project is considered labour intensive. Wages are broken down into two components, namely: (i) wages going to the poor whom the project is actually targeting and (ii) the PWPs that leaks to the non-poor because they have the opportunity to participate in the programme if the PWP is not properly designed or implemented. In the labour intensity calculation of this leakage is netted out. Therefore labour intensity is not just the proportion of the wage bill to total costs but it is the total proportion of the wage bill going to the poor workers.

According to Subbarao (2003) the level of this ratio is affected by the nature of projects selected by the programme. For example, road maintenance would have a higher labour intensity than road construction. Adalo et al (2001) have on the other hand pointed out that there are high challenges in achieving high labour intensity. They point out that in more than a hundred studies undertaken in South Africa it was found that most construction engineers were averse to adopting labour based production techniques. This averseness emanate from fear for extra supervision needed where large gangs are involved. Subbarao (1999) have also argued that this averseness is also caused by fear of strikes from such large gangs especially when they are paid late.

### **3.3.5 Targeting the Poor**

A properly designed PWP should ensure that the expenditure incurred by the programme accrues to the intended beneficiaries, i.e. the poor. It is for this reason that the concept of Targeted Labour Earnings is used in the literature. This is the proportion of wages paid to the poor to the total wage bill where the total wage bill includes leakage of wage payment made to the non-poor. This concept can be refined further by calculating what is referred to as Net Wage Gain which is the share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting all participation costs including the opportunity cost of participating in the programme. As alluded to earlier, ensuring that these projects are established in locations that are close to the poor's areas of residence and that they compliment, and do not compete with the participant's time on other economic activities will maximise the utility of the projects to the poor. Sabbarao's (1997) work in several developing countries has shown that the proportion of total transfer benefits to the poor in these programmes has ranged from 19 to 93 percent due to the prevalence of improper targeting.

### **3.3.6 Cost-effectiveness of PWPs**

Ravallion (1999) has combined the concepts of labour intensity, targeting performance, net-wage gain and indirect benefits generated from assets created by PWPs to get what is referred to as cost-effectiveness. The results from this exercise show that the cost of transferring US\$1.00 to the poor in a middle- income country with the poverty rate of 20 percent is US\$5.00. For low-income countries with 50% poverty the cost would be US\$3.50. To the extent that the study shows that more is spent on transfer costs than on the actual transfers to the poor implies that PWP are an expensive undertaking that needs to be designed with care to minimise these costs.

### **3.3.7 Complementarity with both Private Sector Activities and other Social Protection Programmes**

Well designed PWPs should try to maximise synergies between its self and other programmes. When PWP projects are designed attention should be paid to their impact on the other economic sectors. A program that aims at assisting the private sector expand will no doubt have a stronger impact on the economy and this has been referred to in the literature as crowding in the private sector. For example, when PWPs maintain roads or infrastructure that is critical to the activities of the private sector and provision of play school facilities in a industrial sector can make it easy for factory workers to focus and concentrate on their work. Taken together, these aspects may lead to increased productivity in both the economic and social sectors. It is therefore important

that a consultative process that involves the private sector should take place when PWPs are being designed.

On the social protection front, the approach should be more inclusive to take into account the complementarities and tradeoffs that exists between these programmes. It has already been argued in the self selection section that transfer benefits are highest when the opportunity cost of the PWPs is lowest. If within the social policy framework of the country there are programmes that compliment the PWPs, the transaction cost can be reduced thereby increasing the transfer benefit. Closer home, the co-existence of economic empowerment programmes with Ipelegeng means that effort should be made to link the two by designing the program in a manner that enables participants to work for IP and at the same time engage in these empowering programmes. For example, a task-based PWP arrangement will give its participant more opportunity to engage in economically empowering projects such as running small business. Programmes that aim at encouraging women participation should align themselves with those social protection programmes that address child care needs.

In summary, the list of key design features for good practice of well designed PWPs given by Ravalion (1999) and Subbarao (1997) are worth noting:

- i) The wage should be set at a level which is not higher than the prevailing market wage rate for unskilled manual labour in the setting in which the scheme is introduced.
- ii) Restriction of eligibility should be avoided; the fact that one wants work at this wage should ideally be the only requirement for eligibility.
- iii) If rationing is required then the programme should be targeted to poor areas, as indicated by a credible poverty map. However, flexibility should be allowed in future budget allocations across areas, to reflect differences in demand for the scheme.
- iv) Labour intensity should be as high as possible.
- v) The projects should be targeted to poor areas, and try to assure that the assets created are of maximum value to poor people in those areas. Any exception in which the assets largely benefit the non-poor should require co-financing from the beneficiaries, this money should go back into the budget of the scheme.
- vi) Public works should be synchronised to the timing of agricultural slack seasons.
- vii) In order to encourage female participation, the appropriate form of wage is important – for example, women can benefit from piece rate or tasked-based wages; sometimes wages in the form of food has attracted more women to sites. Also provision of childcare or preschool services can improve participation by woman.
- viii) Transaction costs to the poor are kept low- one important means to accomplish this is through locating the rights of the poor vis-a-vis programme managers.
- ix) The programme should include an asset maintenance component  
(See Subbarao 2003:14).

### **3.4 Implementation and Institutional Factors.**

The task at hand requires a clear understanding of the following implementation and institutional issues. Four critical questions suffice:

- 1) Is PWP better when it is designed to be short-term or when it is on continuous or permanent basis?
- 2) What is the best Funds Flow scenario of a PWP?
- 3) How best are PWP projects selected and who should take the lead for this process?
- 4) How well are PWPs monitored?

These are addressed briefly below.

#### ***Short-term versus Continuous PWPs***

It has already been alluded to the fact that there is a tendency for PWPs to take a more comprehensive long term approach even though they are designed to address emergencies. The reason for this is that there is an increased realisation that to ensure flexible response to such emergencies the state has to have requisite capacity to do that. That capacity is acquired by deliberately building and accumulated it over a long period of time. This is the reason the long term approach is preferred to the short-term emergency geared approach

Historically, PWPs in Africa have mainly been donor funded and donor funds typically run for four to six months and this has denied these countries the opportunity to build their capacity to manage these programmes. Moreover, donor funded programmes normally come with technical staff, an aspect that has further denied recipients the chance to develop their capacity to design and manage such programmes. Sabbarao (2003:20) asserted that, Bangladesh and India's relatively superior performance in their PWPs can be attributed to the statement below which essentially captures the design of such programmes:

In both Bangladesh and India, most public works projects operate right throughout the year, albeit with seasonal ups and downs in coverage, and as a result, much domestic capacity is created over time

It stands to reason therefore that continuous PWPs are preferable to short term ones as they make it possible for countries to build the requisite institutional capacity to plan and implement these projects in the long run.

#### ***The Best Funds Flow Scenario***

Two institutional issues that arise under this subheading are whether PWPs perform better when they are under Government direct execution or when they are outside it. The second question relates to whether these programmes perform better when they are under a special budget arrangement or when they are within the main budget?

As alluded to earlier, PWPs can be executed by different stakeholders, namely; Government, NGOs and Social Funds. A comparison between practices in Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa has found that the former has been more dependent on Social Funds implementation and have been more successful than the latter that have been more dependent of donor funding and are operated by Governments. As Subbarao (1993:20) explains:

Because these programmes were implemented largely by Government agencies as part of their work programme little attention was paid to such details as timing of the programme or monitoring quality of the infrastructure that was built...In all programmes a uniform wage was set, regardless of the type of work done, the location of the work site, or variations among workers in terms of their age, sex, education, and experience

It would appear from this analysis that Private sector involvement in the execution of PWPs can add value better than direct Government involvement.

On whether the PWPs should have a special budget or should they be part of the normal budget process Phillips (2004) pointed out that special budget have the following draw backs;

- 1) They tend to be managed with a short-term perspective.
- 2) Issues of effectiveness, efficiency and quality tend to receive less emphasis under the special budget arrangement.
- 3) There tend to be a perception that labour intensive technology is peripheral to Government activities when this is handled through a special budget.

Phillip cites a South African review of poverty relief programmes that revealed that the separate budget approach had led to tensions in intergovernmental fiscal relations. A school would be built through a poverty alleviation programme and its recurrent costs would then be met through provincial Government budget. The review further found that Government line departments became involved in work which was deemed not to be part of their line functions. For example, Municipalities would be using poverty relief funds to build schools. This led the South African government to place these programmes under the mainstream budget. Under the new arrangement each line department was to carry out poverty relief programmes only as part of their core functions. There was to be no special budget but such activities were funded by earmarking funds on the budget of the line departments.

### **3.5 Coordination**

In order to design and implement the best practice PWPs, Phillip (2004) advised on a number of mistakes that should be avoided during the design and implementation stages. Mistakes that should be avoided include the following:

- i) Attempting to achieve too much too quickly. This can lead to sacrificing at least one of the goals of the PWPs, such as providing quality services, or using labour intensive methods.
- ii) Not allowing time to plan properly and build the required institutional and management capacity for effective and efficient implementation.
- iii) Many small projects without a common programme, resulting in loss of economies of scale, duplication of learning and training costs, and inconsistencies in performance.
- iv) Overloading the programme with too many objectives with the result that the programmes fails to achieve any of them; and
- v) Lack of consistent political support.

### **3.6 Best practice to be emulated includes:**

- i) Consistent political support and a multi-year programme.
- ii) Resources and time allocated to planning the programme and developing the capacity to implement it.
- iii) Planning of programme to ensure that the pace of implementation is linked to the implementation of the programme.
- iv) High priority given to effective systems of monitoring and evaluation.

### **3.7 International Experience**

There exists a wealth of knowledge and experience on Public Works Programmes design and implementation that Botswana can draw from. Best practice examples reviewed for the purpose of this assignment include; India, Latin America block, Ethiopia and South Africa.. For each one, the review focuses on what Botswana can learn from these countries and contextualize in order to suit local conditions.

#### **3.7.1 The Indian Experience**

As one of the pioneers in Public Works Programmes, India first experimented with the Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Maharashtra State (MEGS) in 1965. The programme was later launched in 1973 where it offered every registered participant guaranteed employment at



the minimum wage within a radius of 5 kilometres of his or her home. What is significant to note is the relation between the MEGS wage rate and the minimum wage as well as the 5 kilometres radius. Both are based on self selection and the need to minimise transaction costs through manageable distance to limit travel costs. India's commitment to the use of wages for self-selection was demonstrated by the fact that in 1988 when the minimum wage in the country doubled the MEGS wage also doubled. At that point the number of participants that could be accommodated by this programme fell below the 100 000 that the programme used to accommodate. This significant drop in the number of persons resulted in job rationing which eroded the job guarantee. As Subbaroa (Ibid) puts it ...*"the affluent started joining the programme due to the significant increase in the programme wage rate and the poor were rationed out"*. The lessons drawn from the Indian experience is that there is nothing sacrosanct about the equality of minimum wage and the PWP wage rate. The doubling of the minimum wage might have meant the reduced ability of the private sector to absorb more labour which in turn off-loaded labour to the PWP. What is actually important is the equality between the market clearing wage and the PWP wage rate. The market clearing wage is normally more difficult to establish than the minimum wage. The lesson to be drawn from this is that self-selection actually needs the knowledge of both the minimum wage and the market clearing wage rate for the unskilled labour.

### **3.7.2 The Ethiopian Experience**

Following the great famine of the mid 1990's Ethiopia came up with the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The overall objective of the PSNP was to provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas in a way that prevents asset depletion at household level and creates assets at community level.

Instead of being based on a single year programme the PSNP was to be a multi-year programme. Complementing the PSNP was the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP) whose main objective was to enhance Agricultural productivity through access to credit, extension services and technology transfer.

Beneficiaries from this programme were identified through geographic and community targeting and local committees were used as task forces for the programme. Gillian (2010) characterises the programme as one of the largest in Africa with an annual budget of US\$500million and providing direct benefits to about one million participants.

Using the Nearest Neighbour Matching Estimation method for assessing the effectiveness of the PSNP, Gillian (2010) found that the PSNP has made modest average impact by improving food security, increasing growth of livestock holdings and improving household ability to raise funds during an emergency. Specifically, it was found that:

- Programme impacts on asset accumulation are greater when high levels of transfers are received and when participants have access to PNSP and complementary agricultural services
- PSNP perceive that their welfare has improved relative to control households. They further perceive themselves to be better off in terms of resilience to shocks, food security and asset level growth
- No evidence was found that participation in Public Works Programmes has a disincentive effect on household labour employed in non-farm own business activities, wage employment or work on family farm.
- Impacts were larger when safety nets were combined with access to services designed to improve agriculture.

### **3.7.3 The South African Case**

The post Apartheid South Africa was hit by a sharp decline in the demand for unskilled labour which led to unprecedented unemployment rates. This culminated in the 1990's meeting between organised labour, the construction industry and Government to discuss how labour intensive methods could be used by the industry to absorb this labour. In 2002 South Africa came up with the Code of Good Practice which placed emphasis on:

- 1) Setting targets on the employment of youth, women and the disabled in PWPs
- 2) The use and selection of CBOs in these PWPs
- 3) A PWP system that would use a task-based payment system
- 4) Specifying the duration that PWPs would take

The Code for Good Practice established the framework through which PWPs were to be handled. At a national level two strategic thrusts were adopted. With a job creation target of 130 000 between 1998 and 2004 PWPs would be run through infrastructure based and income generation projects. The second vehicle would be through the orientation of mainstreaming public infrastructure towards labour intensive techniques. In addition to these national initiatives there were some provincial initiatives for PWPs. This segment seeks to compare two provincial initiatives on PWPs and these are the Gundo Lashu Programme in the Limpopo Province and the Zibambeke Programme in KwaZulu Natal. These projects were implemented almost at the same time with the former in 2001 and the latter in 2002. Their poverty and unemployment levels are comparable. The objective in this segment is to demonstrate how project design and implementation can affect the effectiveness of the PWP. The Gundo Lashu is based on short term engagement of beneficiaries while the Zibambeke engages beneficiaries on permanent basis.

### ***The Gundo Lashu Programme***

This project belongs to the family of PWPs that place emphasis on developing capacity that is required to run high labour intensive methods and high quality cost effective projects. At the project's inception 24 aspiring small constructors, 13 of which were owned by women were recruited. Two high level supervisors were recruited for each contractor. The 24 aspirants were sent to Lesotho to be trained on project management. Government arranged finance with ABSA to assist these contractors. Following the Code of Good Conduct Practice, 51 percent of the participants comprised of women, 58 percent were youth and 1 percent the disabled. On project supervision the contractors move from project to project supervising work groups of between 60 and 100 employees at any given time. The beneficiaries are employed for a maximum of four months and their payment is task-based. By 2003/4 this project had increased employment by 600 percent as compared to conventional machine intensive road works. This was achieved without any per kilometre cost increase.

### ***The Zibambele Programme***

This project was initiated by the Natal Department of Transport in 2000. Its objective was to provide rural access road network while at the same time providing poor households with employment. About one third of road routine maintenance in the Province was assigned to the Zibambele programme. Beneficiaries of the projects were engaged for 8 days per month on flexi time basis which was designed to enable participants to engage in other activities. The wage rate was R334 per month. The job was allocated to the household and not individuals, an aspect that made it possible for other members to step in when one was not feeling well or has died. The needy households were identified and selected at district level through a special committee.

McCord (2004) report the finding from the survey that compared these two programmes as follows:

- 1) The Survey found that Limpopo household had 10 percent unemployment rate while KwaZulu Natal had 24 percent. This is indicative of the fact that the KwaZulu project was better at targeting than Limpopo and hence its sample had more poor people.
- 2) Both programmes reported that 25 percent of their participants had to give up alternative employment in order to participate in either programmes. This shows that participating in PWPs has some opportunity costs but in this case the forgone jobs were in low return jobs.
- 3) Participation in both programmes did not move any significant number of people above the poverty datum line. KwaZulu still had 99 percent and 89 percent of Limpopo participants were still below the poverty datum line. As McCord (Ibid) puts it, participation in these projects did not move household above the poverty datum line but it only reduced the poverty gap.

- 4) Notwithstanding the above, one third of the participants in both provinces reported that they believed that their participation in these programmes had taken them out of poverty

McCord's major conclusion from his survey findings of these two projects is summarized below thus:

- The anti-poverty impacts of PWPs may be marginal if they are not targeted to the poorest
- The duration of poverty-reducing benefits arising from short-term PWPs employment may be limited to the period while the wage transfer is taking place

McCord concluded that a short term period of employment may be limited to the periods while the wage transfer is taking place. A short-term PWPs employment is unlikely to have significant or sustained social protection outcomes. If these are desired, a medium to a long-term intervention is required which will enable consumption smoothing and accumulation in the form of assets and savings as well as benefits which were discernable in KwaZulu Natal Province programme. The programme was able to offer sustained employment, while the Limpopo Province programme fell short of achieving the same results.

### **3.7.4 Latin American Social Investment Fund Experience**

Latin and Central America has used the Social Investment Fund model to manage PWPs. Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, Panama and Nicaragua used a demand driven bottom up approach in which communities submit potential project ideas to Social Investment Funds for screening and consideration for possible funding. Through private contractors the communities implement the projects. The focus of these projects is normally on building and repairing infrastructure. Temporary jobs that last up to six months are generated by this model. The only drawback with this demand driven approach is that communities without capacity to generate proposals are normally left out and lag behind in employment creation.

### **3.7.5 The Ipelegeng Review: potential benefit from this International Experience.**

The review of Ipelegeng may benefit immensely from the experiences discussed above. For example the Request for Tender document points that the levels of Ipelegeng wages have been a major point for discussion at policy level. The Indian experience of doubling the programme wage rate on account of the minimum wage having increase may provide some insights on how Ipelegeng wages need to be handled. The relation between Ipelegeng wages, the minimum wage and the unskilled labour market clearing wage level will have to be closely examined when policy recommendations are made.

The Ethiopian example on how PWPs need to be blended with other social safety nets and economic empowerment programmes in order to bring significant and positive results will be used in drawing policy recommendation for the revised Ipelegeng. The issue of disincentives of PWPs on other economic activities will also be drawn from for policy recommendations.

The South African experience underscores the critical role that proper targeting and the programme design plays in PWPs. Information on temporary and permanent benefits will be useful to the Ipelegeng's rotational employment requirement. The Latin and Central American experience opens our eyes to the important role that local communities can play in initiating projects and how the private sector can be roped in to implement such projects.

The preceding section focused on the conceptual framework underpinning the study. It provided an overview of what is internationally considered to be the features of a well designed Public Works Programmes that could provide best practices elsewhere in the world. Case example from India, Latin America, Ethiopia and South Africa were provided. This information will be used in subsequent section to draw recommendations that will be useful in the redesign of Ipelegeng. Section 12 will aim at assessing how Botswana has fared in the best practice of PWP implementation. The next section (section 4) details the methodology used in this investigation. The methods of data collection and analysis are reported and justified

## **Section 4: Methodology**

### **4.1 Study design**

The review of Ipelegeng employed both the quantitative and qualitative research designs. An interviewer administered survey questionnaire was used among 500 adults whose ages range from 18 years and above in all the selected research sites. The survey provided quantitative information regarding the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Ipelegeng Programme.. In addition, semi-structured key informant and focus group discussion (FGDs) guides were utilized for qualitative data collection. In-depth interviews and FGDs were used to solicit views, opinions and perceptions regarding the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Ipelegeng Programme. Other methods included observations, document review, (quarterly and annual reports on the Ipelegeng Programme, budget as well as international and regional literature on Public Works Programmes) and any other relevant material obtained from the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and Office of the President (OP) such as directives and savingrams.

Data for the study was collected during the months of November and December, 2011. The study used both the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FDGs) and a survey focusing on the beneficiaries. The in-depth interviews included, among others, community leaders, IP implementers, Community Development Workers and Social workers across all the selected research sites (Table 4.1). The different groups that participated in the FGDs are shown in table 4.2. In terms of the survey, a total of 500 respondents participated in the survey all of them being the beneficiaries (former and current) of the Ipelegeng Programme.

**Table 4. 1: Summary of in-depth interviews participants**

In-Depth Interview Site	No. of In-depth interviews	Gender	
		Male	Female
Kasane	5	2	3
Kazungula	3	2	1
Lesoma	1	1	0
Nata	7	6	1
Selebi-Phikwe	8	5	3
Sefhophe	4	3	1
Mahalapye	7	3	4
Dibete	3	2	1
Mochudi	6	5	1
Bokaa	0	0	0
Gaborone	8	6	2
Ghanzi	4	2	2
D'Kar	1	1	0
Kang	3	3	0
Phuduhudu	3	1	2
Maun	8	6	2
Toteng	2	2	0
Shorobe	3	1	2
Serinane	1	1	0
Letlhakeng	4	2	2
Letlhakane	3	2	1
Xere	5	4	1
West Hanahai	2	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>29</b>

**Table 4. 2: Summary of FGD participants**

FGDs Site	No. of FGDs	Gender		Total
		Male	Female	
Kasane	1 (IP beneficiaries)	5	6	11
Kazungula	1 (VDC)	5	2	7
Lesoma	1 (VDC)	2	6	8
Nata	2 (IP beneficiaries)	5	7	12
	1 (S&CD Officers)	2	4	6
Selebi-Phikwe	1(IP Beneficiaries)	2	4	6
Sefhophe	1 (IP beneficiaries)	6	2	8
Mahalapye	1 (IP beneficiaries) & 1(VDC)	7	9	16
Dibete	1 (IP beneficiaries)	6	4	2
Mochudi	1 (CD and HE Officers)	2	4	6
Bokaa	1 (VDC)	1	7	8
Gaborone	1 (councilors) 1(Drought committee members)	5	7	13
Ghanzi	1 (District Development Committee)	6	6	12
D'Kar	None	0	0	0
Kang	1 (IP stakeholders: Red Cross, Support Group, Out of school youth, S&CD, VDC)	4	3	7
Phuduhudu	None	0	0	0
Maun	1(Cluster Police)	5	5	10
Toteng	None	0	0	0
Shorobe	1(Current IP participants)	3	4	7
Serinane	1 (VDC)	6	4	10
Letlhakeng	1 (VDC)	5	2	7
Letlhakane	1 (VDC)	3	3	6
Xere	None	0	0	0
West Hanahai	None	0	0	0



## **Selection of the Study Participants**

Lack of baseline data on Ipelegeng beneficiaries posed a serious methodological constraint. A ‘difference-in-difference’ (DD) methodology would have been the appropriate way to evaluate the impact of Ipelegeng, using as a control households with similar pre-programme characteristics to those of the households ‘treated’ by becoming Ipelegeng beneficiaries. However, this approach was not feasible due to the fact that the characteristics of the Ipelegeng beneficiaries were not known *a priori*, rendering the inclusion of a non-treatment control group in the survey impossible. In the absence of the control group, the survey was conducted only on households with members who participated or are participating in the Ipelegeng Programme, the ‘treated’ group. Therefore the Ipelegeng workers themselves formed the sampling unit, and information about their members of households was also collected. The sample was selected from a sample frame provided by the ministry of local government (MLG). The sampling frame was based on the monthly targets of IP employees. From the sampling frame, 23 localities were chosen based on factors such as poverty prevalence and rural urban considerations. The Ipelegeng population from the selected localities numbered 6,942<sup>1</sup>, from which a sample of 500 beneficiaries/households was selected using a one-stage random selection.

## **4.2 Qualitative data collection**

### **In-depth Interviews**

In-depth interviews were conducted with key informants who were deemed to have relevant information to inform the review objectives. Key informants were identified among Government civil servants i.e. Ipelegeng Programme implementers (District Commissioner, Council Secretary, Town and City Clerk, community development officers, and IP coordinators), community and traditional leaders ((Dikgosi, Councillors and Members of Parliament), and business owners. This resulted in a wider coverage with a large number of key informants interviewed in the urban centres, rural and remote settlements. This was done to ensure a wider representation of the key informants who work directly or indirectly with the beneficiaries of the Ipelegeng Programme.

### **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

The focus group participants were selected purposely among eligible beneficiaries and key informants from the selected research sites. FGDs were conducted mainly with IP beneficiaries, councillors, Drought Relief or Ipelegeng Multi-Sectoral Committee and Community Development Officers. Access to FGDs participants was obtained through focal persons (mainly

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<sup>1</sup> This figure is based on the total monthly target of the selected 23 localities and was calculated from the MLG data.

the IP Coordinators) who served as a link between the review team and key informants and the IP beneficiaries at the various research sites. The inclusion criterion for participation in the FGDs was primarily that of a person who has connections with Ipelegeng as a beneficiary (current or former IP beneficiaries), implementer or a policy maker. Participation in the FGDs was also dependent on the availability and willingness of individuals to take part in the IP review exercise. A minimum of six and maximum of twelve individuals were selected to participate in the focus group discussions.

### **Documentary review**

Extensive literature search was conducted on public works programmes in the various regions of the world with a view to inform and guide the study.

Relevant sources identified included literature that gives models and global experiences that have dominated the use of Public Works Programmes for Poverty reduction. Such literature is rich on the architecture and design of successful public works programmes and it articulates the dos and don'ts of such programmes. Before any policy recommendation can be made, the Consultants ensured that they have a thorough understanding of the world empirical experiences relating to the use of Public Works Programmes from which we can draw from as best practices. The literature review enabled the consulting team to answer questions relating to:

- i) Targeting the intended beneficiaries
- ii) Labour market issues balanced with poverty alleviation objectives
- iii) The best mix between public transfers and private transfers for poverty reduction
- iv) Cost effective and operationally efficient Public Works programmes
- v) The microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions of Public works programmes and social protection considerations

The consultant reviewed the literature and case examples from African countries such as: South Africa and Ethiopia, in Asia (India) and Latin America. These are countries where attempts to use Public Works Programmes to alleviate poverty have been made. Such literature was reviewed and possible lessons drawn and applied to Botswana.

Another aspect of literature review focused on Botswana's experiences with the Ipelegeng Programme predecessor commonly known as the Drought Relief Programme or Namola Leuba. The focus here was on the various evaluation reports of the programme including among others the Oxford Food Studies Group (FSG, 1982-1990). The evaluation was conducted by the University of Oxford; evaluations on Social Policy and Social Safety Nets.

The consulting team also reviewed key Government Policy decisions, non-confidential ministerial and cabinet decisions that concern the subject of Public Works Programmes such as Government Directives, Savingsgrams and Memos.

### **Fieldwork preparation**

In preparation for fieldwork, the consultants (working in collaboration with MLG – Department of Local Government Development Planning) identified the focal or link persons at all the selected research sites, contacted them and arranged suitable dates on which the survey, in-depth interviews and FGDs could be conducted as well as to seek permission to conduct the interviews.

In addition, a series of meetings were held with the MLG (Local Government Development Planning) to discuss the research process, to review the survey instruments, to review the sampled locations (research sites) and size and to make contact with different Government Departments and Local Authorities who were involved or were required to facilitate the implementation of the study.

### **Training of Research Assistants (RAs)**

To ensure collection of high quality data, the research team recruited research assistants with previous experience in administering survey questionnaires, conducting in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions.

**Training:** Prior to field work, a one day training workshop for the research assistants was conducted to review basic facilitation techniques for administering the survey questionnaire, in-depth interviews and FGDs facilitation, probing during in-depth interviews and practice sessions using the survey tools. Considerable role play took place during the training to give the research assistants an opportunity to ask questions and practice the tools. The training also included topics on ethical issues such as informed consent procedures, confidentiality and protection of participants. Research assistants were also given orientation on: (i) understanding the overall objectives of the review, (ii) the intention behind each question in the review, (iii) conducting interviews in English and in the local vernacular (Setswana) and (iv) how to observe the cultural and ethical considerations during interviewing.

### **Pre-testing of tools**

Prior to training, all key concepts in the study instruments and consent forms were translated into *Setswana* and back translated to English to ensure the accuracy of the translation. The pre-testing of Ipelegeng draft questionnaire was conducted in Mogoditshane following permission which was sought by BIDPA and the IP Coordinator from the village Chief, council secretary and the District Commissioner to use Mogoditshane as a pre-test site. The selection of

Mogoditshane as the pre-test site was based on its proximity to the city of Gaborone and similar characteristics to the selected research sites. After pre-testing the survey instruments in Mogoditshane, the survey tools were revised and adjusted where necessary and re-submitted to the MLG for review and final approval.

The tools were prepared in English, but the interview took place in *Setswana*. A conscious decision was made during training to identify key concepts in English and translate them into *Setswana*. This was important because it enabled all the researchers to have a common understanding of the key concepts and articulate them in the local language. Note that, although *Setswana* is not the first language for other ethnic groups in Botswana, it is widely spoken and understood throughout the country.

At every stage of the review process, the research team consulted the RG to ensure that they were kept abreast with all the stages of the consultancy. As overseers the RG was consulted with a view to validate or endorse any changes in the tools, and to ascertain the overall quality of the review process. This process took care of the gaps that are usually overlooked at the different stages of the consultancy. For example, experience has shown that consultation with the RG at every stage of the consultancy was essential as through such, the RG is able to guide the consultants and ensure that the objectives of the study are met.

## **Data Collection**

Data collection was carried out through the use of the survey questionnaire, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Data were collected from the beneficiaries of the Ipelegeng Programme and key informants referred to above. The interview questions centred on the five broad themes, namely:

- The relevance of IP
- Efficiency of IP
- Effectiveness of IP
- Impact of IP
- Sustainability of IP

A total of two teams comprised of a lead facilitator and three research assistants conducted the in-depth interviews, FGDs and the survey. One team was dispatched to Northern Districts of the Country, covering Selebi-Phikwe, Mahalapye, Chobe and Kgatleng Districts and the other team covered parts of the Central, North-West, Ghanzi, Kweneng West and Kgalagadi Districts. On completion of field work, the two teams converged in Gaborone and finished off with interviews in Gaborone.

The administration of the survey questionnaire lasted for approximately 40 minutes while each in-depth interview lasted approximately 50 minutes.

## **Data Management**

At the end of each day of fieldwork, notes produced from in-depth interviews and FGDs were reviewed by the team members on the spot for any inconsistencies and issues needing clarification. The researchers also checked the quality of the written notes from the interviews. Free hours not used for the survey and interviews were used for reviewing and checking the survey tools for correct entry and any inconsistencies in responses. All data collected from the sites were put into envelopes and boxes and transported safely to Gaborone BIDPA Offices. In Gaborone a checklist was prepared and all data were checked against the list to ensure that all the data were returned safely.

In addition, all field notes, completed consent and personal identification forms were stored securely under lock and key. All FGDs and in-depth interviews were labelled with a tracking number, gender of respondents, session dates and the length of the interview. Data were kept strictly confidential and accessed only by authorised personnel at BIDPA.

## **Data Entry**

A user-friendly database with adequate quality control checks was designed for data entry. The survey data was entered into Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). First, raw data from the survey was coded and cleaned to identify and address wild codes, missing data, and false entries. Three data entry clerks were hired to enter the data. They were supervised by a qualified statistician who was part of the research team.

Qualitative data came in the form of field notes. A code book was created and all field notes were entered into the data set. All field notes from in-depth interviews and FGDs were assigned identity tracking numbers and entered into a log for ease of reference. In-depth interviews and FGDs were also labelled with interview numbers, gender of the respondents, session dates and entered into the log.

## **4.3 Data Analysis**

### **4.3.1 Qualitative Data Analysis**

Qualitative data analysis procedures were used in compiling, synthesising and reporting the findings from the review of Ipelegeng. Before the analysis began, a data tabulation plan and a code book was prepared, followed by data coding and entry. Data entry was done for each site by the review team and then merged into a single data set. Before entry into the code book for analysis, data were thoroughly cleaned and consistency checks made on each question several

times in order to ensure that all the data or major points under each question were captured. All the narrative content was validated by the review team.

Raw data (i.e. notes) from the in-depth interviews with the key informants were coded and analyzed line by line, common themes, patterns and clusters identified and organised systematically. The data were searched for words, sentences, phrases and patterns that formed thematic areas. This process was repeated by developing a coding and text scheme which enabled the researchers to draw conclusions from the coded data and finally coming up with emerging themes, patterns and meanings to inform the analysis.

A similar process was followed in the analysis of FGDs data. All raw data from FGDs were transcribed and turned into narratives for reporting. A code book was developed and used to capture systematic response patterns and any valuable information from the transcripts. The analysis plan ensured that all questions asked were analysed for content in accordance with the objectives of the study.

In addition, a personal diary and memos used to record daily impressions, questions and uncertainties arising from the field and suggestions of how to resolve them was kept and used as a reference in the analysis.

#### **4.3.2 Quantitative Data Analysis**

Quantitative data analysis procedures were followed in the analysis of the survey data. Data analysis plan was developed. The plan was guided by the objectives of the study. Raw data from the survey was entered into SPSS and analysed per site, and then data from the other sites were merged together into a single data set. This was done in order to capture unique variations in each site as well as to understand similarities and differences between the research sites.

Given the complexity of the analysis plan, a statistician was engaged throughout the study to assist with quantitative data analysis. In terms of the analysis of data, demographic characteristics of the respondents were used as the basis to identify relevant variables for cross tabulations and develop graphical presentations for analysis. Like the qualitative analysis, the quantitative analysis also focused on issues of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of IP at household level with a view to assess the extent to which IP was useful and has contributed to improved household socio-economic situation.

## **Ethical Considerations**

The following ethical principles were observed during the study:

***Informed consent:*** Verbal consent was sought from the participants before being allowed to take part in the study. Therefore only eligible participants i.e. those who gave consent to be interviewed were include in the study.

***Confidentiality:*** Researchers took appropriate actions to safeguard confidentiality. Interviews and administration of questionnaires were conducted in a secure place. Research assistants were trained on issues of confidentiality.

***Anonymity:*** Researchers used codes for filing, interviewing and for identifying documents in order to conceal the identity of the respondents.. No names were written on the questionnaires only codes were used..

***Information Sharing:*** **Data captured from the field** was used only for research purposes. No names or identifying information of the participants was included in the research reports. On completion of the study report, the researchers will share the information with the client who commissioned the study.

***Documentation & Storage:*** All the materials used in the study has been stored in locked cabinets to which only responsible researchers employed by BIDPA will have access.

Section 4 concludes Part A of the report. Part A of this report has covered introduction and background of the study; this was followed by section 2 which reviewed the literature on poverty eradication in Botswana, including the Ipelegeng Programmes. Next, was section 3 which provided the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of the study. The methodological approach adopted for the study followed to conclude Part A of the report.

The next part of the report – Part B presents the findings of the study. Part begins with section 5 which focuses on the presentation and analysis of data obtained from IP households. It reports the data using such key variables as age of the respondent, gender, marital status, educational level, size of the households as well as the socio-economic status of such households.

## **PART B**

### **Section 5: Household Data Analysis**

#### **5.1 Survey Findings**

The survey covered a total of 500 Ipelegeng households, comprising of 3,197 household members. Of these, 215 households were from cities and towns, 123 from urban villages and 162 from rural areas. The 215 households from cities and towns included 278 Ipelegeng workers compared to 172 and 223 in urban villages and rural areas, respectively. About 126 households had more than one Ipelegeng worker. Of these, 48 were from cities and towns and urban villages while rural areas had 39 each. The characteristics of the Ipelegeng workers and their households were analyzed in order to understand their demographic, labour market and socio-economic status.

##### **5.1.1 Ipelegeng Household Characteristics**


This section briefly discusses the characteristics of Ipelegeng households' beneficiaries. The household analysis is intended to capture the poverty dimension of the households. Key variables such as age, gender, educational level and marital status of the household head are analyzed to assess both the social and economic status of the household. The other key variable is the household size which was also used to calculate the dependency ratio with a view to capture the poverty dimension of the households.

##### **Households with children**

Figure 5.1 also depicts the distribution of households with children under the age of five by region. Overall, about 42 percent of the households have children under the age of 5 ranging from 1 to 8 per household. The majority of these were from the rural areas, followed by urban villages, remote areas and lastly urban areas (cities/towns). The higher proportion of households having children may suggest that such households may be poor or are vulnerable to poverty. Evidence from previous studies suggests that households with children are characterized by higher levels of poverty. Kebakile et al. (2011) found that about 33.2 percent of households with many children were poor compared to only 11 percent of households without children. Therefore, this suggests that Ipelegeng is targeting the vulnerable and poor households.



Figure 5. 1: Distribution of households with children under 5 years by region




### Age and gender of the household head

Table 5.1 presents age and gender of the household heads. About 55 percent of the Ipelegeng households were female-headed, suggesting that Ipelegeng is successful in targeting female-headed households, who are more likely to be poor than their male counterparts (BIDPA, 2010). According the 2002/03 HIES, the poverty headcount index was higher for female-headed households (33.3 percent) than for male-headed households (27.6 percent) (CSO, 2008a). In terms of the total poor, female-headed households accounted for 54 percent while their male-headed counterparts accounted for the remaining 46 percent (BIDPA, 2010). Therefore, this may suggest that Ipelegeng is a good safety net for the vulnerable female headed households. The age of the household head averaged 50, ranging from 21 to 96. This may be an indication that Ipelegeng targets even the vulnerable households headed by the elderly who are at risk of being poor. As depicted in figure 5.2, about 29 percent of the Ipelegeng households are headed by the elderly (60 years and above). These results are not consistent with the population and housing census results, where only 18.2 percent of the households were headed by the elderly (CSO, 2003). The majority of the Ipelegeng households are headed by those aged between 30 and 59 years (63.8 percent). These results are higher than the Population and Census results where 57 percent of the households were headed by those aged between 30 and 59 years (CSO, 2003).

Table 5. 1: Age distribution and mean age of the household heads

Minimum Age	Maximum Age	Mean Age	Female (%)
21	96	50	55


Figure 5. 2: Age distribution of the household heads



### Education level of the household head

About 92 percent of the Ipelegeng households were headed by individuals with junior certificate or less (Figure 5.3). This clearly shows that the Ipelegeng households are characterized by low educational attainments which may result in lack of employment opportunities resulting in higher chances of such households falling into poverty. Poverty is inversely related to the education status of the household head. According to the 2002/03 HIES, households in which the head had less than primary school education recorded the highest poverty incidence of 44.7 percent (CSO, 2008a).

Figure 5. 3: Education level of the household heads



### Marital Status of the household head

Figure 5.4 depicts household heads by marital status. With regard to marital status of the head of household, about 45 percent of the Ipelegeng households were single-headed, followed by 21 percent of the households whose heads were living together (cohabiting). About 17 percent of the households were headed by widows and only 16 percent of the households were headed by married individuals. The high proportions of single-headed households may suggest that most of

the Ipelegeng households are poor. Empirical evidence from previous poverty studies on Botswana to suggest that poverty is more prevalent in single-headed households (CSO, 2008a). Therefore Ipelegeng is on track in terms of targeting the poor households.

Figure 5. 4: Marital status of the household head



### Household size and Dependency ratio

Ipelegeng households are characterized by larger household size averaging 6 persons per household and ranging from 1 to 28 dependents (Table 5.2). The average household size of 6 is higher than the estimated average national household size of 4, an indication that Ipelegeng households are characterized by larger household size resulting in higher poverty levels. This is consistent with previous studies which found a positive relationship between poverty and household size (CSO, 2008a). The average household size is higher in urban villages, rural areas and remote areas which suggests higher poverty levels in such areas. According to the 2002/03 HIES, rural poverty was estimated at 45 percent compared to 25 and 11 percent of urban villages, cities and towns respectively. The dependency ratio averaged more than 1, and ranged from 0 to 21, an indication that there were more dependents in Ipelegeng households (see Table 5.3). The ratio was higher in rural areas (about 2), ranging from 0 to 21 dependents. This is expected as dependency ratio is associated with higher poverty levels.

Table 5. 2: Household size by region

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Urban	1	24	5
Urban Villages	1	28	8
Rural Areas	1	27	7
Remote Areas	1	17	7
National	1	28	6

Table 5. 3: Dependency ratio by region

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Urban	0	16	.98
Urban Villages	0	9	1.19
Rural Areas	0	21	1.68
Remote Areas	0	4	1.26
National	0	21	1.28

### 5.1.2 Characteristics of the Ipelegeng Participants

Even though public works programmes are meant to provide social safety net for the poor and vulnerable in society, little information is available on the characteristics of those who benefit from participating in these programmes. The Botswana Government has yet to develop a robust selection criteria i.e. targeting mechanism that will ensure that only the deserving poor are selected as beneficiaries of the programme. Currently, two basic criteria is used to select Ipelegeng beneficiaries, namely: (i) self selection and (ii) low wages set deliberately below the minimum wage. The low wages are set deliberately on the assumption that such meagre wages will attract only the poor.


However, given the high incidence of poverty, unemployment and extremely low informal sector earnings (especially in the rural and remote communities), it is very difficult to ascertain whether or not Ipelegeng attracts only the poor. The reality is that given self-selection as a criteria for eligibility, there has been instances where Ipelegeng attracts even the well off, in particular, youth who are not interested in working for Ipelegeng but only use Ipelegeng to get a piece job to make a quick buck during school holidays. There were a few cases reported of the University of Botswana students who worked for Ipelegeng in order to make a quick buck during the holidays.

### Key Demographic Characteristics of the Ipelegeng Participants

This section presents the demographic characteristics of Ipelegeng workers. Figure 5.5 presents the characteristics of Ipelegeng beneficiaries by gender. Clearly, Ipelegeng is dominated by females with a total of 77 percent participating in Ipelegeng compared to only 23 percent of their male counterparts. This is an indication that Ipelegeng attracts more females than males. Several factors may account for this gender differential. One of the factors is the high unemployment rate among females, leading to a high incidence of poverty. These results are consistent across all regions except in remote areas where only 43 percent of females participated in Ipelegeng compared to 57 percent of males. The gender dimension of Ipelegeng addresses several issues of concern to the women. First, it provides women with access to direct wage employment,

protecting them from loss of income. Secondly, a woman's participation in the labour force and her control over resources is associated with substantially larger improvements in child welfare, and, women's health and status (Swamy, 2003; del Ninno et al, 2009). Therefore Ipelegeng is appropriate in targeting women since the social protection discourse suggests that transfers to women tend to deliver greater human and social capital benefits to households than those to men (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). This was also confirmed by females Ipelegeng beneficiaries who participated in focus group discussions (FGDs). They expressed the concern that Ipelegeng wages received by men had no or very little impact on household welfare than those received by women. They pointed out instances where wives were forced to report their husbands to the *kgotla* for failure to bring the money home. The different gender ratios across regions may suggest that the design of Ipelegeng in terms of targeting by gender should differ across regions especially in remote areas where the males participate more than females in Ipelegeng.

Figure 5. 5: Distribution of IP workers across region by gender



### Age of the Ipelegeng workers

Figure 5.6 below presents the age distribution of Ipelegeng workers. The youth accounts for about 35 percent of the total Ipelegeng workers. The reason could be that the youth are mostly affected by unemployment and therefore resort to Ipelegeng as an alternative source of employment. This was followed by the age group 30-39 with 25 percent and 40-49 with 18 percent. Generally, participation in Ipelegeng declines with increasing age. As shown in Table 5.4 the mean age of Ipelegeng workers by region averaged 38 years. The same results were observed in all regions surveyed, with cities scoring higher with an average of 40 years and the remote areas with the lowest of 31 years. This was also confirmed by the youth during the focus group discussion when they indicated that they find it very difficult gaining formal employment and Ipelegeng serves as the only source of employment opportunity. Thus, even though young people are not the primary target of the Ipelegeng Programme, given high levels of unemployment among the youth, it was found that the youth had no alternative but to seek employment from Ipelegeng. The age range for the Ipelegeng workers stretch from 18 to 88 in rural areas compared to 18 to 76 in cities, towns, urban villages and the remote areas.

Figure 5. 6: Age distribution of the IP workers




Table 5. 4: Age distribution and mean age of the IP workers

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Cities	18	76	40
Towns	18	76	34
Urban Villages	18	76	39
Rural Areas	18	88	37
Remote Areas	18	76	31
Total	18	88	38

## Education of the Ipelegeng workers

Education level is one of the important variables to consider in assessing the socio-economic status of Ipelegeng workers within the regional distribution. The highest level of education completed for each region is set out in Table 5.5. About 89 percent of the Ipelegeng workers have junior certificate or less, an indication that Ipelegeng attracts the less educated who may be unemployed or living in poverty, since poverty is associated with low education levels. However, in urban areas Ipelegeng attracted some individuals up to Diploma level (0.5 percent).

Table 5. 5: Education level of IP workers by region

	Urban	Urban Villages	Rural Areas	Remote Areas	Overall
None	15.8	17.1	12.9	13.3	15.2
Primary	32.6	35.8	42.4	40.0	36.4
JC	37.7	39.0	35.6	33.3	37.2
O' Level	8.8	5.7	8.3	13.3	8.2
Certificate	4.7	2.4	0.8	0.0	2.8
Diploma	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

## Employment in Ipelegeng and Household Income derived

Table 5.6 shows the distribution of Ipelegeng workers per household. Overall, about 75 percent of the households had only one member employed in Ipelegeng whilst the remaining 25 percent of the households had two or more employed in Ipelegeng. Urban villages recorded the highest number of households with more than one member employed in Ipelegeng (32 percent), followed by remote areas, rural areas and urban, with 27, 24 and 22 percent, respectively.

Table 5. 6: Total number employed in IP per household

No. of IP workers per HH	Urban	Urban Villages	Rural Areas	Remote Areas	Overall
1	77.7	68.3	76.5	73.3	74.8
2	15.8	25.2	12.9	16.7	17.4
3	5.6	4.9	6.1	3.3	5.4
4	.9	1.6	4.5	3.3	2.2
5	.0	.0	.0	3.3	.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100

## The Ipelegeng Wage

The research team assessed the wage derived from Ipelegeng in order to determine the income impact on Ipelegeng intervention at household level. Table 5.7 shows the household mean monthly wage of Ipelegeng workers by region. The national Ipelegeng household mean wage was P515 which is higher than the Ipelegeng monthly wage of P400. This may be caused by the participation of more than one member in some households in Ipelegeng per month. Ipelegeng household mean monthly wage was higher in remote areas (P635), followed by urban areas (P564), rural areas (P494), both with significantly wider distributions, and lastly, urban villages (P456) with smaller distributions.

Table 5. 7: Distribution and means of IP household wages

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
Urban areas	400	2478	564
Urban Villages	400	934	456
Rural Areas	267	2100	494
Remote areas	267	2000	635
National	267	2478	515

Ipelegeng serve as an important source of income for a number of households. Table 5.8 shows the distribution of the share of Ipelegeng contribution to total household income. About 36

percent of the households derived more than 50 percent of their total income from Ipelegeng. Of those, 40 percent were from the remote areas, followed by 37, 35 and 34 percent from cities and towns, rural areas and urban villages, respectively.


Table 5. 8: Distribution of share of contribution of IP income to the total household income

	Urban areas	Urban Villages	Rural Areas	Remote Areas	Overall
0-10	10.2	12.2	9.1	6.7	10.2
11-20	14.0	13.8	10.6	6.7	12.6
21 - 30	15.3	13.0	12.9	16.7	14.2
31 - 40	14.4	11.4	20.5	16.7	15.4
41 - 50	8.8	15.4	12.1	13.3	11.6
51 - 60	7.9	4.9	4.5	6.7	6.2
61 - 70	7.0	6.5	6.1	3.3	6.4
71 - 80	3.3	8.9	4.5	6.7	5.2
81 - 90	5.6	2.4	6.1	3.3	4.8
91-100	13.5	11.4	13.6	20	13.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

## Other Incomes Sources

Figure 5.7 depicts other incomes sources apart from Ipelegeng. Salary serves as the second income after Ipelegeng with mean monthly income of P503, followed by piece jobs with P197 and livestock sales with P155.

Figure 5. 7: Mean Incomes





### 5.1.3 Social Safety Nets received by IP Households

In order to capture the value of transfer received in the Ipelegeng households, each household was required to list the transfers received by household members. Figure 5.8 depicts the number of households receiving such transfers. About 30 percent of the Ipelegeng households indicated that they received remittances from family members, followed by 20 percent of the households receiving Old Age Pension (OAP). About 9 percent of the Ipelegeng household indicated that they benefitted from the Destitute Programme, 8 percent from the Orphan Care Programme and lastly 1 and 0.6 percent of the Ipelegeng household benefitted from the Community Home Based Care (CHBC) Programme and World War II Veterans (WWII) Programmes, respectively.


Figure 5. 8: Household income transfers



### 5.1.4 Household Expenditure

The households were requested to provide information on the amount of income spent on different commodities. Figure 5.9 shows the mean income expenditure spent on different items. The mean income expenditure on food was the highest; an indication that most of the Ipelegeng income is used primarily to satisfy basic consumption needs. This was followed by clothes and educational expenses. This is consistent with other studies (McCord, 2003) where it was found that low value transfers by contrast, are mainly consumed, in the form of food and clothes.


Figure 5. 9: Household mean income expenditure



### 5.1.5 Total Household Income, Expenditure and Net Incomes

Figure 5.10 below depicts the household mean income, mean expenditure and net income by region. As expected, the household income is higher in urban areas, followed by urban villages and rural areas. The same pattern is observed in both the mean expenditure and net incomes. The reason could be that in urban areas, household income is more diversified as compared to other regions. There may be other household members who may be engaged in other economic activities such as paid employment and piece jobs outside Ipelegeng. Again Ipelegeng participants often engage in other income generating activities such as selling airtime or engaging in piece jobs outside Ipelegeng working hours. However, this is not possible in the remote areas because there are no alternative sources of income save for Ipelegeng.

Figure 5. 10: Mean total income, expenditure and net income



### 5.1.6 Household Capital Asset Ownership

Ipelegeng households were asked about ownership of capital assets. Figure 5.11 below depicts the share of Ipelegeng households with regard to whether they own any capital assets. About 92 percent of the Ipelegeng households own a cellphone, followed by house ownership (76%) and radio (60%). With regard to livestock ownership about 23 percent of households owned cattle, 21 percent owned goats and only 3.4 percent owned sheep. We therefore conclude that since the majority of the Ipelegeng households did not own livestock (cattle, goats and sheep), they may have higher chances of being poor and Ipelegeng serve as an appropriate safety net for such households. About 40 percent of households owned chicken and 12 percent owned donkeys. With regards to ploughing fields, about 33 percent of the households indicated that they owned ploughing fields. About 9 percent of the households owned a Scotch Cart and 5 percent owned a borehole. Only 1 household (0.2%) owned a Tractor.

Figure 5. 11: Proportion of households by asset ownership





Figure 5.12 below was introduced to capture the poverty dimension with regard to cattle ownership. Clearly, there is a negative relationship between the number of households and cattle herd size. As indicated earlier, about 23 percent of the households owned cattle. Of these, 41 percent kept between 1 and 9 cattle, followed by 28 percent who kept 10 to 19 cattle. As depicted, the ratio declines sharply as herd-size increases. This signals that the majority of the Ipelegeng households who own cattle are smallholders keeping a few cattle. The same scenario is observed in smallstock (goats), an indication that the Ipelegeng households may be more likely to be poor. According to the 2002/03 HIES poverty levels were higher amongst households with small herds of cattle (CSO, 2008a).


Figure 5. 12: Share of households owning cattle by herd size



### 5.1.7 Household Wealth Accumulation

In order to examine the wealth accumulation of the households, we asked the respondents whether they acquired some household assets in the last 12 months. Figure 5.13 depicts the different types of assets acquired by households in the last 12 months. Clearly, Ipelegeng households did not accumulate much of the assets in the last 12 months. About 35 percent of the Ipelegeng households reported that they acquired cellphones, followed by chickens (12 percent) and a house (10 percent).

Figure 5. 13: Proportion of households by asset accumulation in the last 12 months



## 5.2 Main Findings and Recommendations

From the foregoing, it is clear that Ipelegeng households are headed by females than males. The households are characterized by larger household sizes which may have negative impacts on the poverty status of such households. The Ipelegeng household size is much higher than the national average household size of 4, averaging 6 and ranged from 1 to 28. Again, the Ipelegeng household heads are characterized by low educational attainment, with the majority having primary or less. About 45 percent of the household heads are single, while about 21 percent are living together (cohabiting). The survey results showed that Ipelegeng is dominated by females with a ratio of 80:20 favoring the females. Therefore Ipelegeng serves as a good safety net for females as it provides them with access to direct wage employment, thereby protecting them from loss of income. Again, a woman's participation in the labour force and her control over resources is associated with substantial improvements in child welfare, and, women's health and status. The results also show that Ipelegeng also attracts the youth with a participation rate of 35 percent. The results also show that there are elders aged 65 and above participating in Ipelegeng, who are also benefiting from the Old Age Pension Scheme. With regard to income, the majority of the households indicated that they spent most of their income on food followed by clothing. This is consistent with other studies, where it was found that low value transfers by contrast, are mainly consumed, in the form food and clothes. Most of the households own small assets and when using cattle as a proxy for wealth, the majority of the households who own cattle, kept between 1 to 9 head of cattle.

The previous section focused on Ipelegeng household issues. Section 5 captured the poverty dimensions of households through key variable such as age, gender, marital status, educational levels and other related households socio-demographic characteristics. The next section –Section 6 focuses on relevance issues. In this section, the consultants analyzed the data to answer the question: Is the Ipelegeng Programme relevant as a strategy for poverty eradication in Botswana. Section 6 interrogates empirical data in order to provide answers to this pertinent question.

## **Section 6: Relevance Issues**

### **6.1 Introduction**

The first Term of Reference (ToR 1) of this evaluative study requires an assessment of the relevance of Ipelegeng to poverty eradication in Botswana. The critical question to answer was: Is Ipelegeng a relevant strategy for poverty eradication in Botswana? In order to effectively address this ToR, this section begins by an outline of the concept *relevance* as it applies to programme evaluation. The stated objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme (IP) were reviewed and interpreted with a view to identify the main features of relevance that the evaluation sought to assess. This is followed by an analysis of field data to determine issues that make IP relevant or irrelevant as a strategy for poverty eradication at national, district, household and individual levels.

### **6.2 Relevance as it applies to programme evaluation**

The concept of relevance in programme evaluation seeks to establish whether the objective of an intervention such as Ipelegeng is consistent with its intended beneficiaries' requirements. To this end, it is important to ask and be guided by a number of questions, including: (i) does the implementation of IP meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries. (ii) Does sufficient rationale exist to justify the continuation of the programme? In addressing these questions the evaluation process on relevance should go beyond the objectives as they directly apply to the beneficiaries of IP but should also comprehensively include national, local, households and individual levels. For example, while Ipelegeng is meant to address the needs of the poor an evaluation of its relevance should include issues of national, district, and community development.

Since evaluation on programme relevance anchors on the attainment of the intervention's objectives, before an evaluation is undertaken, the objectives of the intervention must first be clearly known and understood. For that reason, the discussions that follow will focus on a brief review of Ipelegeng objectives as stated, implicitly or explicitly, by the Botswana Government. Pertinent questions to ask are: (i) what exactly are the objectives of Ipelegeng and how well understood are these at the national, household and individual levels? (iii) What policy implications do these objectives have? (iv) How do these objectives resonate with the objectives of Public Works Programmes (PWP) identified in the literature review and (v) what implications do these have on the design of this programme? These questions will be addressed fully throughout the report. Once the objectives are clarified, data on the relevance of the IP will be analysed followed by conclusion and recommendations.

### 6.3 Objectives of Ipelegeng

The Guidelines for the implementation of the Ipelegeng Programme (2010) are instructive on the objectives of IP. Ipelegeng exists to: ‘ ***provide relief while at the same time providing essential development projects that have been prioritised in the normal development planning process***’. The guidelines further identify two main conditions that motivated the introduction of Ipelegeng, namely; (i) the reoccurrence of unfavourable hydro-climatic conditions and (ii) low employment opportunities. The two statements clearly show that the Ipelegeng Programme is in line with what has already been high-lighted in the literature review as the standard objectives of PWPs worldwide, which is to:

- Provide income transfer at critical times
- Consumption smoothing
- Provision of useful infrastructure

It is, however, significant to note that the above stated objectives are not exactly about poverty eradication as indicated in (ToR 1) but they are about providing relief. As noted in the literature review section, providing relief is not the same thing as eradication of poverty. As McCord (2004) noted in the Limpopo and Kwazulu Natal programmes, both interventions did not lift the poor above the poverty line but instead ***only reduced the poverty gap***. Building on this argument, it is clear that the use of the word relief as stated in the objectives of Ipelegeng places more emphasis on reducing the poverty gap and not moving people out of poverty. The above notwithstanding, it is abundantly clear from recent Government policy pronouncements that the intention is not to just alleviate but to “eradicate” poverty. The review notes the discrepancy of providing relief and eradicating poverty ***and recommends that the poverty eradication objective should be stated explicitly in the Ipelegeng guidelines***. This is because the difference between providing relief and alleviation or eradication is significant in that the programme design for the former is less demanding than for the latter.

#### 6.3.1 Ipelegeng household Characteristics and the relevance of the programme

The two questions of does the implementation of IP meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries and does sufficient rationale exist to justify the continuation of the programme can be answered by briefly looking at household data captured in Section 5 of this report. In other words this data can be used to answer the question of are these households vulnerable to poverty and does Ipelegeng provide them with relief?

It has emerged from Section 5 that 55 percent of Ipelegeng households are female headed. Literature that shows that female headed households are the most vulnerable to poverty in

Botswana abounds and it has been cited in section 5. It has further been pointed out that the majority of these heads of households are not educated with 37 percent of these heads not having any form of education at all while another 37.2 percent only has primary education. Both high level female household heads and low level of education are no doubt strong indicators of vulnerability to poverty.

Data from this section has also shown that not only are household sizes high but that the dependency ratio in these households is also high. Ipelegeng average household size is 6 while the national average is 4. The dependency ratio is 1.26 implying that the number of those who are not able to provide any form of livelihood to themselves far exceeds the number of those who can provide for themselves and their dependents. This is yet another clear sign of household vulnerability to poverty.

Data on household income has, on the other hand, revealed that the average wage for these households is P515.00. Considering the fact that the Ipelegeng wage is P400, this clearly means that these households are heavily dependent on Ipelegeng wages. This makes the programme highly relevant to the objective of providing relief to the poor.

On asset ownership the evaluation data has revealed that only 22.8 percent of the households owned cattle with 69 percent of these owning less than 10 herds of cattle. Furthermore, only 2.2 percent of these households had bought cattle in the past 12 months indicating that these are poor households who are not able to accumulate assets with which they can fight poverty.

It can be concluded from the above findings that Ipelegeng is well targeted in that it has focused on poor households who are vulnerable to poverty and need relief.

### **6.3.2 Respondents perceptions on the objectives of Ipelegeng**


To effectively evaluate the relevance dimension of IP, it is important to establish the respondents' knowledge and understanding of the objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme. Below is a detailed discussion on the analysis of the different views expressed by the beneficiaries of Ipelegeng who responded to the survey questionnaire. The respondents were asked whether they knew the objectives of the Ipelegeng and if so to list them? The results were aggregated by education and locality/region and are summarized and presented in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 below.

A significant number of respondents indicated that they were aware of the IP objectives with 61.2 per cent registering a yes and 38.8 per cent registering a no. Whilst it is apparent from the figures that the higher the respondent's education level is, the more confident the respondent is, about the knowledge of the objectives, this difference does not seem very significant. This observation is based on the fact that the percentage that said yes for the uneducated category is



not substantially different from that of the JC and O’level certificate holders. Actually, figures for those with no education are identical to those with primary education.


Figure 6. 1: Knowledge of objectives by education level



Gender attributes also do not seem to have a strong bearing on perceptions about the objectives of Ipelegeng as 63.2 per cent of males registered a Yes and 60.6 per cent of females did the same. No discernable pattern is observable when data is analysed by the age of the respondents.

Regional dimensions seem to have a more clear and pronounced effect of the knowledge of the IP objectives. The following Chart shows that the more urban a location gets the more perceptive it becomes about the IP objectives. About 65 per cent of the urban respondents claimed that they knew the objectives while only 46 per cent of the remote areas claimed no knowledge of the objectives of IP.

Figure 6. 2: Knowledge of objectives by region



It is a known fact that poverty is more prevalent in rural and remote areas, it is therefore surprising that the majority of the poor are not knowledgeable about the objectives of poverty related intervention meant to assist them. It begs the question: Did the Government consult the intended beneficiaries on the purposes of Ipelegeng? One would have expected the remote areas

to be more readily willing and able to articulate the objectives of Ipelegeng because they interface with the programme on a daily basis.

Lack of knowledge on IP objectives was a matter of concern also shared by programme implementers who participated in in-depth interviews. The statements below are a summary of their perceptions:

Yes! I am aware that Ipelegeng offers temporary work and relief for us who are unemployed. They encourage us to work for Ipelegeng because we are poor and have no money, but the problem is that they did not tell us that what the intended objectives of Ipelegeng are. For example, we are not aware that Government expects us to graduate from the programme. This expectation was never communicated to us ... they did not tell us at the time we were offered the job..

The expectations of IP have not been systematically shared with the beneficiaries. Therefore many beneficiaries entered the programme with insufficient knowledge of the objectives of the programme, in particular, the expectation that the beneficiaries will graduate after a certain period into other Government poverty eradication initiatives or economic empowerment programmes.. This is important because, the beneficiaries have to prepare themselves psychologically and in terms of acquiring the necessary skill training and asset enhancement for an independent livelihood.

Overall, most respondents indicated that failure by those in authority to clarify the objectives of Ipelegeng is a major setback for the programme. This is mainly because without clear objectives to guide and inform the programme it is very difficult to measure or monitor progress towards the achievement of such objectives. Failure to do so has rendered the programme inefficient.

Those respondents who said that they knew the objectives of Ipelegeng were asked to state their source of information. The results are presented in Table 6.1 below. It is interesting to note that whilst the media (both print and radio) were frequently cited as the major source of information in most geographic areas, this was not the case in the remote areas. It should not be surprising that remote areas were not using the media to access information on Ipelegeng because they reside in remote settlements not accessible by any form of media. Worse still, the majority of the people in these areas cannot read or write, there is a high rate of illiteracy (See Botswana Literacy Survey, 2003). High levels of poverty in these areas also make radio and newspaper virtually unaffordable.

Table 6. 1: Source of information by region

	Media	Observation	VDC	Social Work	Councillor	Kgosi Kgotla	MP	IP Coord	President	Total
Urban	31.9	13.5	17.7	12.1	9.2	4.3	2.1	2.8	6.4	100
Urban village	37.3	22.7	9.3	2.7	13.3	9.3	0	0	5.3	100
Rural	41.9	17.6	9.5	9.5	2.7	12.2	0	2.7	2.7	100
Remote	0	71.4	21.4	0	7.0	0	0	0	0	100
Total	34.2	19.4	13.8	8.6	8.9	7.2	1.0	2	4.9	100

The fact that as much as 71.4 per cent in remote areas claimed that they only know the objectives of IP through observation stands as an outlier relative to other geographic areas. In actual fact VDCs and councillors seem to be the only structures that remote areas seem to be aware of regarding IP objectives. That “observation” is the second most important channel by which IP objectives are understood to remote area participants is very worrisome considering the fact that Government civil servants, in particular Ipelegeng Coordinators as well as community leaders who are charged with the responsibility to promote, educate and disseminate information on Ipelegeng and what it stands for are unable to do so. This suggests that IP has no clear publicity strategy to market its ideals. The fact that VDC is the third source with only 13.8 per cent respondents identifying it as their major source of information is also worrisome. One would have expected that as the supervisors of Ipelegeng Projects and as a structure that interacts most with IP participants they would have been the most cited as the source of information on the programme objectives. ***Under the circumstances, it is strongly recommended that in order to enhance the relevance of the IP, Government must ensure that intended beneficiaries of the programme are made aware and understand its objectives. This is the only way they can understand how they themselves fit into the programme. A strong Information Strategy for Ipelegeng must be formulated.***

Interrogating data further revealed that there was an age bias with respect to preference for media as the source of information for the programme objectives. For youth aged around 19 years 50 per cent identified media as their source whilst the percentage for the other ages ranged from 23.1 to 30 per cent. Females were more inclined to choose media as their source of knowledge than males. Female’s percentage figure stood at 38.5 per cent while that of males was 20.5 per cent. Conversely, as can be read from the figure 6.3 below, males were more prone to choose observation and VDC than females. The educational level of the respondents did not seem to have any bearing on the choice of the source of information.

A plausible conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the direct beneficiaries of IP do not seem to have sufficient information about the programme. The fact that the most poor do not know the objectives of the project meant to assist them suggest possible failure in properly targeting the intended beneficiaries. They may be seeing the programme as one other employing outfit without understanding its special features that are indeed meant to

address their poverty status. *It is therefore recommended that Government should sensitise IP beneficiaries on the objectives of this programme.*


A similar conclusion was arrived at during in-depth interviews with key informants. For example, the respondents were divided on the exact objectives of IP. Clearly, they were not known and understood the same way across the districts. The picture that emerged from the discussion across the board was that, currently IP does not seem to have an explicit statement of objectives to link its activities to the targeted beneficiaries (in terms of poverty eradication) and on that basis to specify what the expected impact of these interventions are in relation to the needs of these beneficiaries.

The above notwithstanding, the objectives of IP were, variously expressed as follows:-

- To cushion beneficiaries against hunger, poverty and various life threatening shocks and natural disasters such as drought
- To enhance the dignity of the poor persons by providing them with temporary employment that would allow them to provide themselves with basic necessities such as food, clothing and rent with a view to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged.
- To alleviate poverty and improve the living status of the individuals and households

Overall, it would appear the participants understanding of IP is that it is a government programme that seeks to provide relief for those in dire need of food by providing them with temporary employment in the various activities implemented under Ipelegeng.

Figure 6. 3: Source of information by gender




## 6.4 Relevance Issues as they pertain to Ipelegeng respondents

A “relevant” intervention that addresses poverty does so by providing opportunity for economic activity through preparing the beneficiary for formal market employment, building entrepreneurial and work skills. This does not only address income poverty but also builds pride

and dignity through self-empowerment. To determine the extent to which Ipelegeng succeeded in achieving poverty eradication and enabled participants to develop a sense of self respect and dignity, a number of questions were asked to the respondents. The analysis of the response to these questions is critical in making a determination of whether these objectives have been achieved and be able to pronounce on whether as presently constituted, Ipelegeng is relevant.

Beneficiaries were asked upfront whether they felt that Ipelegeng had assisted them to improve their livelihood. Those who answered in the affirmative were asked why they felt that way and those who said no were asked to explain why they felt that there was no improvement in their livelihood.

Figure 6. 4: Improvements in livelihoods by region



The results reported in Figure 6.4 above show a clear and complete success of Ipelegeng in improving livelihoods of its participants. Curiously, the more urban the area that one comes from, the more likely the participant is satisfied with Ipelegeng. It can only be opined here that this is a result of Urban and Urban Villages having complimentary options that can be used to augment Ipelegeng income. Ipelegeng participants in an urban area were more likely to find a piece job after Ipelegeng working hours than one who is in a remote area. Similarly, when laid off from an Ipelegeng job, the urban dweller is more likely to find a piece job than those residing in the rural and remote areas with no or limited sources of alternative income..

In addition, it is worth noting that even though all the “yes” responses are close to 80 per cent in most geographical locations, there exists a significant gap between remote areas and others. This region has remained an outlier at 56.7 per cent. This begs two main questions: (i) How well targeted is Ipelegeng to those areas that have the highest levels of poverty i.e. the remote areas? (ii) Is the programme designed to differentiate with a bias towards poor areas? The revised IP has to address these pertinent questions.

Furthermore, an examination of gender figures reveals that females were more content with IP progress than males. Females who said their livelihood had improved stood at 82.8 per cent

while males came closely at 79.5 per cent. Educational attainment did not seem to make much difference in the response to the question as all groups were clustered around 85 per cent.

Beneficiaries who reported improvement in their welfare were asked to indicate what they use Ipelegeng income for. Not surprisingly the bulk of the wages was spent on food and clothes. Combining columns 1 indicates that those who could only afford food whilst column 2 shows those who could in addition to food afford clothes. The overall figures show us that 23.5 per cent could only afford food and 34.1 per cent could afford food and clothes. Looking at geographic dimension, urban centres have the highest percentage (41.1%) that could afford food alone. The other areas are clustered between 22.6 per cent and 25.5 per cent. Actually, adding the first two columns of the Table yields the total percentage that could afford either food alone or food and clothes. These figures are 71.9 per cent, 57.5 per cent, 61.9 per cent and 76.4 per cent for Urban, Urban Villages, rural areas and remote areas respectively. Urban areas are the second highest at 71.9 per cent which is a very curious result particularly because this group has indicated to have benefited most in terms of livelihoods as discussed above. Looking at the proportion that could only afford to buy food and nothing else from its Ipelegeng proceeds urban areas are highest at 41.1 per cent, followed by rural areas at 25.5 per cent and remote areas at 23.5 per cent and urban villages come last at 22.6 per cent. Urban areas are clearly an outlier with an abnormally high percentage of people who can afford food alone from their Ipelegeng wages. A possible explanation can be found from the *transaction cost* concept that was discussed in the literature review.

Table 6. 2: Ipelegeng livelihoods by region

	now can feed my family	now can feed and clothe my family	now can feed and educate my children	now can feed and house my children	now can feed, clothe and educate my children	now can feed, clothe, house and educate my children	now i can afford the above and even save or invest	i can now afford luxury goods that i could not afford before	Total
Urban	41.1	30.8	4.9	3.8	4.9	3.2	2.7	8.6	100.0
Urban Villages	22.6	34.9	14.2	0.0	15.1	5.7	2.8	4.7	100.0
Rural Areas	25.5	36.3	11.8	2.9	13.7	7.8	2.0	0.0	100.0
Remote Areas	23.5	52.9	0.0	0.0	11.8	5.9	0.0	5.9	100.0
Overall	31.7	34.1	8.8	2.4	10.0	5.1	2.4	5.4	100.0

This is the beneficiary's cost of being involved in PWPs work. In urban areas everyone has to pay for transport to go to work. To the extent that most Ipelegeng jobs in urban areas are not necessarily in the areas that beneficiaries live in, transport costs have to be incurred. This renders the residual income to be only sufficient for food. This is a very significant finding that has far reaching policy implications. The fact that the Botswana Government has extended Ipelegeng to urban areas without setting an urban area specific wage rate could be at issue here. This finding is actually consistent with the report from the Gaborone City Council that it is failing to meet the Ipelegeng quota. The net wage that Gaborone people get after their transaction cost is bound to be lower than that of the rural areas. If indeed Government wants Ipelegeng to be equally successful in both urban and rural areas then this question should be addressed. The question is: *Should Ipelegeng wage rate be the same across the country? This is a pertinent policy question that needs answers.*

Indeed, when large projects such as the MEGS in India used self-selection the market wage that was used was a location-specific market wage and not a national one. *It is therefore recommended that Government must investigate how successful it has been in trying to achieve self-selection by having a common wage for Ipelegeng without a wage that is differentiated according to location.*

The data set also shows that very little is spent on housing luxurious goods and that savings are almost non-existent. This raises the pertinent question: How can poverty be eradicated without

an asset base being generated? The situation is worse in the remote areas where there are no or limited alternative sources of income.

Focus group discussion data was also instructive on the main objective of IP which was stated as to provide temporary employment to the unemployed and unskilled laborers. There was a broad consensus among FGDs participants that this objective has been achieved. Community leaders also across the districts visited also underscored the achievement of this objective thus:

*Batho rra ga bana ditiro gotlhelele. Fa go hirelwa Ipelegeng kgotla e e a tlala ... morafhe. Bontsi jwa morafhe o o tlalang fa o batla tiro mo Ipelegeng ke bomme le banana ka go farologana ga bone* [this Kgotla is usually filled up during recruitment for Ipelegeng because people have no jobs].

It was pointed out during in-depth interviews that the majority of the people looking for IP job are women and youth. In almost all the research sites visited to undertake this assignment, the broad consensus among Ipelegeng coordinators (both at regional and district level) is that the programme has, on a continuous basis, absorbed a substantial number of unemployed unskilled labour. Almost all the money earned from IP is used for buying food for the individual and the households.

Further examination of data using the variables, age, education and gender did not reveal any peculiarities except a sharp gender divergence for those who could only afford food. The data shows that the percentage for males in this category was 44.1 per cent while females stood at 28.1 percent. These figures were almost at par (30.1% & 35%) for the second column.

#### **6.4.1 Reasons for failure to benefit from Ipelegeng**

Respondent who indicated that their livelihood had not improved complained about low wages and the temporary and rotational nature of their jobs as the reason for failure to benefit from Ipelegeng. The first two columns of the Table 6.3 below indicate that the opportunity cost factor is not very strong to our Ipelegeng beneficiaries. Only 3.3 per cent of the respondents claimed that the Ipelegeng wage is lower than what they could get from farming, the figure is 4.4 per cent for piece jobs.

The combination of low wages and the temporary nature of Ipelegeng employment was stated as the main reason for reduced benefits. The solution to this problem seems difficult to identify as increasing the wage rate will lead to the need for rationing of available job spaces. One option that Government has is to increase the employment duration for each participant. This is also a difficult choice as it puts a strain on the fiscus. This predicament underscores the importance of linking the Ipelegeng programme with other economic empowerment programmes. It has already been discussed above that urban Ipelegeng workers are the most content with their livelihood benefits from IP because they probably compliment their Ipelegeng wages with income derived



from piece jobs income. Creating a strong link between Ipelegeng and other empowerment programmes will increase the benefits to participants. Drawing from *this it is therefore recommended that Government must find ways to create a link between Ipelegeng and other economic empowerment programmes. This will not only avert the need to increase wages for the programme but it will also reduce the need to increase employment duration for each participant.*

Table 6. 3: Reasons for not improving livelihood

	payment lower than if i work on my fields or take care of my cattle	payment lower than if I do piece jobs	payment could be okay but the fact that it is only for a limited period of time does not help very much	payment too low and too temporary	
none	0.0	9.1	9.1	81.8	100
Primary	2.6	5.3	0.0	92.1	100
JC	6.3	3.1	3.1	87.5	100
O'Level	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100
Certificate	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100
Overall	3.3	4.4	2.2	90.0	100

#### 6.4.2 Preparation for the formal labor market

In response to the question whether they felt that their engagement with Ipelegeng gives them work skills that prepare them for the formal labour market, 63.8 per cent of the respondents affirmed while 36.2 per cent stated that was not the case. This is an encouraging development as a significant proportion of those who join Ipelegeng do so with the expectation to prepare themselves for the formal labour market. There was a varied response between males and females where 71.8 per cent male respondents concurred with the view whilst only 61.4 female respondents confirmed that Ipelegeng prepares them for formal job market. A closer examination of the data revealed that the usefulness of Ipelegeng as a vehicle into the formal labour market is very much dependent on the level of education that is acquired. For those who have O'level 46 per cent of them rejected the notion, while those who possess other educational levels were clustered between 31.1 and 39 per cent. Gender does not seem to have a bearing on how individuals responded to this question.


### 6.4.3 Development of entrepreneurial skills

If Ipelegeng was to assist its beneficiaries to develop entrepreneurial skills and run small business this would not only assist these participants augment their wages from the programme but would also assists them graduate from the programme. To this end, the beneficiaries were asked to state whether they thought Ipelegeng could assist them develop life skills to enable them establish their own small businesses and eventually graduate from Ipelegeng.

Overall 37.4 per cent of the respondents expressed enthusiasm that Ipelegeng had the ability to give them the knowledge and the resources to run their own small businesses. The enthusiasm was highest in urban villages and Villages with 40.7 per cent and 40.9 per cent respectively. As would be expected, remote areas had the lowest expectation at 30 per cent. Rather interestingly urban areas were the second lowest at 34.4 per cent.


It is clear from the Table 6.3 above that the majority of the respondents were not enthusiastic about the use of Ipelegeng as a vehicle for boosting entrepreneurial skills and the establishment of small business nor were they keen to graduate from IP. This further casts doubt on whether Ipelegeng has the potential to generate second round benefits that the literature has alluded to.

Figure 6. 5: Whether IP will assist you establish your own business by region



The gender dimension does not seem to be at play as the percentage that expressed enthusiasm was 35.9 and 37.9 for males. However, an age analysis revealed that the 50 to 59 years cohort seemed the most enthusiastic at 48.4 per cent followed by the age group 30 to 39 at 40.5 per cent. What is most disturbing is that youth does not seem to be very enthusiastic about using Ipelegeng as their vehicle for establishing their own business.

Figure 6. 6: Whether IP will assist you establish your own business by age



No clear patterns emerged from the education dimension. Those with no education had the lowest expectations at 23.7 per cent, Primary School and JC holders are clustered as 41.2 per cent and 41.4 per cent. O'level and certificate holders are at 29.3 and 28.6 per cent respectively.

Evidence presented in the above figures gives a very clear picture on Ipelegeng and skills transfer. The results were corroborated by information obtained from both FGDs with Ipelegeng beneficiaries and in-depth interview with key informants. The pattern that emerges from the interviews is that Ipelegeng as currently designed does not incorporate a skills transfer component, and as such cannot be a vehicle or conduit for provision of entrepreneurial skill.

During focus group discussions with IP beneficiaries revealed that by engaging them as unskilled labourers without any concerted effort to impart skills that they could use to earn a living and graduate from Ipelegeng was counter-productive and ill informed. This view was shared by the key informants across the research sites. They pointed out that the fact that Ipelegeng does not provide any survival skills is a misnomer. This is because failure to do so had instead promoted a culture of dependency on the Government hand-outs at the expense of survival skills. Further, it was pointed out that failure to provide entrepreneurial skills runs counter to the overall objective of poverty eradication and hence raising doubts about the relevance of Ipelegeng with respect to empowering the beneficiaries. For example, almost all community leaders and IP implementers called for the incorporation of skills transfer as a major component of IP. Such life skills may include: entrepreneurial skills, small business development, mentoring, counselling and psychosocial support that could prepare the beneficiaries psychologically to graduate from IP into more productive and sustainable poverty eradication programmes promoted by the Government of Botswana. It is important to point out that some of the beneficiaries may actually be sitting on assets that could earn them a sustainable income beyond the life of Ipelegeng.

During in-depth interviews with community leaders, civil servants and NGO representatives also underscored the importance of imparting livelihood skills to IP beneficiaries as fundamental to the success of the programme. An illustration was made by referring to the old Chinese idiom

that *“when a man is hungry ... do not give him fish, instead teach him how to fish so that tomorrow when he is hungry he can catch fish himself”*. It would appear these words of wisdom should be the guiding principle for sustainable Ipelegeng. If this happens, it was opined that most IP beneficiaries will graduate from Ipelegeng into other government poverty eradication programmes such as Alternative Packages, ISPAAD and LIMID.

#### 6.4.4 Basis for Entrepreneurial Enthusiasm

Seeking to establish a business is very different from taking action to establish it. The former is enthusiasm while the latter is enthusiasm backed by action. In recognition of this difference, the evaluation sought to establish concrete action that had actually been taken by those who had expressed enthusiasm. This group was asked to state the basis for their enthusiasm and the results are as indicated in table Table 6.4 below:

Table 6. 4: If yes, explain by region

	I am already selling a few things to my co-workers at ipelegeng	I have already started saving in preparation for starting my own business	Will start saving for starting own business	Intending to start own business and employing others	Total
Urban	12.2%	33.8%	41.9%	12.2%	100.0%
Urban Villages	24.0%	36.0%	20.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Rural Areas	14.8%	38.9%	42.6%	3.7%	100.0%
Remote Areas	11.1%	22.2%		66.7%	100.0%
Overall	16.0%	35.3%	34.2%	14.4%	100.0%

The results showed that only 16 per cent of those who had expressed enthusiasm had actually started running their businesses and 35.3 per cent had already started setting aside resources (savings) for that purpose. Depending on how accurate this information is when these two figures are added together they give an indication of the magnitude of enthusiasm backed up with action. Therefore 51 per cent of those who said “yes” had actually started doing something about it and the remaining 49 per cent were only aspirants.

The balance between action backed enthusiasm and aspiration does not seem to be significantly affected by locational dimensions. Urban Villages seem to be highest and the rest seem to be at par except, of course, remote areas which are always an outlier. What catches the eye with the remote area figures is the 66 percent that aspires to start business so that they can start employing others. This captures the reality of dire need for more employment opportunities in remote areas.

Table 6. 5: If yes, explain by gender

	i am already selling a few things to my co-workers at ipelegeng	I have already started saving in preparation for starting my own business	Will start saving for starting own business	Intending to start own business and employing others	Total
Male	16.7%	40.5%	26.2%	16.7%	100.0%
Female	15.9%	33.8%	36.6%	13.8%	100.0%
Overall	16.0%	35.3%	34.2%	14.4%	100.0%

To establish who of the enthusiasts were more aspirants between males and female respondents, the first columns yields 57.2 per cent for males and 51.3 per cent for females. This means that 57.2 per cent of the male respondents who said yes had already taken action by either establishing business or had savings. The figure for females was 51.3 per cent.

Data on age shows that actual business establishment progressively increases with age. The proportion that said yes when in actual fact had already started business was 11.0 per cent for the youth. This figure increases as we move to older age cohorts. This seems credible since the older one gets the better chances that the person can establish a business. A different picture emerges in column 2 where youth score highest at 55 per cent while most age cohorts are clustered at around 38 percent except for those aged 60 and above. It is encouraging to see that youth involved in Ipelegeng have actually started saving to establish their own business. This is potentially true as most of these are actually still dependent on their parents and they therefore do not use all their money to buy food but keep some for savings.

Table 6. 6: If yes, explain by age

	I am already selling a few things to my co-workers at ipelegeng	I have already started saving in preparation for starting my own business	Will start saving for starting own business	Intending to start own business and employing others	Total
<= 19	11.1%	55.6%		33.3%	100.0%
20 - 29	13.5%	38.5%	32.7%	15.4%	100.0%
30 - 39	13.7%	35.3%	33.3%	17.6%	100.0%
40 - 49	17.6%	32.4%	32.4%	17.6%	100.0%
50 - 59	19.4%	22.6%	54.8%	3.2%	100.0%
60 - 69	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%		100.0%
70+	25.0%	50.0%	25.0%		100.0%
Overall	16.0%	35.3%	34.2%	14.4%	100.0%

No particularly interesting results emerged on the education as the proportion of enthusiasm backed by action is around 47 per cent for all categories.

#### 6.4.5 Reasons for lack of entrepreneurial enthusiasm

It should be instructive to policy makers to understand why some beneficiaries believed that Ipelegeng cannot boost their entrepreneurial skills and small business development. This group was therefore requested to give reasons for their apprehensiveness.

The three factors that can affect lack of entrepreneurial enthusiasm on Ipelegeng are: (i) limited savings, (ii) limited potential for gaining experience and a (iii) combination of the two. Data from the Table 6.7 below indicates that savings are the main constraints to small business development followed by doubt that business experience can be derived from this programme. Only a few respondents identified lack of savings and absence of experience as an obstacle. While this sequencing of problems applies to most regions, remote areas results are very different from the rest. For them their averseness arises from the combination of lack of savings and entrepreneurial skills. This confirms further that remote areas have a different problem from the rest and as such they need a different solution. Similar results emerge from age data in respect of youth. The data shows that while most age groups identified shortage of savings as the most serious constraint to establishing business youth believes lack of experience is the most serious constraint. According to the data 50 per cent of apprehensive youth aged 19 years cited lack of experience as their reason- compare this with 22.5 to 33.3 per cent for age cohorts 20 to 59 years.

Table 6. 7: If no, explain by region

	no saving can be generated from Ipelegeng to enable anyone to venture into any business	no experience can be derived from IP to prepare any one for business	savings are too low and there is no experience derived from IP to assist establish any business	Total
Urban	48.9%	34.0%	17.0%	100.0%
Urban Villages	52.8%	33.3%	13.9%	100.0%
Rural Areas	48.7%	28.2%	23.1%	100.0%
Remote Areas	33.3%	28.6%	38.1%	100.0%
Overall	48.7%	32.1%	19.2%	100.0%

The gender attitude towards this matter is that women identified saving as a much bigger constraint while males put the three factors almost at par. Education does not seem to have any noticeable effect except for certificate holders whose emphasis is on experience.

Table 6. 8: If no, explain by age

	no saving can be generated from Ipelegeng to enable anyone to venture into any business	no experience can be derived from IP to prepare any one for business	savings are too low and there is no experience derived from IP to assist establish any business	
<= 19	18.8%	50.0%	31.3%	100.0%
20 - 29	42.3%	33.0%	24.7%	100.0%
30 - 39	53.3%	33.3%	13.3%	100.0%
40 - 49	57.9%	22.8%	19.3%	100.0%
50 - 59	68.8%	21.9%	9.4%	100.0%
60 - 69	31.6%	47.4%	21.1%	100.0%
70+	43.8%	37.5%	18.8%	100.0%
	48.7%	32.1%	19.2%	100.0%

Table 6. 9: If no, explain by gender

	no saving can be generated from Ipelegeng to enable anyone to venture into any business	no experience can be derived from IP to prepare any one for business	savings are too low and there is no experience derived from IP to assist establish any business	Total
Male	35.1%	36.5%	28.4%	100.0%
Female	52.9%	30.7%	16.4%	100.0%
Overall	48.7%	32.1%	19.2%	100.0%


#### 6.4.6 Ipelegeng employment as a source of dignity

Dignity is an integral part of individual's livelihood and it therefore constitutes part of this review. Dignity can be gauged by the respect that one is accorded by his/her own family as well as the general self-esteem that one attains as part of his/her existence. Being seen as a relevant person in the community who can be requested to render assistance to individuals or the collective can also dignify one's existence. As part of assessing the relevance dimension of Ipelegeng the consultancy asked the programme beneficiaries whether they thought their engagement in Ipelegeng enabled them to achieve dignity. If they thought so what was their basis for saying that? If they did not think so, what were their grounds? The results are given below (see Tables 6.7 to 6.17).

Overall 85 per cent concurred with the notion that Ipelegeng was according them the dignity they needed as people, however 14.6 per cent rejected the notion. The notion received an endorsement

of 90 per cent in rural areas with urban areas and urban villages both giving 85 per cent endorsement. Remote area came out as outliers at 66 per cent. It can only be opined that the acuteness of poverty in remote areas makes them more concerned about issues of survival and less with issues of pride.

Figure 6. 7: Whether IP is a source of dignity by region



Educational status seems to be inversely related to judgement on dignity in that data shows that the more educated one is the less concerned about dignity one becomes. It can be seen from the chart that those with no education and those with primary school endorsed the notion at 86.8 per cent. JC, O'level and certificate holders endorsed the notion at 86.6 per cent, 80.5 per cent and 64.3 per cent respectively. Ordinarily the opposite would have been expected. With regard to gender, males endorsed the notion at 82.9 per cent compared to 82.6 per cent their female counterparts. The quest for dignity seems to progressively increase with age. The 19 years and below age cohort gave the notion an 80 per cent endorsement which progressively increased to 100 per cent at age 60 to 69 years.

Figure 6. 8: Whether IP is a source of dignity by education







Figure 6. 9: Whether IP is a source of dignity by age



In conclusion we note that a significant proportion of Ipelegeng beneficiaries believe that the opportunity to participate in the programme has assisted them to gain dignity through self empowerment by providing livelihood to themselves.

#### 6.4.7 Reasons for thinking that Ipelegeng accords beneficiaries dignity

The beneficiaries were requested to explain why they thought Ipelegeng accords them the opportunity for enhancing their dignity. The three choices that they were given to explain their concurrence with the dignity notion were (i) respect by family and acquaintances; (ii) being approached for loans and assistance in the village and (iii) self-esteem. Self-esteem was rated highest with a rate of 56.3 per cent of those who had concurred with the notion. This was followed by respect in the family and acquaintances at 42.3 per cent. Being approached for loans and assistance was a distant third at 1.1 per cent. While maintaining a similar sequence of ordering women gave a heavier weight to self-esteem relative to family respect whilst men gave it less. Women voted for self-esteem at 60.8 per cent and 39.2 per cent for family respect. For men the proportion is 55 per cent to 43.3 per cent. Age does not seem to be a factor except for the cohort 19 years and under who placed family respect at 70 per cent and self-esteem at 30 per cent. Education seemed to have no bearing and noticeable divergences. Geographic factors were almost uniform with all regions rating self-esteem highest with the exception of remote areas that reversed the ranking and put a heavy weight on respect within family.

Table 6. 10: If yes, explain dignity by gender

	I feel respected by my family and acquaintances	I am even approached for loans & assistance in the village since i started working for IP	as a person I really feel dignified	
Male	39.2%		60.8%	100.0%
Female	43.2%	1.8%	55.0%	100.0%
Overall	42.3%	1.4%	56.3%	100.0%

Table 6. 11: If yes, explain dignity by age

	I feel respected by my family and acquaintances	I am even approached for loans & assistance in the village since i started working for IP	as a person I really feel dignified	
<= 19	70.0%		30.0%	100.0%
20 - 29	38.1%		61.9%	100.0%
30 - 39	37.6%	2.0%	60.4%	100.0%
40 - 49	45.7%	2.5%	51.9%	100.0%
50 - 59	45.5%	1.8%	52.7%	100.0%
60 - 69	36.0%		64.0%	100.0%
70+	50.0%	5.6%	44.4%	100.0%
Overall	42.3%	1.4%	56.3%	100.0%

Table 6. 12: If yes, explain dignity by region

	I feel respected by my family and acquaintances	I am even approached for loans & assistance in the village since i started working for IP	as a person I really feel dignified	
Urban	39.6%	1.6%	58.8%	100.0%
Urban Villages	40.0%	1.0%	59.0%	100.0%
Rural Areas	49.6%	1.7%	48.7%	100.0%
Remote Areas	35.0%		65.0%	100.0%
Overall	42.3%	1.4%	56.3%	100.0%

Table 6. 13: If yes, explain dignity by education

	I feel respected by my family and acquaintances	I am even approached for loans & assistance in the village since i started working for IP	as a person I really feel dignified
none	40.9%	3.0%	54.5%
Primary	43.0%	1.9%	55.1%
JC	39.8%	.6%	59.6%
O'Level	51.5%		48.5%
Certificate	44.4%		55.6%

#### 6.4.7 Ipelegeng not as dignity vehicle

The majority of those who were apprehensive about Ipelegeng's ability to give beneficiaries some dignity judged piece jobs to be better and more respectable. This view scored 58.3 per cent, whilst the claim that friends laugh at them was second at 38.9 per cent and keeping ones involvement in Ipelegeng a secret was a distant third at 2.8 per cent. Males rated piece jobs at 80 per cent while females rated them at 50 per cent. This serves to demonstrate that the piece-job market as an alternative market is a male dominated labour market. This point is significant in that it should influence the design for Ipelegeng to consider the fact that women have fewer options than men.

Education does not seem to have any discernable effect on this aspect except that certificate holders gave an abnormally high rating to piece jobs of 80 per cent when next highest rating for this aspect is 58 per cent. Age has no effect save for the fact that the youth has indicated a higher propensity to hide the fact that they work for Ipelegeng. Their rating is 25 per cent compared to 10 per cent as the next highest rating.

Regionally, Remote areas, once more, stand as an outlier this time in respect of the piece job explanation which scored a 90 per cent. There is a possibility that the term piece job has a different connotation in remote areas. Our survey indicated that there are no other employment options outside of Ipelegeng in remote areas. For example, in one remote area settlements the Headman joked that in his settlement an applicant who is left out of the Ipelegeng hiring has to be employed by those who will have been successful in securing Ipelegeng jobs as there are no other options available. It is possible that remote area respondents treated piece jobs as prestigious because most of the time these opportunities emerge by way of external contractors doing short assignments in the settlements. For example, when BPC installs power lines in the settlements they offer piece jobs to residents and these are obviously more prestigious to Ipelegeng. In other regions piece jobs are broader as they could include sweeping other peoples yards and doing laundry.

Table 6. 14: If no, explain dignity by gender

	my friend & acquaintances laugh at me and despise me	i keep it a secret from my friends that i work for ipelegeng	Ipelegeng is less dignified than doing piece jobs	
Male	20.0%		80.0%	100.0%
Female	46.2%	3.8%	50.0%	100.0%
Overall	38.9%	2.8%	58.3%	100.0%

Table 6. 15: If no, explain dignity by age

	my friend & acquaintances laugh at me and despise me	I keep it a secret from my friends that I work for ipelegeng	Ipelegeng is less dignified than doing piece jobs	Total
<= 19	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%	100.0%
20 - 29	34.8%		65.2%	100.0%
30 - 39	52.0%		48.0%	100.0%
40 - 49	30.0%	10.0%	60.0%	100.0%
50 - 59	25.0%		75.0%	100.0%
70+	50.0%		50.0%	100.0%

Table 6. 16: If no, explain dignity by region

	my friend & acquaintances laugh at me and despise me	I keep it a secret from my friends that I work for ipelegeng	Ipelegeng is less dignified than doing piece jobs	Total
Urban	45.2%	3.2%	51.6%	100.0%
Urban Villages	27.8%	5.6%	66.7%	100.0%
Rural Areas	61.5%		38.5%	100.0%
Remote Areas	10.0%		90.0%	100.0%
Overall	38.9%	2.8%	58.3%	100.0%

Table 6. 17: if no, explain dignity by education

	My friends laugh at me	I keep it a secret	IP is less dignified than Piece jobs	Total
None	40.0	0	60	100
Primary	37.5	4.2	58.3	100
JC	44.0	0	56	100
O'level	37.5	12.5	50	100
Certified	20	0	80	100
Overall	38.4	2.7	58.9	100

### 6.4.8 Ipelegeng reforms

Overall, about 92 per cent of the respondents felt that Ipelegeng should be reformed. Regional dimension showed no difference between urban and rural, each scoring about 96 per cent of the respondents who felt that Ipelegeng should be reformed. About 86 per cent of the respondents in urban villages felt that Ipelegeng should be reformed and 70 per cent of the remote area respondents felt the same. With regard to gender, there was not much difference between males and females with about 91 per cent of males indicating that Ipelegeng should be reformed compared to 92 per cent of their female counterparts.

Figure 6. 10: Do you believe that IP should be reformed by region





Table 6. 18: Do you believe that IP should be reformed by gender

	yes	no	
Male	90.6%	9.4%	100.0%
Female	92.2%	7.8%	100.0%
Overall	91.8%	8.2%	100.0%

With regard to Ipelegeng reforms by educational level of the respondents, there was not much difference across educational levels, all scoring above 92 per cent except for the junior certificate where 89 per cent indicated that Ipelegeng should be reformed.

Figure 6. 11: Do you believe that IP should be reformed by education



Age distribution by the Ipelegeng reforms depicts an inverse U shape, an indication that the majority of those supporting the Ipelegeng reforms were the middle aged from the ages of 30 to 59.

Figure 6. 12: Do you believe that IP should be reformed by age






Figure 6.13 depicts the proportion of respondents by different options for the Ipelegeng reforms. Salary increase ranked highest with about 90 per cent of the respondents indicating salary or wages as a priority in reforming Ipelegeng. This is followed by 65 per cent of those who indicated that protective clothing should be a priority in reforming Ipelegeng. The third priority is the provision of leave.

Figure 6. 13: Ranking IP reforms



Clearly wage increment in Ipelegeng is the highest priority with 78.6 per cent of the respondents giving it the highest rank and only 7.1 per cent of the respondents gave provision of protective clothing the highest score. The third priority (provision of leave) scored only 4 per cent in terms of the rankings.

Figure 6. 14: Most important IP reforms



The preceding discussion interrogated the survey data on relevance issues. Through the quantitative data, the consultants sought to answer the question: Is Ipelegeng a relevant strategy for poverty eradication? The analysis has unearthed interesting findings that generally endorse IP as a relevant strategy. However, a complete analysis demands that the data be interrogated further by providing supporting evidence from the qualitative analysis. The second part of this discussion presents data generated through in-depth interviews with key informants and FGDs. It is important to point out that qualitative data from in-depth interviews and FGDs have in many ways corroborated and endorsed many of the issues raised from the survey. Below is a detailed

discussion of the issues raised by key informants and FGDs on the relevance of IP as a strategy for poverty eradication.

In terms of relevance, the first key issue of the consultations with key informants and FGDs concerned the relevance of the Ipelegeng Programme (IP) as a strategy for poverty eradication. The key questions for debate centered on the main objectives of IP, the benefits of Ipelegeng to both the individual and the households, as well as the needs of the community, targeting of the beneficiaries and the strengths and weaknesses of the programme with respect to the overarching objectives of poverty eradication.

From the initial discussion with key informants on the relevance of the Ipelegeng Programme, it was clear that providing relief for people so vulnerable and in dire need was the core of the Ipelegeng Programme. Among the implementers interviewed for this review, the relevance of the policy was identified in terms of providing temporary work to the unemployed people in circumstances of dire need, with the result that in Botswana people do not die of starvation.

The capacity of IP to meet the basic needs of the poor and other vulnerable groups was also underscored by the beneficiaries of IP when they acknowledged that the Ipelegeng programme has provided them with employment opportunities in the context of high levels of unemployment, especially for the unskilled labourers. The elderly women working for Ipelegeng, for instance, noted how they had struggled to make ends meet because of the various circumstances such as debilitating poverty, ill health, old age infirmities, neglect by their children and other challenges in life. They acknowledged with gratitude how the Government of Botswana, came to their rescue through the Ipelegeng Programme. Through this programme, they are able to buy food for their children and do not die from starvation.

The relevance of the IP was further underscored by some of the community leaders interviewed who noted with appreciation the decision taken to provide Ipelegeng on a continuous and/or permanent basis. They noted that since Ipelegeng has assumed a permanent status it has had two major benefits. Firstly, at an individual level, Ipelegeng has relieved many poor and unemployed people from dire poverty by providing them with employment opportunities on a temporary or continuous basis. Through Ipelegeng such people were able to:

(i) buy food for themselves without depending on the government or relatives to provide and as such do not die of hunger (ii) some have access to credit from local shops and kiosks (semausu) and this enables them to provide basic household items on a continuous basis. Secondly, at a community level, Ipelegeng has contributed to maintenance of government buildings, a clean environment, and fighting crime.



The issue of relevance was explored further by asking the respondents questions on the benefits and weaknesses and/or challenges of IP. Their responses are discussed briefly below:

### The benefits of Ipelegeng

Data gathered from the field is instructive on the benefits of Ipelegeng at individual, households and community level. Specifically, most respondents indicated that Ipelegeng is very useful and relevant in that, it has helped many poor Batswana who were unemployed and without any visible source of income to work and provide for themselves and their families. Some of the IP beneficiaries noted with appreciation that “*Ipelegeng has brought dignity, a sense of self-worth and independence to us because like everyone else we can go to the shops and buy ourselves food*”[*le rona jaanong motho o kgona go ithekela letogonyana la phaletshe*].

Evidence gathered from in-depth and FGD with key informants suggests that progress has been made towards the realization of the IP objectives since it started (in particular, the objective of providing temporary unemployment for the unskilled laborers). A number of tangible benefits have been realized at individual, household and community level. These are briefly discussed below:

### Individual/household benefits

1. **provision of temporary employment:** The main objective of IP was to provide temporary employment to the unemployed and unskilled laborers. This objective has been achieved. Community leaders across the districts visited bear testimony to this: “*Batho rra ga bana ditiro gotlhelele. Fa go hirelwa Ipelegeng kgotla e e a tlala ... morafhe. Bontsi jwa morafhe o o tlang fa o batla tiro mo Ipelegeng ke bomme le banana ka go farologana ga bone* [this Kgotla is usually filled up during recruitment for Ipelegeng. The majority of people looking for IP job are women and youth. In almost all the research sites visited to undertake this assignment, the broad consensus among Ipelegeng coordinators (both at regional and district level) is that the programme has, on a continuous basis, absorbed a substantial number of unemployed unskilled labor. In almost all the cases, the programme is fully subscribed, and in some cases oversubscribed, especially in rural and remote settlements where no or very limited employment opportunities exist except for Ipelegeng. In almost all the districts surveyed, Ipelegeng is able to meet its quota and people are engaged on a rotational basis. However, the research team notes an interesting finding in Gaborone, where IP is under-subscribed. Gaborone is unable to full-fill its quota. In fact, to do so, recruitment for

Ipelegeng workers has been extended to the neighboring villages of Mogoditshane and Tlokweng. Even then, the quota cannot be filled. This is surprising in the context of seemingly high unemployment rate in the city and hence one would expect a high demand for Ipelegeng jobs.

2. **Buy food for self and family:** One of the benefits identified by almost all the respondents was that the bulk of the earnings from IP was used to buy food for self and the family. This is consistent with the original intention of the programme – to provide relief from poverty. Many poor households were expected to use their earning to buy food instead of depending on government welfare handouts, particularly, the destitute ration. In fact, most of the people working for Ipelegeng are former able-bodied destitute who were de-registered and enrolled in Ipelegeng. The assumption was that once the basic need for food was satisfied then IP beneficiaries will be motivated to utilize other government poverty eradication programmes such as backyard gardens and Alternative Packages.
3. **Keep self-busy:** Another interesting finding from focus group discussions with Ipelegeng beneficiaries was that they enrolled in the programme in order to keep themselves busy while still looking for a job. Some pointed out that if they had a choice they will not work for Ipelegeng because the wage paid is too low and exploitative. An IP beneficiary in Mochudi noted: *I am just keeping myself busy and winding time because I do not want to stay home all day and do nothing ... its boring, so why no pass time ka Ipelegeng (FGD participant – Mochudi).*

### **Community level benefits**

1. **Reduce cost of social development:** Ipelegeng has primarily focused on five major projects, namely: litter picking; de-bushing; government building maintenance; green scorpion and community policing. Evidence gathered from the field suggests that it is very expensive to deliver these services, particularly by a private contractor. Instead of engaging a single contractor, it was found to be cost effective to engage Ipelegeng employees to do the job. They are cheaper and through this process, the government is able to deliver on the mandate of Ipelegeng which is to promote labor intensive public works programmes. It was reported that the communities have greatly benefited from Ipelegeng. The programme has delivered a clean environment, a reduction in criminal activities and maintenance of government buildings. In fact, some key informants were concerned that the community has benefited more at the expense of the poor. While quality of life for the poor is not improving as a result of working for Ipelegeng, the community has greatly benefited through completion of the above activities.

2. **Exchange and learning of basic skills:** One of the benefits of Ipelegeng gleaned from FGDs with IP beneficiaries is that in some activities such as painting and brick laying, they are able to learn from the professional artisans who work with them. For example, most of the women employees pointed out that they have acquired the skill on: mixing concrete (Daka); laying a brick, and painting. *I have learned these basic skills ... just by observing what others are doing and through practice. I am now able to do it myself. The problem is that they do not give us references ... I want a reference so that I can look for a job at the Councils or Government Maintenance Department.*

### Weakness of IP

The above benefits notwithstanding, a number of shortcomings were identified which militate against or may render Ipelegeng irrelevant, including: IP objectives not fully understood and known by all the stakeholders, the rotational approach, low wages, payment made by a cheque, late payments, and no skills transfer/training.

1. **Objectives of IP not fully known and understood:** The review sought to establish whether the objectives of IP were known and understood by the various stakeholders and how the various stakeholders defined and perceived Ipelegeng.  
The respondents were divided on the exact objectives of IP. Clearly, they were not known and understood the same way across the districts. The picture that emerged from the discussion across the board was that, currently IP does not seem to have an explicit statement of objectives to link its activities to the targeted beneficiaries (in terms of poverty eradication) and on that basis to specify what the expected impact of these interventions are in relation to the needs of these beneficiaries. Without clear objectives to provide a guiding framework for implementation, and its anticipated impact on the targeted beneficiaries, respondents could only make inference to the objectives from their experience with how the IP has hitherto been implemented. There was broad-based consensus that a key objective of the policy was and should be to provide relief for those in dire need of food by providing them with temporary employment in the various activities implemented under Ipelegeng. This was variously expressed as follows:-
  - To cushion beneficiaries against hunger, poverty and various life threatening shocks and natural disasters such as drought
  - To enhance the dignity of the poor persons by providing them with temporary employment that would allow them to provide themselves with basic necessities such as food, clothing and rent with a view to promote the welfare of the disadvantaged.
  - To alleviate poverty and improve the living status of the individuals and households

While provision of temporary employment and relief was recognized as a critical and relevant objective, most respondents were also aware that dire need had a multiple of causations: some of which were short term and due to personal disasters and others were of a chronic nature and not readily amenable to immediate change. The non-amenable causes included old age, ill health, infirmities and other disabilities which rendered people and their families unable to meet their basic necessities due to erosions of their income and asset base. The combination of physical incapacity, material incapacity and limited opportunities to engage in alternative interventions for independent and sustainable livelihood maintenance render the individual a destitute. The situation of individuals caught in this dilemma was further worsened by an absence of supportive social networks within the family structure and the community, which could lessen the vulnerability of those unable to fend for themselves. IP beneficiaries caught in this dilemma are less likely to graduate from Ipelegeng or participate in any other government poverty eradication programme. Instead, they are likely to be re-registered as destitute persons in the event they are unable to obtain a month wage from Ipelegeng due to the rotational nature of Ipelegeng.

To revamp IP, the majority of policy implementers identified two other objectives as fundamental to a programme geared at reducing the incidence of poverty and destitution. These are: (i) the policy must have both preventative and long term rehabilitation aspects for both family and households experiencing poverty and individuals who have landed in a poverty situation but can be taken out of relief through income, asset building and provision of psycho-social support interventions. In terms of rehabilitation, the proposed objectives by Community Development Officers across all the research sites were articulated as follows:-

- To empower beneficiaries to become independent people not dependent on social welfare provided by the state
- To promote skill development to enable beneficiaries to empower themselves so that they can graduate from Ipelegeng
- To rehabilitate beneficiaries so that they could exit the Ipelegeng Programme
- To promote income generating activities that will enable beneficiaries to become self-employed and able to sustain themselves
- To link the beneficiaries with other Government poverty eradication programmes which will enable them to graduate from Ipelegeng

A number of concerns were raised with regards to IP failure to incorporate empowerment, rehabilitation and skills development (training) in the overall programme

design. Observers noted that as currently implemented, the programme had encouraged a culture of entitlement, despondency and dependency among people who could otherwise be assisted to be income self-reliant and productive. Secondly, it was also noted that it encouraged unscrupulous politicians to use the programme for political gains where the number of people a politician succeeded in pushing into the Ipelegeng Programme were used by such politicians to measure the success of the programme. As a result there was ambiguity over whether the success of the programme should be measured in terms of an increase or decrease in the number of people enrolled in Ipelegeng.

Respondents noted that despite national commitment to reducing poverty and promoting self-reliance, the number of IP beneficiaries continues to increase monthly as reflected by increase in quotas with no indication of exit or graduation from Ipelegeng. Thus suggesting that either poverty is increasing or Ipelegeng is reaching a broader constituency than the strictly poor and vulnerable persons it is meant to assist.

The escalation in numbers of new entrants has, it is argued, led to an untenable situation where resources are over-stretched, the quality of support for the really needy compromised, and the empowerment and rehabilitative aspects of the programme grossly under-emphasized. It was claimed that IP beneficiaries have now been reduced to doing menial jobs devoid of any skills such as litter picking, de-bushing and street sweeping with no emphasizes on projects that promote sustainable livelihood such as agriculture. In fact, many people were reported to have abandoned agriculture to work for Ipelegeng.

In reaction to these perceived challenges, in-depth interview respondents emphasized the importance of an objective committing the programme to a robust program of rehabilitation, empowerment and capacity building (skills development and training). It was, emphasized that the skills transfer and rehabilitation objective should be developed, incorporated and implemented with immediate effect and should not be tied to the programme of relief but must rather be broad based in terms of institutional mandate for implementation in the public, private and non-governmental sectors. The emphasis on empowerment and rehabilitation echoes the sentiments expressed in Botswana national strategic documents such as Vision 2016, (1997); NSPR, (2003); BIDPA Rapid Poverty Profile (1996/97); Revised National Policy on Rural Development (2002); A Review of Social Safety Net (2007); Community Development Strategic Framework (2010) and NDP 10 (2009 – 2016).

Given the political and hand-out nature of the Ipelegeng assistance which some politicians dubbed “*athama ke go jese*” (open your mouth and let me feed you), there was need to **build an empowerment, training and rehabilitation component into the programme** with a view to build and promote a stronger sense of social and individual responsibility for sustainable livelihood and self-reliance. This feeling is particularly strong among Community Development Officers across the districts. They feel that Ipelegeng beneficiaries as individuals must be expected and be encouraged to make their own contributions towards their own up-liftment and not rely solely on government hand-outs. They recommended **provision of information and skills to IP beneficiaries so that they can, in the long run graduate from Ipelegeng**. The present structure, function and “modus operadi” of the IP office apparently does not have the type of manpower which can provide such guidance and support for sustainable livelihood.

2. **Rotational approach:** As currently designed and given its labor intensive emphasis, Ipelegeng strives to engage as many people as possible. In order to ensure that no one is disadvantaged, a rotational approach has been adopted and implemented. Through this approach, employees are engaged on a monthly basis after which they wait to give others not previously engaged a chance. The cycle is repeated and the VDC supervisor has the responsibility to ensure that no cheating takes place. However, this has been identified as a major weakness of Ipelegeng. There is a broad consensus among all the key stakeholders that if Ipelegeng is to be a relevant strategy for poverty eradication, the programme beneficiaries should be engaged on a continuous basis. The argument is that engaging a poor person on a rotational basis will not in anyway contribute to an improvement in their quality of life, instead, the rotational approach has great potential to worsen their poverty situation. i.e. drive the poor deeper into poverty ... the rhetorical question asked by many respondents is: What happens during the waiting period; What do they survive with since Ipelegeng is the only source of livelihood for them? Some suggested that the beneficiaries should be enrolled for a minimum of at least six months continuously before rotation.
  
3. **Low wages:** This is major complaint expressed by almost all the respondents (both IP beneficiaries and key informants). Ipelegeng wages are extremely low given the ever-increasing cost of living. The prices of basic necessities such as food, clothing, rent and other essential services are forever on the increase. The question asked repeatedly: What can you do or buy with P400.00? One respondent expressed her frustration thus: *Tota ga gona sepe ... ke go sotla batho hela* [There is nothing ... this is just to worsen people's suffering].

However, the above complaints notwithstanding, the beneficiaries also acknowledge government efforts to provide some meager income to the poor and unemployed ... *Madi*

*a mannye thata but it is better than nothing.* Most of the women participants reported that the amount paid is not enough to buy food at all, especially for the family. This was corroborated by some programme implementers who observed that food is very expensive hence the beneficiaries end up buying cheaper food of poor quality (Phaleshe ya Bokomo) and sometimes get food that has already expired. They noted that for the elderly and HIV positive beneficiaries this pose a major health risk.

Recent escalations in food prices pose more challenges to meeting the food and other requirements of the most vulnerable members of society. So the respondents felt that the amount received from IP was grossly inadequate given the escalating prices of goods and services. This was highlighted by respondents in the remote settlements where cash employment opportunities are particularly low or non-existent and the depth of poverty high in terms of headcount. Failure to adjust IP wages in line with inflation therefore runs counter to the relief objectives of IP and its efforts to eradicate chronic poverty.

4. **Payment by cheque:** In some parts of the Central District Ipelegeng employees are paid by a cheque. This mode of payment has attracted a lot of criticism by the employees. Firstly, it is time consuming and cumbersome given the small amount. Secondly, the cheque issued has to be cashed at the Bank. The problem arises in small villages without banking facilities. Transport is a problem and where available it has to be paid for and thus depleting the already meager wage. The cheque holder is left with no alternative but to cash the cheque from available Chinese shops who charge a transaction fee in exchange. They either charge a small amount or require the bearer to buy goods worth at least P150.00.

In addition, sometimes payments are disbursed late. This has the effect of impoverishing the already poor and rendering Ipelegeng ineffective as a strategy for poverty reduction.

5. **No skills transfer:** Safety-net social development programmes should be empowering and sustainable. Through skills transfer such programmes seeks to build capacity of the beneficiaries for a sustainable livelihood. Unfortunately Ipelegeng as currently designed does not incorporate a skills transfer component. The beneficiaries are engaged as unskilled laborers and there is no effort to impart skills that they could use to earn a living and graduate from Ipelegeng. Thus, Ipelegeng does not provide any survival skills but instead promote dependency on government handouts. This runs counter to the overall objective of poverty eradication and hence raising doubts about the relevance of Ipelegeng with respect to empowering the beneficiaries. Almost all community leaders and IP implementers called for the incorporation of skills transfer as a major component of IP. Such life skills may include: entrepreneurial skills, small business development, mentoring, counseling and psychosocial support that could prepare the beneficiaries

psychologically to graduate from IP into more productive and sustainable poverty eradication programmes promoted by the Government of Botswana. It is important to point out that some of the beneficiaries may actually be sitting on assets that could earn them a sustainable income beyond the life of Ipelegeng.

The overemphasis of the IP on relief means that most of the time young people go without adequate life skills, counseling and guidance to help them face the problems and challenges of living in order to map out a better future for themselves and family. IP beneficiaries include able bodied youth and adults who may be temporarily rendered unemployed by lack of skills and the market failure to generate adequate jobs or by diseases such as HIV/AIDS. These people need greater encouragement and motivation to engage in productive employment activities after recovery. The skills transfer and rehabilitation programme for those who were de-registered from the destitute list remain largely under-resourced in terms of funds, human resources and planning. As most IP implementers pointed out, a considerable proportion of the budget for this programme [approximately 60%] goes into relief, leaving 40 percent for projects and nothing for the development of life skills, empowerment, rehabilitation and other exit programmes.

Furthermore, and in terms of relevance of IP as a strategy for poverty eradication, most programme planners and implementers submit that under the circumstances in which the IP is implemented i.e. with emphasis on filling the quota (the number of people engaged in Ipelegeng). Under the circumstances there is little or no hope that other critical components of the programme such as skills transfer, capacity building, empowerment and rehabilitation will be considered in the short-term.

### **Overall assessment**

Participants expressed serious dissatisfaction with the wage paid by Ipelegeng. They submitted that it is too low, poverty wages and exploitative given the amount of work done. The wage was set deliberately at a lower level because it was meant for the poor household, unemployed unskilled labourers and those in desperation and despair. They lamented that they were often harassed at work by their supervisors who are always pushing them to deliver more yet they get paid very little. They were also concerned about the attitude of the Ipelegeng coordinators who shun and look down upon them and always quick to apply “no work ... no pay rule” even when one had reasonable excuse not to be at work e.g. on account of ill-health. The low wages coupled with the need for rotation renders Ipelegeng irrelevant as a strategy for poverty eradication.

In the light of the above challenges, almost all the respondents across the districts visited were of the view that as currently designed, IP cannot eradicate poverty But can only relieve people from



hunger and destitution. If the current approach of giving the poor man a fish without teaching him how to fish continue, the Government of Botswana will never win the war against poverty.

To sum up, for the Ipelegeng Programme to be more relevant and respond more effectively to the problems of poverty, a more holistic approach that explicitly includes the core strategic objectives of effective targeting, skills transfer, graduation, empowerment, and **prevention should be included in the design of IP**. Each of these strategic objectives would have their specific objectives providing guidelines on intended impacts and outcomes. Above all, they should have an in-built monitoring and evaluation framework with clear objectives, indicators and targets to be achieved.

## **6.5 Main Findings and Recommendations**

### **Findings**

Is Ipelegeng relevant as a strategy for poverty alleviation was the main question that TOR 1 required the consultancy to address. Based on Ipelegeng beneficiaries' responses to this question, as well as our investigations based on focus group discussions and key informants interviews this study concludes that:

#### **A. Ipelegeng is a relevant strategy for poverty for poverty eradication**

- (i.) The Ipelegeng Programme is relevant to addressing the plight of the poor. This conclusion was arrived at across the data sources. (i.e. survey, in-depth interviews and FGDs).
- (ii.) An overwhelming 82 per cent of the respondents felt that the programme had assisted them improve their welfare. Only 18 per cent felt that the programme had not improved their welfare. This group cited low wages and the temporary and rotational nature of the programme as the main problem.
- (iii.) The majority of the respondents (63.8%) affirmed that Ipelegeng had given them skills that prepare them for the formal job market.
- (iv.) An overwhelming majority of 85 per cent of the respondents confirmed that they felt that Ipelegeng gave them some dignity. Most of those who rejected this notion thought the programme is less favourable compared to piece jobs.

Taken together, the evidence presented above shows that IP is relevant as a strategy geared towards addressing the plight of the poor. In the same vein, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with key informants have corroborated the view that Ipelegeng is a relevant programme by stating the following:

- i.) IP beneficiaries are able to buy food for themselves without depending heavily on relatives and Government
- ii.) The beneficiaries now have access to credit particularly from small shops (Semausu)
- iii.) The beneficiaries' dignity has been enhanced through their participation
- iv.) In somewhat unstructured manner the participants have gained some skills by observing work being done. This suggests that a structured training component within Ipelegeng has the potential to add value

**B.) Ipelegeng is weak as an Entrepreneurial vehicle.**

The notion that Ipelegeng could be used as a vehicle for entrepreneurial skills and small business development was rejected by 62.6 per cent of the respondents and endorsed by only 37.4 per cent. The main reason cited for the rejection was lack of savings generated from Ipelegeng to warrant any business venture. Focus Group Discussions and Key Informants interviews have buttressed this by pointing out that in addition to the temporary and rotational nature of Ipelegeng the programme lacks a strong structured training component. As they put it Ipelegeng gives people fish without teaching them how to fish. Some argued that with proper training and education Ipelegeng participants can actually make more money from collecting and recycling litter than they are making from the P400 wage.

**C.) The stated Ipelegeng objectives are not consistent with the current Government policy pronouncement on poverty /eradication and rural and remote area dwellers do not seem to know the objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme.**

The official Ipelegeng guidelines talk about providing "relief" while the official Government position is to achieve poverty eradication. Relief can make an improvement to ones poverty situation without necessarily taking the individual across the poverty line. These two stances have to be streamlined.

**D.) Both the Ipelegeng beneficiaries and key informants expect the Botswana Government as the sole sponsor of the programme to increase Ipelegeng wages, increase the employment duration, and employ participants permanently.**

**E.) Urban Centres particularly have shown a higher percentage of Ipelegeng participants who can only afford to buy food with their Ipelegeng wages.** The percentage for urban areas stands at 41.1 while the next geographical region is at 25.3 percentages. The only plausible explanation for this is that urban centres have high participation costs such as transport and payment of rentals which most likely leave a limited residual wage. Interviews with the Gaborone City Council have actually shown that the city is unable to exhaust its quota and it has to recruit from surrounding villages.

**F.) Remote Areas are very different from the rest of the regions as demonstrated by the fact that in virtually all conclusions in this section they are either opposite to the norm or are outliers. And in most cases these exception portray them as a much tougher terrain to fight poverty with the common ammunition.**

**G.) Some districts still pay participants using cheques and this has had the bearing of increasing participation costs to beneficiaries thereby reducing their net benefits.**

**H. IP objectives are relatively unknown among IP beneficiaries.** In this respect, the study found that 64 per cent of remote area Ipelegeng participants and 44 per cent of rural areas participants claimed they did not know the objectives and intention of the Ipelegeng Programme. FGD and key informants (KI) interviews further showed that across districts these objectives were known and understood differently. These groups felt that this lack of common understanding of these objectives adversely affects the implementation of the project. Particular concern was expressed regarding the participant's failure to understand that they are expected to graduate from the programme.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

***Recommendation 1:*** *Ipelegeng objectives must be revised and be aligned to the national objective of poverty eradication. Such an alignment should portray the programme only as a part of a process that seeks to achieve poverty eradication since on its own it cannot achieve that. Such an objective should therefore place emphasis on coordinating and linking the programme with other government programmes with the view to draw maximum synergies with such programmes.*

***Recommendation 2:*** *Ipelegeng must be redesigned to be result based to introduce flexible working schedules where beneficiaries will be assigned work and will work at their own time and pace and be paid on work done instead of time spent at work. Such a change should be done with the view to enable participants to get involved in other productive activities in the spirit of recommendation 12 below. Piece rate and task- based remuneration system as well as flexi-time should be introduced where feasible.*

***Recommendation 3:*** *Ipelegeng must introduce a well-structured capacity building component that arms participants with production skills as well as survival skills. Such skills will assist the participants to graduate to better paying jobs*

***Recommendation 4:*** *A strong and clear Communication, Education and Public Awareness Strategy for Ipelegeng must be designed. Such a strategy should place emphasis on ensuring that*

*the programme objectives are clearly known and understood by all stakeholders. The need for participants to graduate must form a central core for such a strategy.*

***Recommendation 5:*** *A cost benefit analysis of using a single national Ipelegeng wage rate to achieve self-selection must be undertaken with the view to establish whether different regional factors can be taken into account and hence vary the wage rate regionally.*

***Recommendation 6:*** *The Ministry of Local Government should investigate the reasons for Remote areas having displayed very different results from the rest of the groups regarding Ipelegeng Issues. Based on the outcome of this investigation the Ministry will determine if a Special Ipelegeng Programme targeting Remote areas should be designed and implemented.*

## Section 7: Effectiveness Issues


### 7.1 Introduction

The effectiveness of an intervention is measured by the extent to which its immediate objectives have been achieved. As can be seen from the analysis of data on IP relevance in the previous section, evaluating the effectiveness of an intervention requires that its objective should be clearly known and understood by all the major stakeholders. In addition, set targets of the intervention should be clear and known. The effectiveness of Ipelegeng was evaluated by asking the question: Has the programme provided “relief” from starvation to its beneficiaries and has it, at a national level, assisted with “poverty eradication”? This was done by looking at issues of sustenance as well as the usefulness and quality of the services provided by the programme.

### 7.2 Sustenance

Figure 7.1 below depicts a situation in which the majority of the respondents indicated satisfaction with the sustenance that Ipelegeng provides. This majority constituted 77 percent of the total sample. However, 22 percent of the respondents indicated that Ipelegeng was not adequately providing for their sustenance. Although a policy and/or a programme cannot provide the same level of satisfaction to all its intended beneficiaries, the fact that almost a quarter of the sample judged the programme to have failed to address their sustenance needs is significant and has some policy implications. It is apparent from Figure (7.1) below that females are more satisfied with this programme than males. The reasons for this will be discussed later in other sections of the report.

Figure 7. 1: Ipelegeng and sustenance by gender



The capacity of IP to meet the basic needs of the poor and other vulnerable groups was also underscored by the beneficiaries of IP who participated in FGDs when they acknowledged that the Ipelegeng programme has provided them with employment opportunities in the context of high levels of unemployment, especially for the unskilled labourers. The elderly women working for Ipelegeng, for instance, noted how they had struggled to make ends meet because of the various circumstances such as debilitating poverty, ill health, old age infirmities, neglect by their children and other challenges in life. They acknowledged with gratitude how the Government of Botswana, in particular came to their rescue through the Ipelegeng Programme. Through this programme, they are able to buy food for their children and do not die from starvation.

Through Ipelegeng, the beneficiaries were able to: (i) buy food for themselves without depending on the government or relatives to provide and as such do not die of hunger (ii) some have access to credit from local shops and kiosks (semausu) and this enables them to provide basic household items on a continuous basis.

The quotes below summarize participants' views on the effectiveness of Ipelegeng:

*Ga go tshwane le tshoo, kana ga gona ope yoo ka tlang a go neela P400.00 mahala o ntse hela. Ka madinyana ao motho o kgona go reka paletshenyana a lale a jele* [it is better than nothing ... no one can just give you P400.00 for free ...with that little amount one is able to buy a bag of mealie-meal to avoid starvation].

*Le fa go sa tshwane .... Mme hela ka ha e ntseng ka teng Ipelegeng ga e ka ke ya fitlhela maikaelelo a yone a go fedisa lehuma* [although it is better than nothing, as currently designed, Ipelegeng cannot deliver on the objective of poverty eradication].


The above perceptions were corroborated by evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with key informants, in particular, implementers and overseers of the Ipelegeng programme who made the following suggestions: :

1. That modest progress has been made towards the realization of the outcome referred to above. For example, in terms of employment there was a broad consensus among the key informants that the objective of creating temporary employment opportunities has been achieved. Ipelegeng is labor intensive and to this extent, many unemployed and unskilled laborers are now engaged and working for Ipelegeng. Each district is given an employment quota to fill and almost all sites visited had their quotas filled and had requested for an increase. Only Gaborone was unable to fill its quota of about 2000 beneficiaries per month. In Gaborone, it is difficult to fill the Ipelegeng quota because firstly, Ipelegeng is not the preferred form of employment because the wages paid are very low compared to other available unskilled jobs. Secondly, in Gaborone numerous employment opportunities exists, including casual jobs at both household and industry level.

2. Similar sentiments were shared by focus group discussion with VDC members and the beneficiaries across all the research sites. According to focus group discussion participants, Ipelegeng is a good programme that seeks to provide employment opportunities for the poor people. Participants were of the view that the effectiveness of Ipelegeng is clearly manifest in the income it brings to the beneficiaries. The expression “ ... Ipelegeng wages are very low ... but no matter how little ... it is better than nothing at all ... [*le rona re kgona go oba lebogo fa kgwedi e fela ... re tshwana le batho*]” was repeated in almost all the discussions with both in-depth and focus group discussion participants. This is a clear testimony that Ipelegeng cannot be dismissed simply as a non-starter. Ipelegeng contributes to the welfare and sustenance of the poor and without IP many poor people are likely to suffer.


Figure 7.2 and 7.3 below report the results on IP sustenance by the age and educational level of the respondents. An analysis of the data on sustenance by age (see Figure 7.2 below) reveals that satisfaction with Ipelegeng is directly proportional to age. The older one is, the more they are satisfied with the programme. The programme received a 71.1 percent endorsement from the age group 20 to 29 years which increases to 77 percent for the 30 – 39 age cohort. This increases progressively until it reaches 96.0 percent for the 60 to 69 years age group. This can be explained in several ways. It could be that the elderly are more appreciative and therefore accept the programme more readily. Alternatively, the older you are, the broader your asset base becomes and so is your ability to augment your Ipelegeng wage. The complementarity issue discussed in the literature review could be at play here.

Figure 7. 2: Ipelegeng and life sustenance by age



Unlike in the age case, figures in the Figure (7.3) below show the relationship between level of education and satisfaction with Ipelegeng. It is clear from this table that the higher the level of education, the less satisfaction one derives from working for the Ipelegeng Programme. This makes intuitive sense because employment opportunities open up with more education.

Figure 7. 3: Ipelegeng and sustenance by education level



The observed low urban approval rates for the Ipelegeng Programme have already been explained in terms of high participation cost in the relevance section. Also emerging from this Table is the fact that both rural and remote areas are the least satisfied with Ipelegeng. It could be that the two already have high poverty levels and the programme is only scratching the surface. In addition, IP beneficiaries who participated in focus group discussion repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the wages paid to Ipelegeng workers by the government. They pointed out that although what they get paid from Ipelegeng is better than nothing or than simply sitting at home and doing nothing, the wages remain very low and unable to meet basic household needs.

Figure 7. 4: Ipelegeng and sustenance by region







Figure 7. 5: Lack of sustenance by gender



The group that felt its sustenance had not improved was asked to explain their answer. The low wages paid by Ipelegeng was given as the main reason for Ipelegeng's failure to provide sustenance to the beneficiaries. There was almost complete unanimity across gender, different age groups, different education levels and geographic regions.

### 7.3 Targeting and Ipelegeng benefits

The literature review section of this report has already made the point that the extent of benefits that can be derived from a PWPs depends on proper targeting of the poor. This review sought to establish how well targeted to the poor Ipelegeng is by posing a number of questions to the sampled participants. The first question was how they felt about the project's ability to target the poor? The responses were summarised and are presented in Table (7.6) below. Data revealed that 69.2 percent said that there was good targeting of the poor by the programme and 30.8 percent said that there was no targeting. 70.9 percent believed that Ipelegeng was well targeted to the poor and the figure is 68.7 percent for females and 70.9 percent for male respondents. Education data suggests that the more educated the respondent is the more likely he/she is to believe that Ipelegeng is less targeted to the poor. At 72.4 percent urban villages lead the respondents in the belief that Ipelegeng is well targeted to the poor followed by urban areas with rural and remote areas coming last at 67.4 and 63.3 percent respectively.

Figure 7. 6: Ipelegeng and targeting by gender





Figure 7. 7: Ipelegeng and targeting by education level



However, contrary to the view expressed by the majority of survey respondents as demonstrated by the above Tables that Ipelegeng is well targeted, data gleaned from in-depth interview with key informants, in particular, government civil servants responsible for the implementation of the Ipelegeng programme indicated that the programme does not have any specific criteria for selecting the target group nor any qualification. The target group is broad, wide and self defined. For example, for one to benefit from the programme, they are required to be 18 years of age and above who are in possession of a valid Omang Card. A key respondent noted:

While other government safety net or poverty programmes have clear criteria for qualification and hence targeting, this is not the case with Ipelegeng. For example, there is a specific criteria developed for one to be defined as a destitute person or an orphan. Interestingly for Ipelegeng, poverty and vulnerability is by self definition. This means that


anyone can work for Ipelegeng should they wish to define themselves as poor and are willing to work for the paltry P400.00.

Participants also made comments on the rotational nature of Ipelegeng and how such an approach can make targeting very difficult. They pointed out that the beneficiaries can remain in and out (rotational) of the programme as long as they want. There is no push for one to graduate as evidenced by the limited projects initiated at district level which encourage beneficiaries to graduate from the Ipelegeng programme. None of the districts consulted could actually provide any list of beneficiaries who graduated from the programme, nor could any executive officer provide any statistics reflecting the goals and targets set at district level. There was effectively no evidence that districts had any commitment to eradicate or reduce poverty to any significant degree and in line with national commitments, enshrined in other national poverty policy documents such as NSPR, 2003, NDP 10 and Vision 2016. Lack of targeting and indifference towards graduation obviously render IP inefficient as a strategy for poverty eradication.

### 7.3.1 Improving Ipelegeng targeting

Figure 7.8 below depicts the proportions of the respondents who indicated that they did not believe that Ipelegeng has actually targeted the poor as a preferred target groups. About 92 percent of the respondent indicated that their preferred target group is the members of the poor households with no working members. From these, 50 percent ranked it the highest priority, followed by 31.7 percent who ranked it second and only 18 percent ranked it third. The second option indicated by the respondents was targeting the unemployed youth especially orphans, with 77.9 percent of the respondents opting for it as a priority. Of these, 25.8 percent ranked it higher (highest priority), followed by 36.7 percent ranking it second and 37.5 percent ranked it third. 64.3 percent felt that the targeted group should include de-registered able bodied destitute whilst 52.6 percent felt that the female headed households should be targeted. Only 2.2 percent indicated that the unemployed males should be targeted.

Figure 7. 8: Ipelegeng and targeting of the poor



## 7.4 Selection of Ipelegeng Participants

It has already been argued that the net benefit to PWP participants is measured by the *net wage gain* where the net wage gain is the wage less the participation costs. Bribes constitute part of this participation costs. It stands to reason that where corruption is prevalent participation costs will increase thereby diminishing the net wage gain which naturally reduces the effectiveness of the intervention.

Participants' views on whether there was any unfairness in Ipelegeng hiring were solicited and this was followed by establishing how the participant had been hired. The results are captured in Figure 7.9 below. Overall, 86.0 percent believed that the selection process was fair while 14 percent believed it was not fair. Whilst those who thought there was fairness fair in hiring far exceeds those who thought there was a practice of unfair hiring, the figure of 14 percent is significant and it can grow to dangerous levels if not controlled in time. This will become more likely when unemployment increases and the demand for Ipelegeng jobs also increases.

Figure 7. 9: Fairness and Ipelegeng selection by gender





Figure 7. 10: How did you get enrolled in Ipelegeng, by respondents' gender



Figures 7.9 and 7.10 above depicts a situation where most people are employed through proper channels with very little interference. The social worker column captures the able bodied group that was transferred from the old Destitute Programme. Very little political interference can be read from the figure above. VDC direct involvement in hiring as a supervising body seems limited.

Throughout the consultations and across all the districts visited, it was reported that almost all the people who work for the Ipelegeng programme present themselves in person to the Kgotla to look for a job. The process of recruitment is open, non-discriminatory and fair. If recruitment is happening for the first time it is basically on a first come, first enrol basis. The VDC, who in this case are involved in the process of recruitment are only concerned about filling in the quota provided by the Ipelegeng Coordinators. However, the dynamics change when the recruitment is conducted the second time around. This time attention is paid to those who are seeking IP jobs for the first time. This is consistent with the rotational aspect of the Ipelegeng programme. . The VDC has to ensure that those who had participated before to give others a chance also to work (rotational). This approach was clearly captured by one of the supervisors who is a VDC member:

*Rra, mo Ipelegeng re hira ka tekatekanyo. Re dira gore mongwe le mongwe a bone photlha leene a bone go oba lebogo gore a tle a kgone go rekela bana phaletshe. Kana re hira mongwe le mongwe hela ... a o mogolo, a o nale bogole kana o seso hela ha o kgona go bereka re a go hira* [We recruit fairly, we want and recruit everyone because we want everyone to get a chance whether you are old, young or a person living with disability if you can work it is fine].

*Ba bangwe batle ba re go firwa ka losika, tota ga go a nna jalo. Ke hela gore fa gongwe batho ba a tlhela o bo o fitlhela go bereketse batho ba le bangwe ruri. Mme hela re leka gore batho ba bereke botlhe. Kana go jewa go sutelanwa* [some people accuse us of

practicing nepotism in the recruitment process, but this is not true. Its only that sometimes we do not have enough laborers and the same people come back. We try to give everybody a chance to work for IP].

Similar sentiments were expressed by community leaders (Dikgosi) that during the time of recruitment their Kgotla get filled up. VDC members and Ipelegeng Coordinator then conduct the recruitment process in an open Kgotla and ***“I did not observe any attempt to hide anything”***.

The sentiments reported above clearly demonstrate the open and fair nature of the recruitment process. Ipelegeng does not discriminate and everyone get a chance to work if they are willing or able to do so. Clearly, socio-economic status in the community is not a criteria, the criteria is self-definition and self-selection. The assumption is that those who are well off will not present themselves for IP employment. It would appear this approach has worked well so far in that there were no complaints about the well off (rich) people taking slots for the poor. But one would argue that most VDC members who also happen to be supervisors are not necessarily poor and vulnerable. They may be taking slots for the destitutes persons who were de-registered from the destitute list on account of being able bodied. A sizeable number of key informants recommended ***that in future clear criteria of IP beneficiaries should be developed. Such criteria should be consistent with other poverty eradication policies and should incorporate an empowerment and graduation dimensions.***

### ***Quality of Ipelegeng services***

It has already been argued in other sections of this report that IP is not only supposed to create employment but it is also expected to generate high quality durable assets that can have second round effects on employment creation by crowding in the private sector. This resonates well with the Botswana Government's stated Ipelegeng objective “...to provide relief whilst at the same time carrying out essential developmental projects....” To establish the usefulness and quality of Ipelegeng activities participants were requested to rate the usefulness of seven such activities. The results are analysed below.

Figure 7.11 below shows that Ipelegeng participants rated road de-bushing and clearing highest at 88 percent followed by Green Scorpions at 79.8 percent with crime prevention at a distant third of 60.8 percent. Cleaning of various surroundings gets the least rating at 11 percent. The second least rated Ipelegeng activity is litter picking at 20 percent. It would be interesting to map these figures against the actual numbers of participants deployed in these activities. One seems to get the impression that the two least rated programme activities absorb a reasonable proportion of the Ipelegeng work force. Admittedly, the evaluation process omitted to assess the ratings of the maintenance component of the Ipelegeng activities which actually is a significant part of the overall budget. That notwithstanding, the overall impression gathered from FGDs and Key Informants Interviews is that there still exists substantial room for improvement in Ipelegeng project selection.

Figure 7. 11: Ipelegeng activities approval rate





Figure 7. 12: Strongly agree by region



Ipelegeng participants from each geographic area were asked to rank each programme activity according to the ratings of: - strongly agree, agree, neutral and disagree. Figure 7.12 above has mapped only the strongly agree ratings for each programme activity. These ratings are being used as popular rating for each activity. It is clear from Figure 7.12 that for urban areas road bush clearing is the most preferred as it received the highest percentage of “strongly agree” rating. Dam and drain de-silting comes second followed by Green Scorpions at third place. Cleaning of various surroundings is the least preferred at 15.8 percent. Litter picking is the second last at 32.6 percent. The preference ordering for urban villages is road and bush clearing

first, followed by Green Scorpions with crime fighting coming third. Litter picking comes last. Remote areas rate Crime Fighting highest and school feeding programme, for obvious reasons, is rated second. A clear conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 7.12 is that road bush clearing is the most popular in terms of value addition as judged by participants. Litter picking and cleaning of various surroundings are the least rated in terms of value addition.

With reference to the above, what comes out clearly from in-depth interviews and FGDs is that before the projects to be undertaken under the Ipelegeng project are selected, the various communities through their representatives should be consulted. This view was expressed throughout the districts visited. Clearly, kgotla meetings were held in Villages, Ward and Town Hall meetings are also held in urban centres for the communities to decide on their priorities with Government officials. However, focus group discussion with VDC (supervisors) revealed that in practice their priorities (projects) are always ignored while Government preferred projects prevailed.

There was also a general consensus among community leaders (councillors and Dikgosi) that the current projects implemented under Ipelegeng are not reflective of the needs and priorities or pressing development concerns and issues in their communities. They expressed dissatisfaction that the projects are not sustainable and will not take people out of poverty. They preferred more productive and income generating projects, particularly in Agriculture. These are sustainable projects that will build the capacity of the people for self-reliance rather than encourage people to depend on Government handouts forever. A few indicated that although Ipelegeng might have good intentions of poverty eradication, it is in fact getting Batswana deeper into poverty and it is a waste of funds. It is unwise to continue wasting funds like this when the country is undergoing a recession. One of the participants summarized these concerns by recommending that:

***The Government should always consult with the people and do what people want ... not what they think is good for the people. Councillors, VDC and Dikgosi are important local stakeholders who should be engaged.***

The research team also observed uniform Ipelegeng projects throughout all the districts. For example, in almost all the districts, the IP projects were: Litter picking, de-bushing; building maintenance; green scorpion; road sweeping; drain de-silting and community policing (crime prevention). The response from Ipelegeng Coordinators and other government officials is that Ipelegeng seeks to promote labor intensive projects. In their opinion it is the labour intensive nature of the above projects that make them more attractive to the Government.


Overall, the consultants believe that that the poor should be consulted as this is consistent with Government thinking and pronouncements that for poverty eradication measures to be effective, the poor must be consulted as an important stakeholder.



### ***Measure for Increasing Effectiveness***

Figure 7.13 depicts the different initiatives suggested by the participants that can be taken to increase the effectiveness of Ipelegeng. About 77 percent of the respondents felt that Ipelegeng wages need to be increased to increase the effectiveness of the programme. This is followed by 66 percent who felt that beneficiaries should be employed on permanent basis while 57.8 percent felt that beneficiaries should be taught production skills. Only 14.2 percent of the respondents felt that there was need to do means testing in Ipelegeng in order to increase its effectiveness.

Figure 7. 13: Proportion of respondents by priorities



## **7.5 Main Findings and Recommendations**

The answer to the question whether Ipelegeng has effectively addressed the objective of poverty eradication and relief is that there has been more relief than poverty eradication. The high sustenance ratings that the project has received from the evaluation indicate that the project has provided the required relief to the poor. However, as seen in other sections of the report, low savings associated with this project mean that no asset base is being built to fight poverty. Furthermore, even though hiring appears to be non-corrupt, targeting, particularly of women, seems to be weak. The seemingly poor quality of Ipelegeng activities renders this programme's effectiveness incomplete. This is because effectiveness does also relate to the quality of assets that the PWPs are producing.

Qualitative data also arrived at similar conclusions that Ipelegeng has been generally rendered ineffective because unlike other "regular" government programme, it would appear the programme is given preference over others because it was initiated by the state President. In terms of the manner in which it is implemented, this programme appears to be very popular among the poor people, especially those living in the rural and remote areas.

A major limitation identified by key informants is that IP is often implemented in a top-down fashion that often took the form of Directives. According to in-depth interviews conducted with civil servants, the top-down approach to implementation of IP has limited their ability to contribute to a rationale revision and re-design of some aspects of Ipelegeng. Worse still, there is always pressure from MLG and OP to deliver the programme by meeting the set quota. This has frustrated proper planning and execution of Ipelegeng such that it delivers on its mandate.

A more bottom-up approach accompanied by broad consultation and alertness to delivery might boost the programmes effectiveness. This approach would avoid as one civil servant puts it “*the numbers game ... not a poverty eradication strategy*” that characterizes the current programme. It is believed this approach will deliver increased welfare to the benefit of the poor. That way targeting will be enhanced and implementation improved. The bottom-up approach is also consistent with some of the best features of well-designed Public Works Programmes.

***In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that:***

***Recommendation 7:*** *The IP project selection should be based on the following key criteria:*

- i ) a genuine bottom - up consultative process where community’s wishes on Ipelegeng projects to be implemented will be headed to.*
- ii) the environment, natural resource endowment and skills base for the concerned areas.*
- iii) high quality projects with second round employment generation effects and the crowding-in effect on the private sector*

***Recommendation 8:*** *Ipelegeng should be redesigned to take on board gender, age, health status and different group specific issues. Such a re-design would look, for example, at the needs of women in terms of their mothering and nursing roles as well as their household responsibilities. Consideration should be given to providing relevant facilities that are complementary to women’s responsibilities. Work schedules would also have to consider minimizing the participation costs that both gender groups face. Use of piece-rate and task based payment must be explored where feasible.*

***Recommendation 9:*** *Ipelegeng should review and upgrade its Health and Safety guidelines.*

## **Section 8: Efficiency Issues**

### **8.1 Introduction**

The third term of reference requires that the review should assess and explain the efficiency of the Ipelegeng Programme (IP) and the capacities of the central and local government departments responsible for its implementation. Based on the research team's understanding of the meaning of the term efficiency within the context of the language used in programme evaluation studies, this section used the data that was collected from IP beneficiaries, key informants and focus group discussions to address the requirements of this ToR. This section starts by presenting a working definition of efficiency. This is followed by an analysis of data from the survey using major variables such as gender, education, age and districts/locality or regions. The main findings emerging from the data were used to formulate policy recommendations which are critical in the design of the "new" Ipelegeng Programme.

### **8.2 The Meaning of Efficiency**

When an intervention expends its resources in a manner that produces the best outputs, in terms of both quantity and quality, the intervention is considered to be efficient. This section, therefore, concerns itself with how well Ipelegeng inputs have been utilized. The term inputs in this context refers to labour, raw material and equipment. The efficient deployment of labour affects both the magnitude and quality of services rendered by Ipelegeng. To the extent that labour is used together with raw materials, tools and equipment to provide Ipelegeng services, the programme evaluation process has to cover all these items. Both the quality and quantity of Ipelegeng services are central to the evaluation process.


The efficiency of any programme can be determined by comparing the inputs that go into the programme against the output generated by the programme. Programme data that could enable such an analysis is not available. Had it been possible to determine the value of the activities that Ipelegeng engages on, a comparison of this value to the costs incurred by the programme would have shed some light on the extent of the efficiency of the programme. It is noteworthy that the inexistence of such data is a consequence of the absence of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism in the current Ipelegeng programme.

The above notwithstanding, one can hazard a very rough indication on efficiency from the scanty programme data available. One way is to look at the trends in the programme budget and compared these to trends in actual expenditure. The percentage of the budget spent on different components of the programme can also be as a rough indicator of the programme efficiency.

## Budget Trends vs Expenditure trends and Employment Trends


Figure 8.1 depicts trends in Ipelegeng budget and actual expenditure. Both the budget and expenditure experienced a downward trend from 2007/08 to 2009/10. With the exception of 2010/2011 budget data seems to suggest that the budget for Ipelegeng has trended downwards from P330 million in 2007/8 to P281.5 million in 2011/12. The expenditure on the other hand, even though experienced a downward trend till 2009/10, it increased from 218.7 million in 2009/10 to about 300 million in 2011/12. One possible explanation for this could be that increases in wages might have caused the upwards trend in expenditure.

Figure 8. 1: Trends in Ipelegeng Budget and Expenditure




Employment trends in Ipelegeng have been on the increase from 2007/08 to 2011/12 (Figure 8.2). One is tempted to conclude from these results that because Ipelegeng has increased its expenditure and employment while the budget was trending downwards the programme has, overtime, gained on efficiency.

Figure 8. 2: Trends in Ipelegeng employment



A clearer picture of what is actually happening emerges when you dissect Ipelegeng expenditure into expenditure on labour, inputs and on project expenses. Figure 8.3 shows a drastic transition from draught relief which was material dominated to the new Ipelegeng that places extreme importance on labour intensity. The programme that emerged after 2007/8 saw the labour cost shares increase six folds from 13.7% in 2007/8 to 84.8% in 2011/12. Materials shares plummeted ten times from 70.5% in 2007/8 to 7.1 % in 2011/12. Similarly running expenses shares were halved from 15.9 % to 8.1%. The increases in both expenditure and employment may not necessarily have arisen from efficiency gains but from the drastic increase in labour intensity.

Figure 8. 3: Ipelegeng Cost Allocation over time



This clearly has a bearing on the relative quality of Draught Relief projects as against Ipelegeng Projects. Both focus group discussions and Ipelegeng participants expressed some nostalgia about the former stating that its projects were of high quality as compared to the current Ipelegeng. It can be concluded from this that while Ipelegeng has drastically pushed the employment figures up it might have injured the quality of the projects by drastically reducing the amount of inputs as well as running costs of the new programme.

### 8.3 Data Analysis

The literature review section has already articulated how the beneficiary's cost of participating in an intervention is netted out of the PWP wage to get the "*net wage gain*". For example, when a woman hires a maid to assist in child care so that she can participate in an intervention the maid's wage has to be deducted from her salary to get her actual benefits from the intervention. If she cannot afford to hire the maid either she goes with the child to work or she does not go to work at all. The wage that is paid to the maid is considered her "*participation cost*." When these costs are high such that beneficiaries cannot afford to meet them they either exclude themselves from the intervention or revert to some unconventional measures such as taking their children with them to the work place as it is currently the case in some Ipelegeng projects. When an intervention imposes transaction costs on its beneficiaries, the intervention is considered not to be efficient.


To reduce these participation costs to manageable levels, PWPs are usually designed in a manner that takes into account participation costs and the participants' special circumstances. For instance, the elderly, old and infirm, and pregnant women who work for Ipelegeng are given lighter jobs. Mothers are posted at crèches or near play schools so that their children can be taken care of while they, as parents, participate in PWPs assignment. Similarly, farmers who need to participate in the PWPs are given flexi time so that they can conveniently divide their time between their farms and the PWPs. In that way Ipelegeng takes into account the special circumstances of its participants. It was for this reason that Ipelegeng participant who were sampled in the survey were asked whether their personal circumstances were taken into account when they were assigned to their current posts. A detailed analysis of the views expressed by the respondents is discussed below.

#### 8.3.1 Personal circumstances and Ipelegeng post assignments

The current and former beneficiaries of Ipelegeng were asked to state whether their personal circumstances were taken into account when employed by IP. Almost 60 percent of the respondents claimed that their circumstances were not taken into account (at 57.6 percent) of the sample while those who believed that their circumstances were taken into account constituted 42.4 percent of the sample. In terms of gender, a slight variation was observed in favour of females. For example, 42.6 percent of females affirmed that their circumstances were taken into account and 41.9 percent for males said the same. The finding that a significant proportion of females were not consulted is worrisome because properly designed PWPs are expected to take into account women multiple responsibilities. This result, in a way explains why as will be seen in some sections of the report was some women working for Ipelegeng have had to take their

children with them to work. This has not only adversely affected their productivity but has also raised issues of safety of these children.

Figure 8. 4: Personal circumstances




Data obtained from qualitative interviews attribute the absence of consultation to lack of standard programme guidelines. A concern was expressed by almost all the key informants, in particular, councillors interviewed that Ipelegeng, unlike other Government programmes, does not have sufficient and standardized programme guidelines to guide those responsible for its operations and implementation. They expressed the view that each district seems to have its own guidelines. Worse still, these are not clearly stated and understood by both the supervisor and the workers resulting in arbitrary discretions that borders on nepotism and favoritism. The existing guidelines are loosely defined, selectively applied and not strictly enforced. For instance, it is not uncommon for mothers to bring their babies to site yet no clear guidelines exist that allows this practice. Thus, there is no clear provision on this, yet it is a practice generally accepted among Ipelegeng workers, supervisors and coordinators in some areas while it may not be the case in other locations.

The broad consensus is that Ipelegeng guidelines are not clearly defined in the programme objectives. In-depth interview respondents indicated that in order to enhance the efficiency and relevance of the programme, standardized programme guidelines should be developed together with clear terms and conditions of employment. This might clear the confusion currently bedeviling the implementation of the Ipelegeng Programme. The development of the guidelines requires extensive consultations with all the potential beneficiaries. It is the contention of the majority of the key informants that the development of the Ipelegeng guidelines should not be handled by government officials (i.e. MLG and Office of the President) alone but it should be discussed with other important stakeholders such as Village Development Committees (VDCs), councilors, Dikgosi and the community at large.

Figure 8.5 shows that 50 percent of those aged 70 years and above claimed that their

circumstances were taken into account and this is gratifying. One would have, however, liked to see a picture where the percentage that said “yes” progressively increasing with age, capturing the fact that Ipelegeng is sensitive to the needs of the elderly. The pattern emerging from Figure 8.5 seems to be random and not reflecting any deliberate intension in the design of the programme to address the needs of this group. If after an elderly person has been assigned a job that is more physically demanding and he needs to buy medicine to relieve muscle pain, he will have to spend money on transport to buy the medication. Buying the medication lowers his net wage gain relative to that of a younger man. The reduction of the net wage gain does not auger well for the programme’s relief and poverty eradication objective.

Figure 8. 5: Personal circumstances by gender




An observation was made by a number of participants during focus group discussions. They pointed out that since Ipelegeng is not regarded as a proper job, many decisions are often left to the discretion of the Ipelegeng coordinators or project supervisors. The supervisors are always keen to apply the “no work no pay rule” even under circumstances that do not warrant such. This is clearly captured by the quote below from one of the beneficiaries:

*Kana tota batho bone ga bana maikaelelo a a tshwanang le a puso a go nyeletsa lehuma. Bone ba batla gore sotla hela. Kana gompieno jaana ha ke lwala ke bo ke ikopa go ya ko tlilining thekethe yame e a emisiwa. Gape go nale kgethololo, ba bangwe ba letlelelwa go lofela tiro mme ba bangwe bone ke molato. Nna tota ga ke tlhaloganye [these people do not have similar intentions to that of Government to eradicate poverty. All they want to do is to ensure that we continue to suffer. A mere request to go to the clinic for health reason attracts no work no pay rule. There are also behaviors from supervisors that borders on discrimination .... Others are punished while others are left free. I really do not understand this].*

The analysis of data on education does not yield any clearly discernible pattern. Similarly, no clear pattern emerges from regional / district data or are there any peculiarities coming from educational data sets.



Figure 8. 6: Personal circumstances by education



### 8.3.2 Ipelegeng Labour Productivity

Contrary to its literal meaning, which connotes self-reliance, Ipelegeng is generally seen as one of the Government programmes that promote a dependency syndrome. During field research the team came across allegations that some Ipelegeng participants were refusing to work hard because they felt that the project was not meant to make them work but was just a conduit through which Government wanted to give people some money. The transfer of the able bodied destitute persons from the Destitute Programme (2002) to Ipelegeng gave further credence to this view as Ipelegeng was now perceived to be a continuation of the Destitute Programme.

To establish productivity dimensions of Ipelegeng the participants were asked to rate and compare the effort that they put into Ipelegeng projects and the effort they would expend into their own personal chores or piece jobs.

Overall, 85.6 percent of the respondents reported that they were working as hard in their Ipelegeng assignments as they would in similar tasks of their own. Only 14.4 percent admitted that they were putting in less effort in Ipelegeng assignments than they would in their own. Analysis of data by age, gender, education and districts produces this same picture that portrays a highly productive and efficient Programme. These figures need to be interpreted with caution as they may be exaggerated. Participants might have thought that a negative impression about the productivity of the programme could lead to the recommendation that the programme be discontinued. For purposes of policy recommendation this information will have to be supplemented by focus group and key informants data. Some policy insights can also be derived from the group that admitted to expending less effort in Ipelegeng activities.

Figure 8. 7: Efforts put in IP by gender




Figure 8. 8: Efforts put in IP by age




Figure 8. 9: Efforts put in IP by education





Figure 8. 10: Efforts put in IP by region



Unfortunately, the data presented above (85.6 percent) was not confirmed by the majority of qualitative interview participants, in particular, the key informants at almost all research sites. They pointed out that Ipelegeng beneficiaries did not put much effort in their work. In fact, in both in-depth interviews and FGDs with key informants, the majority did not mince their words. They were emphatic that Ipelegeng workers are lazy and spoiled. One participant said:

These people do not have any work ethic. They simply refuse to work and spend a lot of their time idling. Some come to work hopelessly drunk and sleep on the job. They simply do not care. The situation is worsened by lack of supervision.

Similar sentiments were shared by key informants who were members of the Ipelegeng Coordinating Committee, thus:

Ipelegeng employees simply do not take Ipelegeng as a proper job. They refuse to work and would rather spend time during working hours just loitering around or at worst, they sleep during working hours.

One of the key informants said rather surprisingly:

I have a vote for casual laborers. I employ the same people who qualify to work for Ipelegeng ... they are poor and do not have skills. You cannot believe it. These people work so hard and complete work on or even before the time. Ironically, you take the same people to Ipelegeng and they refuse to work. I think this is an attitude problem.

The researchers can confirm the above sentiments from their own observations. In almost all the research sites visited, we observed general lack of work ethic among Ipelegeng beneficiaries. A piece of work that would ordinarily take one week to complete often takes months and no one seem to be worried about that. At one site we literally took pictures of people sleeping on the job.

### **8.3.2.1 Reasons for low productivity**

The group that admitted that its efforts were not to the level that they would expend if they were working for themselves was asked to give reason for their position. The most popular reason for not expending much effort into Ipelegeng projects was low levels of remuneration at the rating of 38.9 percent of this subgroup. Failure to take into account health and safety measures came second at 31.9 percent. Bad supervision and failure to harness workers' skills and strengths were tied at third position with at 12.5 percent rating.

The fact that a health and safety measure rating is almost at the same level in terms of rating with low remuneration is very significant and has policy implications. Even more important is the fact that 39.2 percent females cited this reason against 14.3 percent for males.

Problems in health and safety measures in the study related to failure by the programme to provide participants with protective clothing and work suits. Work conditions that made it difficult for participants to receive medical attention were another dimension.

Participants complained that Ipelegeng does not provide them with protective clothing in spite of the type of manual jobs they undertake. Stories of trees falling on participants and beneficiaries having to handle rough and thorny bushes without hand gloves were cited as sources of unsafe protection. The threat of snake bites due to unavailability of work boots and possibility of being attacked by wild animals with not proper protection is an example of another source of concern.

Health issues specifically concerned the fact that picking litter without always having the proper protective gear could be health threatening. Furthermore, the absence of proper sick leave also put the beneficiaries' health at risk as they were forced to skip going for medical attention for fear of losing their wages.

From the policy point of view the only disturbing factor is that to be rated close to remuneration level is significant enough to warrant policy attention. Drawing from this Ipelegeng Health and Safety measures need to be identified and addressed. The huge divergence in the female and males' rating of this problem is also an important policy and programme design matter that needs to be addressed as it signals the existence of some major Ipelegeng aspects that women are not happy with. The literature Review section has already underscored the fact that the design of PWPs needs to take on board females' special requirements. A review of Ipelegeng Programme aiming at factoring in women issues will be needed. Low remuneration was further corroborated by in-depth interviews and FGDs with key informants. Across all the research sites there was a broad consensus among participants that Ipelegeng wages were extremely low given the ever-increasing cost of living. The prices of basic necessities such as food, clothing, rent and other

essential services are forever on the increase. The question asked repeatedly throughout the interviews was: What can you do or buy with P400.00? One respondent expressed her frustration thus:

*Tota ga gona sepe ... ke go sotla batho hela* [There is nothing, this is just to worsen people's suffering]. *Mpolelela wena hela gore o ka dira eng ka matsananyana a teng bogolo jang fa o nale bana. Ga gona se o ka se dirang. Nna tota ga ke itse gore goromente yoo are o okanya jang tota. Kana tota le fa o fa batho ga gore o ba sotle* [Just tell me what you can do with Ipelegeng money especially when you have children to feed and support. There is nothing you can do. I do not know the thinking of this government. If this was meant to be a free gift, it should not be degrading and punitive].

The above complaints notwithstanding, the beneficiaries also acknowledge government efforts to provide some meager income to the poor and unemployed ... *Madi a mannye thata but it is better than nothing*. Most of the women participants reported that the amount paid is not enough to buy food at all, especially for the family. This view was corroborated by some programme implementers who observed that food is very expensive hence the beneficiaries end up buying cheaper food of poor quality and sometimes get food that has already expired. They noted that for the elderly and HIV positive beneficiaries this pose a major health risk. Recent escalations in food prices pose more challenges to meeting the food and other requirements of the most vulnerable members of society. So the respondents felt that the amount received from IP was crossly inadequate given the escalating prices of food and other essential household items. This was highlighted by respondents in the remote settlements where cash employment opportunities are particularly low or non-existent and the depth of poverty high in terms of headcount. Failure to adjust IP wages in line with inflation therefore runs counter to the relief objectives of IP and its efforts to eradicate chronic poverty.

Bad supervision leading to absenteeism and shirking was mentioned mostly by males at 28.6 percent rating whilst females rate it at only 5.9 percent. This is yet another gender divergence that signals a need for a programme design that takes into account the different needs of different Ipelegeng stakeholders and participants. Another divergence between the two sexes emerges when males rate improper harnessing of skills at 19 percent while females rate it at 9.8 percent.

The foregoing discussion has identified areas of sharp divergence between females' and males areas of interest that warrant a programme review and policy change.

Table 8. 1: Most important reasons for this difference in output by gender

	Bad supervision leading to high absenteeism and shirking	Mob psychology causes less productivity	our skills and areas of strengths are not properly harnessed	failure of the system to take into account health and safety measures	IP payment too low	Total
Male	28.6%	0	19.0%	14.3%	38.1%	100.0%
Female	5.9%	5.9%	9.8%	39.2%	39.2%	100.0%
Overall	12.5	4.2	12.5%	31.9%	38.9%	100.0%

Table 8. 2: Most important reason for this difference in output by age

	Bad supervision leading to high absenteeism and shirking	Mob psychology causes less productivity	our skills and areas of strengths are not properly harnessed	failure of the system to take into account health and safety measures	IP payment too low	Total
<= 19	20.0%			20.0%	60%	100.0%
20 – 29	15.2%	3.0%	15.2%	27.3%	39.4%	100.0%
30 – 39		14.3%	14.3%	21.4%	50.0%	100.0%
40 – 49	14.3%			57.1%	28.6%	100.0%
50 – 59	12.5%			50.0%	37.5%	100.0%
60 – 69	33.3%		33.3%	33.3%		100.0%
70+			50%	50.0%		100.0%
Overall	12.5%	4.2%	12.5%	31.9%	38.9%	100.0%

An age analysis of productivity differentials reveals that low wages are lamented by almost all age groups with the youth (ages 19 – 35 years) group complaining most with a 60 percent rating followed by the age group 40 – 49 years at 57.1 percent. Interestingly, ages 60 years and above do not see low salaries as a problem. The cohort 70 years and over splits its rating equally between health and safety measures and failure to properly harness available skills. Those aged 60 to 69 years split their vote three ways equally between bad supervision, bad harnessing of skills and health and safety measures. The fact that senior citizens of this country are almost unanimous about safety measures and harnessing of skills is significant especially when they had the option of complaining about salaries on the menu and did not pick it up.

Similar sentiments were underscored by the qualitative data. It would appear that Ipelegeng is not concerned about empowerment and capacity building of its beneficiaries so that they can ultimately graduate from the programme. The main challenge identified during in-depth

interview with key informants is that there is no additional staffing to facilitate the implementation of the empowerment or rehabilitative component of the Ipelegeng programme. One key informant noted:

Ipelegeng should not only be reduced to de-bushing and litter picking, it should build the capacity of the beneficiaries for sustainable livelihoods. IP should build capacity of the beneficiaries and prepare them for self-reliance instead of making them to rely on the Government for their sustance.

Educational attainment does not seem to have any effect except that certificate holders have voted 100 percent on bad supervision and O’Levels have thrown their weight behind bad skills harnessing. The certificate query is understandable in that these are technical artisans who are charged with the responsibility to undertake some of the technical jobs. They work with Ipelegeng participants directly as their assistants but do not supervise them. When participants do not turn up for work artisans’ work suffers. Artisans are therefore expressing their frustration with IP participants. O’level holders are aspiring clericals who, instead, get to be allocated to manual jobs and are supervised by the not so educated VDC officials.

Table 8. 3: Most important reason for this difference in output by education

	Bad supervision leading to high absenteeism and shirking	Mob psychology causes less productivity	our skills and areas of strengths are not properly harnessed	failure of the system to take into account health and safety measures	IP payment too low	Total
None	12.5%		12.5%	37.5%	37.5%	100%
Primary	11.8%		5.9%	41.2%	41.2%	100%
JC	8.8%	2.9%	11.8%	35.3%	41.2%	100%
O ‘Level	9.1%	18.2%	27.3%	9.1%	36.4%	100%
Certificate	100.0%					100%
Overall	12.5%	4.2%	12.5%	31.9%	38.9%	100%

District and Regional data shows that all regions consider low wages as one of the major obstacles to high productivity. However, Urban Villages have placed health and safety issues at the top of their list. Remote areas have instead explained low productivity mainly through bad supervision and interestingly placed a significant rating of 25 percent on improper harnessing of their skills with the balance of 25 percent going to low wages. There is a significant point being made through the complaint on unharnessed skills. Most remote areas thrive on traditional trades such as craft production, traditional medicine and, of- course, hunting and gathering. In focus group discussions various people complained that Ipelegeng is too generic, a “one size fits all” that does not take into account idiosyncrasies of different areas. The project is designed as if all

parts of Botswana are the same. Examples were given that in December Ipelegeng closes for people to go and plough even in areas where arable agriculture does not apply. One reads the message from the above result that Remote areas are saying they have special skills which Ipelegeng can harness but does not do so. With creativeness and innovative thinking, special skills and talents that different geographic areas have can be harnessed through Ipelegeng. This programme needs to be redesigned to be more robust to embrace such skills with the view to enhance its potential to generate second round benefits.

Table 8. 4: Most important reason for this difference in output by region

	Bad supervision leading to high absenteeism and shirking	Mob psychology causes less productivity	our skills and areas of strengths are not properly harnessed	failure of the system to take into account health and safety measures	IP payment too low	Total
Urban	10.0%	5.0%	25.0%	20.0%	40.0%	100.0%
Urban Villages	4.8%		9.5%	47.6%	38.1%	100.0%
Rural Areas	14.8%	7.4%	3.7%	33.3%	40.7%	100.0%
Remote Areas	50.0%		25.0%		25.0%	100.0%
Overall	12.5%	4.2%	12.5%	31.9%	38.9%	100.0%

### 8.3.3 Efficient use of Input and Equipment

The participants were asked whether in their activities there were some inputs which they felt were not being used appropriately or being misused. The same question was separately asked in respect of equipment.

Table 8. 5: Categories input and equipment abuse report

	Hand Tools	Heavy Machinery	Machinery	Building Material	Total	%
Always Stolen	9	1	2	2	14	19.2
Borrowed for personal use	4	0	1	2	7	9.7
Badly Maintained	16	2	3	2	23	31.5
Idle	2	3	0	1	6	8.2
Roughly Handled	7	1	1	2	11	15.1
Over Utilised	11	0	1	0	12	16.4
	49	7	8	9	73	100

Information on equipment abuse is summarized above. The data shows that bad maintenance is the most prevalent form of equipment abuse. This is followed by stealing of equipment where hand tools are most susceptible to theft. Bad maintenance of tools is also a problem and it was



found that hand tools were badly maintained. Rough handling of equipments comes third followed by over utilization.

An analysis of the actual providers of the information above is given below. For ease of comparison, results on inputs are put on the same Table with those on equipment and they are then jointly analysed.

Table 8. 6: Abuse and misuse of Inputs and Equipment by Age

	Are there any inputs that you feel are carelessly/inappropriately or misused? % <i>Saying YES</i>	Are there any inputs or equipment that you feel are not appropriate for the kind of activity that you are doing as a group? % <i>Saying Yes</i>
	<b><i>Raw material/Inputs</i></b>	<b><i>Equipment</i></b>
19 years and below	4.0	12.0
20 – 29	10.1	6.7
30 – 39	10.3	9.5
40 – 49	15.4	8.8
50 – 59	12.5	10.9
60- 69	8.5	8.0
70+	20.0	5.0
<b><i>Overall</i></b>	<b><i>11.4</i></b>	<b><i>8.0</i></b>

The four Tables presented above show that 11.4 percent of all those who were interviewed indicated that they felt that materials were carelessly or inappropriately used at their Ipelegeng jobs. For equipment the figure is 8.0 percent. This means that there is most likely to be more abuse of materials than equipments.

In-depth interview with key informants, in particular, IP Coordinators also complained about abuse of equipments. They pointed out that IP beneficiaries often steal the equipment. The challenge is exacerbated by the absence of supplies clerks to monitor and take care of the tools supplied. Such responsibility was shifted to supervisors who are members of the Village Development Committees (VDCs). On many occasions equipment are lost, and the supervisor in charge often fail to account for the missing tools. They cannot be held accountable because there is no proper procedure and security on how such equipment should be handled. Missing equipment leads to delays in the implementation of some projects.

As a result workers have to spend weeks idle due to lack of basic equipment and tools such as shovels, axes and grass slashers. Delayed delivery of such equipment lead to delays in completion of projects and this renders the project inefficient. At times IP projects took a long time to complete not because the people are lazy and refuse to work but because of a delay in the supply of equipment.

Analysing the same data by age reveals that, for inputs the older one gets the more one becomes suspicious of inputs abuse. In other words, the older participants are more suspicious of equipment abuse. However, data shows that beyond 50 years of age they become less suspicious of this crime. An almost similar pattern emerges for equipment save for the age cohort 40 to 49 years. Information from the Tables below shows that females are more suspicious of material abuse than male in both cases of materials and equipments. Figures from the regions seem to suggest that abuse of materials and equipments are highest in urban areas. Remote areas are second in raw materials theft but third in equipment theft. Urban villages seem to be the only place where there is a higher likelihood of abuse of equipment than raw materials. For equipments, the likelihood for abuse is significantly less than that of urban areas, recording only 3.8 percent compared to 6.7 percent for rural and remote areas respectively with 10.6 and 10.7 percent for urban villages and urban areas respectively

Table 8. 7: Abuse and misuse of input and equipment by gender

	Are there any inputs that you feel are carelessly/inappropriately or misused? % <i>Saying YES</i>	Are there any inputs or equipment that you feel are not appropriate for the kind of activity that you are doing as a group? % <i>Saying Yes</i>
	<b><i>Raw Material/Inputs</i></b>	<b><i>Equipment</i></b>
Male	10.3	7.7
Female	11.7	8.9
Overall	11.4	8.6

Table 8. 8: Abuse and misuse of inputs and equipments by education

	Are there any inputs that you feel are carelessly/inappropriately or misused? % <i>Saying YES</i>	Are there any inputs or equipment that you feel are not appropriate for the kind of activity that you are doing as a group? % <i>Saying Yes</i>
	<b><i>Raw Material/Inputs</i></b>	<b><i>Equipment</i></b>
No Education	13.2	6.6
Primary School	12.6	9.9
JC	9.7	9.7
O'Level	14.6	2.4
Certificate	0	7.1
Overall	11.4	8.6


Table 8. 9: Abuse and misuse of inputs and equipment by region

	Are there any inputs that you feel are used carelessly/inappropriately or misused? % <i>Raw Material/Inputs</i> Saying YES	Are there any inputs or equipment that you feel are not appropriate for the kind of activity that you are doing as a group? % <i>Equipment</i> Saying Yes
	<i>Raw Material/Inputs</i>	<i>Equipment</i>
Urban Areas	15.8	10.7
Urban Villages	8.1	10.6
Rural Areas	7.6	3.8
Remote Areas	10.0	6.7
Overall	11.4	8.0

### 8.3.4 Labour efficiency in Ipelegeng

That labour is the main input in Ipelegeng activities makes it the most important variable for analysis, thus its efficient use is very pertinent to this evaluation. To this end, participants were asked whether time was being efficiently used and well respected within the programme.

Figure 8. 11: Efficient use of time by gender



The results show that 90 percent claimed that time is well utilised and respected with 9.8 percent indicating that they do not believe so. There is a very marginal gender variation of the perception on whether time is efficiently utilized or not. Information on the age shows that there is not much difference between the different age groups save for the age 70 plus group. Most age groups are lumped between 88 percent and 90 percent. As in the case of productivity this is an almost perfect situation which should be interpreted with caution as self-interest might be at play as previously alluded to. The age group 70 year plus however stands at 75 percent. Educational qualification does not seem to have any effect on this perception as all categories are lumped between 88 percent and 91 percent.

Those who had indicated that they thought that time was not being respected were followed up

with the question why they thought that was the case. To answer the question they had to choose from a menu of answers that included the following:

- a) Workers come late.
- b) That there is high absenteeism.
- c) Time is lost during month end through the pay collection process.
- d) Workers deliberately take a long time to do simple tasks
- e) IP offices do not deliver materials on time.

The summarized data from the survey results reveals that the most notorious time waster in Ipelegeng is late coming. This reason is rated at 55.1 percent followed by late delivery of material by the IP offices at a distant second of 22.4 percent. Shirking does not seem to be a serious problem from this data. What is also interesting is that females lead in the protest about late reporting to work with at rate of 62.9 percent against the 35.7 percent for males. This confirms that females are different from males even though they are treated the same in the programme. Males lead the protest against delay in delivery of material at the rate of 35.7 percent against 17.1 percent for females.

Table 8. 10: If no, why do you think time is not efficiently utilized by gender

	workers come late	high absenteeism	workers deliberately take long to take simple jobs	the IP office is always delaying progress by not delivering materials on time	
Male	35.7%	14.3%	14.3%	35.7%	100%
Female	62.9%	14.3%	5.7%	17.1%	100%
Overall	55.1%	14.3%	8.2%	22.4%	100%

Education does not seem to have any strong effect as the leading protestors on late coming were the most educated who have attained O' level, they recorded 75.0 percent together with those that do not have education at 71.4 percent with the next group at 53 percent of Primary School Certificate holders are the least vocal against late coming at a 47 percent vote. Certificate holders remain consistent with their dislike for absenteeism as discussed before this is demonstrated by the 50:50 allocations to both late coming and absenteeism.

Table 8. 11: If no, why do you think time is not efficiently utilized by education

	workers come late	high absenteeism	workers deliberately take long to take simple jobs	the IP office is always delaying progress by not delivering materials on time	Total
None	71.4%			28.6%	100
Primary	47.6%	9.5%	14.3%	28.6%	100
JC	53.3%	26.7%	6.7%	13.3%	100
O'Level	75.0%			25.0%	100
Certificate	50.0%	50.0%			100
Overall	55.1%	14.3	8.2%	22.4%	100

Age data does not have a clear discernible pattern save for the fact that those aged above 60 strongly protest against late coming to work. The age group 60 – 69 gives a 100 percent vote to late coming with the 70+ group voting against this habit at 80 percent. The below 19 years of age group has an outlier vote (66% against 33.3 % as the next highest vote) against delay in material delivery by the IP office.

Table 8. 12: If no, why do you think time is not efficiently utilized by age

	workers come late	high absenteeism	workers deliberately take long to take simple jobs	the IP office is always delaying progress by not delivering materials on time	
<= 19	33.3%			66.7%	100.0%
20 – 29	58.3%	33.3%		8.3%	100.0%
30 – 39	80.0%			20.0%	100.0%
40 – 49	10.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	100.0%
50 – 59	50.0%		16.7%	33.3%	100.0%
60 – 69	100.0%				100.0%
70+	80.0%			20.0%	100.0%
Overall	55.1%	14.3%	8.2%	22.4%	100.0%

Urban Villages and remote control have voted 100 percent against late coming and material delivery second in those areas that have not voted 100 percent for late coming.

The survey data on IP efficiency has identified a number of issues that confirm the efficiency or lack thereof of IP as a strategy for poverty eradication. However, given the nature of the study, as

with other aspects of the evaluation of IP, it was imperative to corroborate quantitative data obtained from the survey with qualitative data obtained from the use of in-depth and FGDs interviews with the respondents. The summary presented below is a synthesis of views, opinions and perceptions of the participants with respect to efficiency issues of IP.

With respect to efficiency, the consultancy was required to explore the extent to which IP is efficient. The critical questions for assessment revolved around whether the costs of the Ipelegeng programme could be justified by the results. The specific questions that were to be answered included:

- Have IP implementers or management ensured that the resources have been effectively managed or utilized?
- Has each of the programmes activities been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency?
- What measures have been taken during the design, planning and implementation of IP to ensure that resources are efficiently used?
- Could each of the programme activities have been implemented with fewer resources (time and money) without reducing the quality and quantity of the results?

The above questions sought to explore the overall efficiency of the Ipelegeng programme, in particular, the extent to which the funds allocated were utilized in a cost effective manner. A key informant in Gaborone noted:

It would appear that Government has not put in place any measures that seek to enhance the efficiency in resources utilization under the Ipelegeng. The focus seem to be on the numbers of people engaged and paid than on efficient use of both human and financial resources. It is simply a numbers game.

A number of key informants in Phikwe and Mochudi echoed similar sentiments as captured in the quote below:

Programme efficiency requires a critical assessment of whether funds spent on the Ipelegeng could be justified in terms inputs and outcomes i.e. Are Batswana tax payers getting their money's worth? You know IP is believed to use a lot of money ... it is said to have an unlimited budget. Now the question is whether this money is being put to good use or wasted. There is need to explore alternative avenues on how IP funds could be best

utilized ... we have to look for more sustainable and more productive projects than just sweeping streets, grass-cutting and litter picking..

In assessing the efficiency of Ipelegeng, the review team revealed a number of challenges some of which were raised by the IP beneficiaries who participated in the survey. These include among others; poor supervision and lack of coordination; unknown programme guidelines; negative attitude towards Ipelegeng by both the implementers and the beneficiaries (preference to drought relief than IP); political pressure; lack of clarity on objectives; a poorly defined target population; inadequate staffing; inadequate institutional arrangements (lack of sectoral and project synergies). These are briefly discussed below:.

- **Poor supervision and lack of coordination:** In terms of the current programme design, those working for Ipelegeng are directly supervised by a member of the VDC (appointed by the VDC). Usually it is a senior member of the VDC such as the secretary or chairperson. The beneficiaries were indirectly supervised by the Ipelegeng coordinator. Evidence from in-depth interviews suggests poor supervision and lack of coordination of the programme. It was repeatedly stated in both in-depth interviews and FGDs that those charged with the responsibility to supervise lack the necessary competencies to do so. As a result, Ipelegeng employees spend most of their time idle and in some cases sleeping on the job. The researchers have also observed cases of people sleeping on the job or sitting down under trees for extended periods of time. There was ample evidence of poor work ethic and lack of commitment to work. Poor work ethic leads to poor results. The problem was compounded by lack of coordination between the project supervisors and IP coordinators. There is always communication breakdown in terms of the expectations of the programme and this situation is worsened by the absence of standardized programme guidelines.

For example, the researchers observed a bush clearing job that would normally take five working days to complete taking the whole month. There a number of IP projects across the research sites that took a long time to complete due to poor work ethic and lack of supervision.

- **Lack Standard programme guidelines:** A concern was expressed across all the research sites visited that Ipelegeng, unlike other Government programmes, does not have sufficient and standardized programme guidelines to guide those responsible for its operations and implementation. For example, each district seems to have its own guidelines. Worse still, these are not clearly stated and understood by both the supervisor and the workers resulting in arbitrary discretions that borders on nepotism and favoritism.

The existing guidelines are loosely defined, selectively applied and not strictly enforced. For instance, it is not uncommon for mothers to bring their babies to site yet no clear guideline exists that allows this practice. Thus, there is no clear provision on this, yet it is a practice generally accepted among Ipelegeng workers, supervisors and coordinators. Respondents felt that the Ipelegeng guidelines were not clearly defined in the programme objectives. To enhance the efficiency and relevance of the programme they recommended the development of standardized guidelines together with clear terms and conditions of employment. This might clear the confusion currently bedeviling the implementation of the Ipelegeng Programme.

- **Negative attitude towards Ipelegeng:** Throughout the consultations and across all the districts visited, it was reported that almost all the people who work for the Ipelegeng programme had negative attitudes towards the programme. In fact, the majority of the respondents preferred Namola Leuba to Ipelegeng. In support of Drought relief, a key informant at Nata said:

*Motlhala wa namola leuba oa iponatsa. Go nale ditsela tsa teng, maobo a dikgotla, le masaka a dikgomo tota. Re agile matlo a VDC le mathichara.... Re dira ditiro tse dintsi hela thata. Jaanong Ipelegeng tota ditiro tsa yone ga di bonale ka gore ga se tsa se nnela ruri* [The legacy of drought relief is very clear as reflected by the number of community projects completed by the programme, including roads, cattle crushes, kgotla shelters and VDC and teachers houses].

Interestingly, the beneficiaries generally do not regard Ipelegeng as a proper job but as casual labor. The manner in which the beneficiaries conduct themselves while at work is indicative of the casual approach towards Ipelegeng. For example, most employees were reported to come late to work and leave before time, those who stay at work either refuse to work or put the bare minimum, some sleep while on duty and there is general lack of respect for the supervisor. So entrenched is the negative attitude towards IP as reflected by this quote:

*Kana tota Ipelegeng gase tiro, ke go itlosa bodutu hela gore motho a seka a bolawa ke tlala” le goromente tota ga a ise a re ke tiro ... le one madinyana a teng ga se a tiro e e tlhoafetseng.[You know Ipelegeng is not a proper job ... one is just there to pass time and socialize so that he does get some Money so as not to starve. Even the Government knows this and that explains the low remunerations paid].*



To demonstrate the casual nature of IP, the beneficiaries have openly moved in and out of IP as and when they wish to do so. For instance, some have left in the middle of an activity to work for the Roads Department which offers better pay for the same job e.g. de-bushing. The Roads Department pays P50.00 per day, while Ipelegeng pays a paltry P20.00 per day. Ironically, Ipelegeng is not taken as regular work even by those in authority. For example, there is no job security for IP workers. Ipelegeng does not attract basic job benefits such as sick leave pay, gratuity, protective clothing and workmen's compensation. According to one of the IP regional coordinators, due attention was taken by the authorities to ensure that IP does not attract any job related benefits and hence remain casual and unattractive.

- **Lack of clarity on objectives:** Although programme implementers are generally aware that Ipelegeng offers temporary work and relief for the unemployed and those enrolled in the programme, there is no clarity of objectives that those enrolled are expected to graduate from the programme into more permanent and sustainable citizen economic empowerment programmes within a short period of time. The expectation of IP has not been systematically shared with the beneficiaries. Therefore many beneficiaries entered the programme with insufficient knowledge that they were expected to graduate after a certain period as such they had to prepare themselves psychologically and in terms of skill training and asset enhancement for an independent livelihood. Most respondents indicated that this is a major undoing of the Ipelegeng because clarity of objectives is always a good place to start. Failure to do so has rendered the programme inefficient.
- **Inadequate staffing:** Ipelegeng is a very sensitive, complex and a demanding assignment. Unfortunately, it does not have permanent staff to deliver on its mandate. For example, those currently working as IP coordinators are seconded from other council departments. Many of them have very limited skills, training and competencies to run a social development programme of that magnitude. The main challenge is that there is no additional staffing to facilitate the implementation of the empowerment or rehabilitative component of the Ipelegeng programme. One key informant noted:  
Ipelegeng should not only be reduced to de-bushing and litter picking, it should build the capacity of the beneficiaries for sustainable livelihoods. IP should build capacity of the beneficiaries and prepare them for self-reliance instead of relying on the government.
- **Inadequate institutional arrangements:** respondents noted that there were no clearly laid down guidelines to compel other government departments at district level with a

poverty reduction mandate such as Agriculture, Health, Trade and Industry, Transport and those with the mandate to implement Ipelegeng such as the District Commissioner's Office to assist in the implementation of Ipelegeng. The responsibility was left to the Councils or Local Authorities and its staff to seek assistance from other departments without a supporting structure and laid out procedures to facilitate communication and cost sharing. It was noted that even within the Local Authorities there existed compartments that leads to fragmentation in service delivery and tension between implementers. Thus, there was very little inter-departmental cooperation and therefore the zeal to work together was lost. For example, currently, the Ipelegeng Programme forms part of the District Commissioner's Performance Development Plan (PDPs) but in terms of overall programme implementation and management, the responsibility lies with Councils. There is need to decide a permanent home for the Ipelegeng programme. If it means the programme be independent, let it be.

- **Inadequate equipment:** Another problem identified revolves around inadequacy of equipment to carry out the various activities. It was reported that at times workers have to spend weeks idle due to lack of basic equipment and tools such as shovels, axes and grass slashers. Delayed delivery of such equipment lead to delays in completion of projects. At times IP projects took a long time to complete not because the people are lazy but because of a delay in supply of equipment. However, it is important to point out that, there were divergent views on the adequacy or inadequacy of tools or equipment needed to implement IP activities. In some districts, equipment was supplied on time and adequate and this was not the case in other districts. The only problem experienced was the absence of supplies clerks to monitor and take care of the tools supplied. Such responsibility was shifted to a supervisor who is a member of the VDC. On many occasions equipment are lost, and the supervisor in charge often fail to account for the missing tools. They cannot be held accountable because there is no proper procedure and security on how such equipment should be handled. Missing equipment lead to delays in the implementation of some projects.

## **Overall assessment**

Although no figures were given, there are mounting concerns that through the IP, Botswana is not receiving sufficient value for its expenditure. The general view is that IP is inefficient, it is generally a waist of funds in the sense that it seems to be leading to more dependency on the programme than graduation into more sustainable poverty eradication programmes. Worse still, the political leadership responsible for its implementation seem to be concerned about numbers (filling up the quota) and this has undermined and compromised the efficiency of the programme.

There was a broad consensus among both in-depth and FGD participants that the challenges stated above require urgent attention. If left unattended they may render the Ipelegeng programme totally inefficient. A combination of poor supervision and lack of coordination, lack of clarity on objectives, insufficient and badly conceived unstandardized programme guidelines, , poor targeting, inadequate institutional arrangements and inadequate staffing coupled with negative attitudes towards the programme conspire to frustrate any effort to deliver on the mandate of Ipelegeng.

Finally, the lack of systematic data collection on the efficiency or otherwise of the programme, limit the ability of programme implementers to (i) monitor programme efficiency in terms of costs and benefits and (ii) identify gaps for improving efficiency.

## **8.4 Main Findings and Recommendations**

### **Findings**

The analysis of data collected has led to the following major findings:

- A human input in the form of labour is the major resource for Ipelegeng. Different circumstances of different participants determine their benefits from the project as well as their usefulness to the project. Ipelegeng does not seem to take into account the special circumstances of different participants in assigning them work.
- Women have special needs, the elderly have special needs and so does the youth. Treating these as identical groups does not only increase costs to the individuals but also does that to the Programme.
- There is a major problem with health and safety issues pertaining particularly to females in this programme.
- Explanations on why some individuals would expend less effort in Ipelegeng work than they would in their own jobs have revealed that females' interests are very different from those of males. This was further confirmed by the results coming from the explanations why some Ipelegeng participants do not have respect for time.
- Focus Group Discussions and Key Informants interviews have revealed that the absence of clear and standardized Guidelines has led to too much use of discretion which has in turn resulted in major variations in how the programme is implemented across districts. This frustrated proper implementation of the programme.
- There is evidence of improper use of time through late reporting for duty, shirking and absenteeism. Equipment abuse was reported in by both the beneficiaries and key informants.

- Lack of clear objectives, existence of negative attitudes towards the programme, inadequate staffing and weak institutional arrangement have led to weak implementation of the programme as well as bad supervision of projects rendering the programme to fail to deliver value for money that Government spends on this programme.

In the light of the above findings, the following recommendations were made:

***Recommendation 10:*** *Government must undertake a cost benefit analysis of engaging the Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations to supervise the design and implementation of some Ipelegeng projects.*

***Recommendation 11*** *New comprehensive guidelines for the programme should be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, including Ipelegeng beneficiaries*

The preceding sections focused on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Ipelegeng Programme. Through this analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data, the report has unearthed some interesting findings on the Ipelegeng Programme.

The next section – section 9 is a further interrogation of the data. The focus here has now shifted to IP impact issues. The consultancy assesses and report on the impact of Ipelegeng as a strategy for poverty eradication.

## **Section 9: Impact Issues**

### **9.1 Introduction**

This section seeks to address ToR 4, which requires an assessment of the impact of Ipelegeng Programme (IP) on the intended beneficiaries. The section will also reflect on the implementation of the programme in relation to other Government poverty eradication initiatives.

### **9.2 Impact as it Applies to Programme Evaluation**


In programme evaluation, the assessment of an intervention's impact entails looking at broader consequences of the intervention. These consequences mainly emerge in the long run. These entail intended and unintended programme results. They can be positive or negative. This section of the report therefore examines this category of issues where the programme participants, focus groups discussion participants and key informants were requested to respond to issues pertaining to both positive and negative externalities of the programme.

### **9.3 Respondents' Perceptions**

#### **9.3.1 Perceptions about the achievement of IP poverty eradication objectives**


Findings from the previous section on relevance revealed that, a significant (61.2 percent) of the IP beneficiaries knew the objectives of IP. When asked whether IP has been able to achieve the objectives of poverty eradication the majority of participants agreed that the programme has indeed achieved its poverty eradication objectives. When analysed by region, a significant number in urban areas, urban villages and rural areas (76.3%, 83.7% and 66.7% respectively) felt that IP has been able to achieve its poverty eradication objectives. In remote areas, it's a different case as there is an insignificant difference between those participants (53.3%) who believed that IP has achieved its poverty eradication objectives and those participants (43.3%) who didn't think that way. This is probably due to the fact that poverty is prevalent and visible in remote areas than in urban areas.

Figure 9. 1: Perceptions about IP poverty eradication objectives by region




The gender dimension shows similar results. Majority of respondents (70.9% of all males and 75.2% of all females) feel that IP has achieved its poverty eradication objectives.

Figure 9. 2: Perceptions about IP poverty eradication objectives by age.



When compared by educational attainment, the majority of respondents with different levels of education agree to the fact that IP has achieved its poverty eradication objectives.

Figure 9. 3: Perceptions about the achievement of IP eradication objectives by education level.



Interestingly, the majority of in-depth and focus group participants held a different perception to the above. They did not in any way believe that Ipelegeng has achieved poverty eradication objectives. Instead, in their view, it has failed to reduce or eradicate poverty among its current or former beneficiaries but has only managed to provide relief..

Evidence gathered from the field suggests that although Ipelegeng has been somewhat effective as reflected by the number of temporary jobs created for the beneficiaries, it nevertheless had very little impact on the general welfare of the intended beneficiaries. The participants pointed out that, while no empirical evidence exists in terms of improvement in the overall quality of life, there exists ample anecdotal evidence to demonstrate that the socio-economic situation of the majority of IP beneficiaries have remained the same as before even after Ipelegeng intervention. There was a broad consensus among key informants that what Ipelegeng has successfully achieved was to relieve people from extreme hunger and destitution but could not eradicate poverty in both the short and long term.

They opined that Ipelegeng has failed to build capacity of the poor for self-reliance and sustainable livelihood but instead the beneficiaries have even become more dependent on the government. To the extent that the majority of IP beneficiaries do not want to graduate from Ipelegeng is a clear testimony that the programme has had very little impact, if any, on the lives of the intended beneficiaries.

### 9.3.2 Knowledge of the poor who benefitted from IP and are now better off


Several studies (Del Ninno, 2009) found that public works programmes had a positive impact on the beneficiaries, at least in the short term. For this section, IP participants were asked if they knew any person who have benefitted from the IP and are now better off.

Clearly, IP seems to be impacting positively on people's lives, as evidenced by the high number of respondents who knew one or more people who have benefited from the programme and are

now better off. In most instances, respondents were giving themselves as a living example. Such as, in urban areas, 67% knew people who have benefited from IP and are now better off.


There were 61.8% and 60.6% respondents from urban and rural areas, respectively, who knew someone who had benefited from IP. A different case scenario is observed in remote areas where the majority of respondents (56.7%) did not know of anyone who had benefited from IP and was better off. This may be because of the high rate of poverty, lack of exit policies or employment opportunities which could improve people's living standards, and reduce their dependence on the IP programme which is just a temporary measure. The study results also show that the 67.9% of those that were below 19 years of age do not know people who have benefitted from the programme and were now better off. The majority in the rest of other age groups knew those who have benefitted from the programme and were now better off.

Figure 9. 4: Knowledge of the poor who benefitted from IP and are now better off, by region



Regarding respondents' level of education, those with higher levels of education, e.g. certificate (64.3%), do not know anyone who had benefitted from IP and were now better off. This is clearly so because their expectations were higher than those with little or no education.

Figure 9. 5: Knowledge of the poor who benefitted from IP and are now better off, by level of education.






The above figures notwithstanding, it is important to point out from the onset that since its inception, Ipelegeng did not have set targets and parameters for indicating its impact on the welfare of its beneficiaries. Further, IP did not have in place a plan on how to cater for the pool of potential poor on the “edge” of poverty in the event that they are not absorbed into Ipelegeng because of the number of people on the waiting list being rotated. In addition, there is a regrettable lack of baseline data and district level situational analysis to inform programme implementation and provide a guide for appropriate targeting. The result is that at district and sub-district levels, planners and policy implementers did not always have a clear idea of the nature, character and size of the problem Ipelegeng is meant to address in their locality. They thus have no clear indicators for assessing whether and to what extent they were likely to achieve the overall objective of Ipelegeng i.e. poverty eradication through provision of temporary employment opportunities as well as provision of relief and/or safety nets to cushion those at the extreme end of poverty.

### 9.3.3 Knowledge of able bodied destitute previously registered in the destitute programme who are now working for IP

The results show that those less than 19 years still do not know able bodied individuals who have benefitted from the Destitute programme and are now working for IP. For all other age groups, they knew of those who were once destitutes, but were now in IP.

Figure 9. 6: Knowledge of able bodied destitute previously registered in the destitute programme who are working for IP.



### 9.3.4 Perceptions of positive and negative externalities

Reviewing the impact of the IP on livelihoods, communities and on other interventions is very crucial as it guides as to whether the programme is achieving its intended objectives as well as redirects the programme from being in conflict with other interventions, programmes and

policies. The types of impacts considered in this study include the intended impacts of the programme such as growth of rural economy and unintended impacts of the programme such as dependency syndrome of beneficiaries on the programme.


### 9.3.4.1 Positive externalities

#### i) IP and migration to urban areas

IP was introduced to urban areas recently after it was implemented in the rural areas only. Respondents in this study were asked if they believed that IP has stopped the influx of people migrating from rural to urban areas. 37.2% and 33% of those in urban areas strongly agreed to that, as they felt the introduction of permanent IP in rural areas has lessened the rural-urban migration drift.

However, in the remote areas, it is a different case. The results showed that 46.7% and 40% disagreed to the statement. There is a small difference between those who agree and those who disagreed. One can conclude that in the remote areas, half of the respondents agree with the statement while the other half did not.

Figure 9. 7: IP and migration to urban areas by region




More females than males agreed that IP stops poor people from migrating to urban areas. This is so because when adding those who strongly agreed to those who just agreed, men account for 61.6% while women make up 70.4%. Women would probably believe that IP stops people from migrating to urban areas as they are in most cases left in the villages to take care of the household while also working for IP whereas men migrate to urban centres in search of employment opportunities.

Similarly, a high percentage of respondents across all age groups do strongly agree that IP stops people from migrating to urban areas. For example, adding those who strongly agree or just

agree gives 56%, unlike the 40% for those who strongly disagree or just disagree. The same results were apparent when looking at the various age groups, in particular, those below 19 years.


Figure 9. 8: IP and migration to urban areas by education



## ii) IP and growth of village economy


Public works programme will indirectly stimulate employment if local enterprises are able to respond to the demand generated by the increased purchasing power of the poor households. For example, irrigation infrastructure and rural roads produced by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in India have led to further second round employment creation. By creating assets that boost productivity in agriculture and rural non-agricultural activities, the programme has created a virtuous circle, reducing the need for public works by increasing employment opportunities in the more remunerative private sector. (Samson et al 2006). Respondents of this study share the same sentiments. This is because, when asked if Ipelegeng programme helps the village economy grow as people are able to buy from local shops, a significant number of respondents in all the regions either strongly agreed or just agreed. (See Figure 9.9 below) In addition, Gobotswang (2004) reports that, at the community level, labour intensive public works programme can have a positive impact on the local economy as a result of increased cash circulation and creating rare employment opportunities for women.

Figure 9. 9: IP and growth of village economy by region



Similarly most respondents with different levels of education (52.6 percent for those with no education, 51.1 percent for those with primary level, 52.2 percent for those with JC and 53.7 percent for those with O level) agree that IP helps the village economy grow as people are able to buy from the local shops. The results are consistent with Lal et al (2010) findings which demonstrated that public works programme can help stabilize local development and help to lay foundations for new growth. Evidence from the literature suggests that public works programme through provision of employment to the less skilled and less well educated, helps crowd-in local investment by providing the much needed infrastructure and services. Investment programmes can also help to pave the way for recovery by addressing infrastructure bottlenecks and stimulating investments in new sectors.


Figure 9. 10: IP and growth of village economy by education



### iii) IP activities and village productive process


According to Gobotswang (2004), construction and maintenance of earth roads done by Ipelegeng programme can improve transportation between small villages and the main commercial centres. From this study results, a significant percentage of respondents in urban (70.7%), urban villages (50.4%) and rural areas (58.3%) strongly agree that activities provided by the Ipelegeng programme facilitate productive processes in the village. Unlike in other regions, in remote areas, majority of respondents (60%) only agrees that activities provided by the Ipelegeng programme facilitate productive processes in the village. This is probably because Ipelegeng activities in remote areas are mostly pure labour based, for example, litter picking and would not add so much value to the village productive process.

Figure 9. 11: IP activities and village productive process by region



When adding those who agree and those who strongly agree, respondents with no education (90.8%), primary (89%), JC (92.5%), O'level (92.7%) and certificate (85.7%) agree that activities provided by the Ipelegeng programme facilitate productive processes in the village.

Figure 9. 12: IP activities and village productive process by education



In terms of the benefits of Ipelegeng to the community or the growth of the economy in general, the views expressed in survey were corroborated by qualitative data from both the key informants in-depth interviews and FGDs. They pointed out that in their respective districts, Ipelegeng has primarily focused on five major projects, namely: litter picking; de-bushing; government building maintenance; green scorpion and community policing. Evidence gathered from the field suggests that it is very expensive to deliver these services, particularly by engaging a private contractor. Instead of engaging a single contractor, it was found to be cost effective to engage Ipelegeng employees to do the job. Hence IP was seen more as a programme that reduces the costs of social development.

The overall perception is that Ipelegeng workers are cheaper and through this process, the government is able to deliver on the mandate of Ipelegeng which is to promote labor intensive public works programmes. It was reported that the communities have greatly benefited from Ipelegeng. The programme has delivered a clean environment, a reduction in criminal activities and maintenance of government buildings. In fact, some key informants were concerned that the community has benefited more at the expense of the poor. This means that while IP work was done on a continuous basis and the outcomes were visible in the community i.e. in terms of clean environments, there was no evidence to suggest that quality of life for IP beneficiaries was improving as a result of working for Ipelegeng.

In addition to a reduction in the cost of social development, some of the beneficiaries pointed out that as a result of their involvement in Ipelegeng, they learned basic skills such as painting and bricklaying. One of the benefits of Ipelegeng gleaned from FGDs with IP beneficiaries is that being engaged in some activities such as painting and brick laying, they were able to learn from

the professional artisans who work with them. For example, most of the women employees pointed out that they have acquired the skill on: mixing concrete (Daka); laying a brick, and painting. One of the project beneficiaries said:


I have learned these basic skills ... just by observing what others are doing and through practice. I am now able to do it myself. The problem is that they do not give us references ... I want a reference so that I can look for a job at the Councils or Government Maintenance Department.

### 9.3.4.2 Negative externalities

#### iv) IP and the spirit of self reliance

When asked if IP has killed the spirit of self reliance, majority of respondents across regions either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 76.1% males and 78.3% females either disagreed or strongly disagreed that Ipelegeng has killed the spirit of self reliance. These results differ with that of the Poverty Status Report for Botswana done by BIDPA and UNDP (2005). According to the Poverty Status Report, some people consider a public works programme to be a welfare programme and this has contributed to the dependency syndrome on the programme by most Batswana. Thus, instead of working hard as used to be the case with the food for work programme, Batswana do very minimal work, at least just to be able to earn the little money payable under the programme.

Figure 9. 13: IP and spirit of self reliance by age



For all the age groups, a good number of respondents that disagree with the notion that IP has killed the spirit of self reliance outweighs those who agree or strongly agree. There is a small margin between those who disagree (30.0%) and those who agree (25.0%) in the age group 70+ as compared to other age groups. In this group of the elderly, those who agree that IP has killed

the spirit of self reliance are probably making a comparison to the old Ipelegeng which was only introduced during drought years.

However, in contrast to the views expressed by those who participated in the survey, in-depth interview with key informants and FGDs participants support the view that Ipelegeng has killed the spirit of self reliance. They pointed out that despite national commitment to eradicate poverty and promote self-reliance, the number of IP beneficiaries continue to increase monthly as reflected by increase in quotas with no indication of exit or graduation from Ipelegeng. Thus, suggesting that either poverty is increasing or Ipelegeng is reaching a broader constituency than the strictly poor and vulnerable persons it is meant to assist.

The escalation in numbers of new entrants has, it is argued, led to an untenable situation of dependency in the context where resources are limited. As a result meagre resources are over-stretched, the quality of support for the really needy compromised, and the empowerment and rehabilitative aspects of the programme grossly under-emphasized. It was claimed that IP beneficiaries have now been reduced to doing menial jobs devoid of any skills such as litter picking, de-bushing and street sweeping with no emphasizes on projects that promote sustainable livelihood such as agriculture. In fact, many people were reported to have abandoned agriculture to work for Ipelegeng. One of the respondents said “this is unsustainable because one cannot depend on Ipelegeng forever. The government should go back to the basics and promote the spirit of self-reliance....”


In reaction to these perceived challenges, in-depth interview respondents emphasized the importance of an objective committing the programme to a robust program of rehabilitation, empowerment and capacity building (skills development and training). It was, emphasized that the skills transfer and rehabilitation objective should be developed, incorporated and implemented with immediate effect and should not be tied to the programme of relief but must rather be broad based in terms of institutional mandate for implementation in the public, private and non-governmental sectors. The emphasis on empowerment and rehabilitation echoes the sentiments expressed in Botswana national strategic documents such as Vision 2016, (1997); NSPR, (2003); BIDPA Rapid Poverty Profile (1996/97); Revised National Policy on Rural Development (2002); A Review of Social Safety Net (2007); Community Development Strategic Framework (2010) and NDP 10 (2009 – 2016).

Given the political and hand-out nature of the Ipelegeng assistance which some politicians dubbed “*atlhama ke go jese*” (open your mouth and let me feed you), there was need to build an empowerment, training and rehabilitation component into the programme with a view to build and promote a stronger sense of social and individual responsibility for sustainable livelihood and self -reliance. This feeling is particularly strong among Community Development officers across the districts. They were of the view that Ipelegeng beneficiaries as individuals must be



expected and be encouraged to make their own contributions towards their own up-liftment and not rely solely on government hand-outs. They recommended provision of information and skills to IP beneficiaries so that they can, in the long run graduate from Ipelegeng. The present structure, function and “modus operadi” of the IP office apparently does not have the type of manpower which can provide such guidance and support for sustainable livelihood.

Figure 9. 14: IP and the spirit of self reliance by education level



#### v) IP and arable farming

Different opinions have been expressed in terms of whether, IP has killed the willingness to undertake arable farming. This view was also expressed by some researchers in a study conducted by Government of Botswana (GoB) and UNDP (2002). The study found that in some instances, labour based public works programme has led to lower participation in the agricultural sector because it takes away labor from agriculture. Lekobane and Seleka (2011) also found that participation in paid employment such as public works programmes have some disincentive effects towards participation in arable agriculture. However, the results from this study differs with the BIDPA and UNDP study in that a fairly large number of respondents do not agree with the assertion that labor based public works programmes has killed willingness of the poor people to undertake arable farming. The percentage of those who disagree ranges from 43.1 percent in urban villages to 47.4 percent in urban areas and 56.7 percent in remote areas. In terms of age distribution, all age groups have respondents disagreeing that IP has killed the willingness to undertake arable farming.

Focus group discussions participants supported the view that Ipelegeng does not kill the willingness of the poor to undertake arable farming. They pointed out that many people are still engaged in farming and only work for IP during off-ploughing seasons. However, there were some who opined that indeed some people may not be willing to undertake arable farming not because of the introduction of Ipelegeng but because of poor climatic conditions. Caution should

be taken in interpreting these results as there is a possibility that participants were exaggerated in defence of Ipelegeng out of fear that any negative assessment of the programme may lead to its discontinuation. From the policy stand point what is important is whether Ipelegeng can be redesigned in a manner that can enable agricultural activities to run concurrently with Ipelegeng programme without undue conflict.

Figure 9. 15: IP and arable farming by region






Figure 9. 16: IP and arable farming by age



## vi) IP and serious shortage of herders


Advocates of self-targeting recommend that a public works wage in a low income country should be no higher than the market rate for unskilled agricultural labour in a normal year. They argue that a sufficiently low wage rate will ensure self-targeting by the poor and thus reducing leakage to the less poor, providing wider coverage for the poor and serving as a non-contributory social insurance mechanism. (Samson 2006). Information gleaned from focus group discussions revealed that IP does not attract herders because it pays below the minimum wage and most herders are paid above the minimum wage. In addition, the survey results show that 53.3 percent of respondents in remote areas, 35.6 percent in rural areas, 36.6 percent in urban villages and 33 percent in urban areas disagree that IP has led to a serious shortage of herders. However, in urban areas 20.5 percent strongly agree that IP has led to a serious shortage of herders (a number higher than in other regions). This is probably because those in urban areas need to hire herders for their cattle while those in rural areas especially in remote areas, do not stay far from their livestock hence the impact on them is minimal.

Figure 9. 17: IP and serious shortage of herders by region



Unlike for other age groups, the elderly (age group 70+) strongly agree that IP has led to a serious shortage of herders. Even though some farmers are facing a shortage of herders, it would appear that is not a serious problem that IP can be blamed for. There are other contributory factors to the shortage of herders such as unfavorable working conditions in farms.

Figure 9. 18: IP and serious shortage of herders by age



Overall, similar conclusions as above were reached during in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The participants were unanimous in articulating what they consider to be a wider problem which reflects the unintended impacts of the Ipelegeng programme such as shortage of herders and people leaving agriculture to work for IP.

Other related problems observed include:

- Failure to utilize other Government poverty eradication initiatives by IP beneficiaries who do not want to graduate from Ipelegeng. Evidence gathered from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions across the districts revealed a disturbing trend among the beneficiaries of Ipelegeng. Although the majority of the beneficiaries indicated that they shun and despise Ipelegeng, ironically, they want to remain working for Ipelegeng and have no intention of graduating from the programme. The unintended effect of this is that instead of people graduating into other government poverty eradication and citizen economic empowerment programmes, the majority of the beneficiaries want to remain and work for Ipelegeng.
- The rotational nature of Ipelegeng does not seem to have changed people's attitudes towards the programme. In fact, most beneficiaries said they like Ipelegeng despite the fact that wages paid are too low. They would rather wait until their turn comes, than engage in other productive activities supported by the government.
- Agricultural programmes meant for poverty eradication such as LIMID, ISPAAD and Backyard Gardens were reported to be suffering most as many people leave their lands for the villages in order to work for Ipelegeng. In fact, agriculture was

reported to have suffered neglect as many people now prefer Ipelegeng to agriculture. Income poverty for most poor households seems to be the driving force to work for IP.

Clearly, three to four years on, in many localities, Ipelegeng has become a household name and seem to have overshadowed other government poverty eradication initiatives that preceded Ipelegeng. The energy and vigor as well as funding that is pumped into Ipelegeng have relegated other equally important or even better programmes to the periphery.

One of the key informants related an incident in which IP beneficiaries refused to participate in a Sustainable Livelihood workshop whose objective was poverty eradication through skills transfer, instead preferring to work for Ip. The attitude was that sustainable livelihood was a waste of time and could only work for those who are not poor but comfortable and have other sources of income. For the chronic poor, they prefer a programme that will put food on their table immediately such as Ipelegeng. The beneficiaries emphasized the costs of shelter (rent) in an urban setting where utilities, energy, and plots have to be serviced at a cost that is onerous for the poor and vulnerable. Many beneficiaries wanted to get immediate cash to pay service levy, rent, build a toilet and/or install a water standpipe. Securing a plot in an urban area is a problem for most beneficiaries. The housing need was also highlighted by the IP beneficiaries in Kasane who complained that there was not enough space for them to build houses for the homeless people nor was there any assistance coming from the Government in that regard. They wanted shelter with sanitary facilities since there were no places to hide to relieve oneself as used to be the case in the context of small settlements and access to the veldt. To them IP could be of great assistance and would make a lot of impact if it focused and addressed the important issues of shelter. They argued that what make IP ineffective and of little or no consequence is the imposition of IP projects by Office of the President (OP) and Ministry of Local Government (MLG) without regard to the unique needs and aspirations of local communities.


By articulating special needs in accordance with locality the respondents highlighted the need for consultation on projects and setting of community priorities. This will enable the community to engage and implement projects that are in line with and best address their needs and aspirations. This has implications on the impact factor both in the short and long term and has implications on the success or failure of Ipelegeng.

#### **vii) IP in urban areas and rural to urban migration**

According to the survey results, most respondents in urban (35.3%), urban villages (43.1%) and remote areas (60.0%) disagree with the notion that the introduction of IP in urban areas will cause rural -urban migration. In the urban centres of Gaborone, IP coordinators reported that they are unable to meet the employment quota and as such they are forced to ferry IP workers from


the nearby villages of Tlokweng and Mogoditshane, This is clear testimony that IP does not in any way serve as a pull factor (rural-urban migration). It is important to point out that while towns and cities are at times unable to fill the quota, the situation is different in the rural and remote areas. The numbers of those willing to work for IP are always very high and hence the rotational aspect is always implemented. However, a small difference is observed between those who disagree and those who just agree especially in rural areas and in urban areas. (See graph below)

Figure 9. 19: IP in urban areas and rural to urban migration



The same applies when respondents were disaggregated by gender. The general conclusion is that IP in urban areas will not cause rural to urban migration. 52.1 percent of men disagree (including those who strongly disagree) and 57.5 percent of women disagree (including those who strongly disagree) that IP in urban areas leads to rural to urban migration.

Figure 9. 20: IP in urban areas and rural to urban migration by gender



### viii) IP and drunkenness in villages

Drunkenness in villages seems not to be a problem brought by IP. About 50 percent of respondents in remote areas, 38.6 percent in urban areas, and 39.4 percent in rural areas disagree that drunkenness has increased in the villages as a result of employment opportunities created by IP and leading to an increase in disposable income. In urban villages, 39.4 percent strongly disagree (a figure more than those who just disagree) In the focus group discussions, IP beneficiaries claimed that, IP wages are too low to even buy any other commodity besides food, so they don't see how drunkenness can increase in villages. Another conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that, most IP beneficiaries are women with large families and children to feed and obviously the meagre earnings from IP is all spent on food. Similarly, the majority of men and women either agree or strongly agree that drunkenness in villages has not increased because of the earnings from IP.

Figure 9. 21: IP and drunkenness in villages by region





Figure 9. 22: IP and drunkenness in villages by gender



### ix) IP and rural crime

Respondents were asked to state whether rural crime had increased as more people were now earning cash from IP. Generally, the majority of the respondents strongly disagreed. For example, across all regions, more than 50 percent of the respondents in each region strongly disagreed and more than 50 percent of all males and females also strongly disagreed (See Figure 9.23 and 9.24 below). Evidence from the focus group discussions points to the fact that rural crime has now decreased because people (especially among the youth who in most cases are associated with crime) are now engaged in IP and earning a wage. In addition, respondents pointed out that the introduction of cluster policing under the auspices of IP has greatly contributed to a reduction in criminal activities in the rural areas hence crime was gradually on the decline.

Figure 9. 23: IP and rural crime by region






Figure 9. 24: IP and rural crime by gender





In contrast, the age group 60 to 69 years claims that rural crime has increased as more people now have disposable income to spend on alcohol. . The rest of other age groups either disagree or strongly agree that rural crime has increased due to earnings from IP.

Figure 9. 25: IP and rural crime by age



## 9.4 Main Findings and Recommendations

### Findings

When all the evidence is considered, this evaluation process concludes that indeed Ipelegeng has had both negative and positive impacts, some of them intended and some unintended. This conclusion is based on the followings findings:

1. Response from participants regarding the programme's effect on poverty alleviation is that there has been some positive effect on welfare. The beneficiaries were able to confirm that they were aware of people who had benefited from IP and are now better off. They also testified that they were aware of de-registered abled bodied people from the destitute programme who now work for Ipelegeng. This notwithstanding, complimentary information from FGD shows that this achievement has only been in terms of relief and not on poverty eradication per se.
2. IP beneficiaries do not seem to believe that the introduction of this programme in urban centres has led to increased rural urban migration but instead believe that the permanent

nature of the programme has ameliorated the movement of people from rural to urban centres.

3. The Ipelegeng programme has created a positive environment for economic growth in rural the economy. This has been confirmed by both programme beneficiaries and key informants.
4. While beneficiaries are of the view that Ipelegeng has not killed the spirit of self-reliance, FGDs and key informants' interviews holds a contrary view that IP has significantly harmed this spirit. Ever increasing numbers of applicant for the programme seem to bear testimony to increased dependency on the programme at the expense of other economic activities. Hence arable agriculture and livestock farming seem to have suffered from this effect most.
5. There is complete concurrence among all stakeholders that Ipelegeng has led to the reduction of both crime and alcoholism. Now that the formerly unemployed are working, shebeens no longer open in the morning but only open toward late afternoon. Community policing has also boosted crime monitoring.

## **Recommendation**

***Recommendation 12:*** *Re-design Ipelegeng in a manner that enhances complementarity between this programme and other programmes and other Economic Activities. In a properly designed Ipelegeng, Agriculture should not compete with Ipelegeng for labour. Proper time scheduling for Ipelegeng should make it possible for labour to be shared between economic activities and these sectors.*

The section on impact has provided data on both the intended and unintended impacts of IP on the programme beneficiaries. It is clear from the data that IP has in various ways created both a positive and negative environment on the lives of the beneficiaries. For example, positively, Ipelegeng has contributed towards the growth of the rural economy. It has stimulated economic growth in the rural economy by increasing the purchasing power of the poor people resident in those areas.

## Section 10: Sustainability Issues


### 10.1 The Sustainability of Ipelegeng

If the programme is relevant, efficient, effective and produce the desired impact it is likely to be sustained in the long term. However, an irrelevant, inefficient and ineffective programme that cannot deliver on its objectives would be very difficult to sustain. The sustainability section sought to assess whether Ipelegeng Programme (IP) can be sustained or not. In assessing the sustainability or otherwise of IP, the study asked the participants a number of questions that revolved around the issues of graduation from Ipelegeng, motivation to exit Ipelegeng, alternatives sources of income (skills on income generation) as well as participants knowledge of other Government economic empowerment programmes. The results are analyzed and presented below:

### 10.2 Graduation from Ipelegeng


For Ipelegeng to be regarded as being sustainable, one of the key area that was considered is graduation. Respondents were asked if they intend to graduate from Ipelegeng. Figure 10.1 depicts the results. Overall, less than half (48 percent) of the respondents indicated that they intended to graduate from Ipelegeng. Of these, 49.1 percent were females and 44.4 percent males.

Figure 10. 1: Graduation from IP by gender



With regard to the regional dimension, the more rural the area, the lesser the chance of graduating from the programme. About 41 percent of the respondents in rural areas indicated that they want to graduate from Ipelegeng and the figure declines further to about 33 percent in remote areas (Figure 10.2). The reason could be that there may be limited employment opportunities in both the rural and remote areas outside Ipelegeng. Again these areas are characterized by higher poverty levels making it very difficult to survive outside Ipelegeng. In these remote settlements, Ipelegeng is the only source of income.

Figure 10. 2: Graduation from IP by region



The chances of graduating from Ipelegeng decline with increases in age, an indication that the elderly and those in the middle age who are currently in Ipelegeng may not have much options or alternatives outside the programme. However, a higher proportion of the youth (64 percent) indicated that they intend to graduate from Ipelegeng. This clearly shows that the youth engaged in Ipelegeng are doing so because they have been forced by economic hardships such as lack of employment opportunities. To them, Ipelegeng is a temporary measure and they are actively looking elsewhere for employment opportunities.

Figure 10. 3: Graduation from IP by age





Figure 10.4 depicts respondents' intention to graduate from Ipelegeng by education. As expected, those with lower educational attainments are less likely to graduate from Ipelegeng or have the intension to do so. About 29 percent of the respondents with no educational attainment indicated that they did not intend to graduate from Ipelegeng followed by 34.1 percent of those with only primary education. This is expected as poverty levels are higher amongst those with no or low educational attainments who may not have other employment alternatives outside Ipelegeng.

Figure 10. 4: Graduation from IP by education levels



The results presented in Figures 10.1; 10.2; 10.3 and 10.4 were in many ways confirmed by focus group discussions with IP beneficiaries. The majority of those interviewed said they are not ready to graduate from Ipelegeng and lead an independent life. In fact, some of them were surprised that they were expected to graduate given their debilitating poverty. One participant said:

*Nna rra ga ke ka ke ka tshela go sena Ipelegeng. Ke kaa swa ke tlala. Kana matsananyana a le fa ese a sepe mme hela ke kgona go oba lebogo. Motho o kgona go ithekela phaletshenyana* [I cannot live without Ipelegeng. I will die of hunger. Even though the money is not enough ... it is better than nothing].

The above statement summarizes the perceptions and feelings of the majority of IP beneficiaries, especially the elderly people. The researchers can also confirm this state of affairs. Ipelegeng does not have a skills transfer component and as such those who intend to graduate will have virtually nothing to fall back on. For example, IP has not taught the beneficiaries life skills nor encouraged them to take advantage of and enroll in other Government poverty eradication programmes, in particular, agricultural programmes which are more sustainable. As such it will be impossible for IP beneficiaries to sustain themselves beyond the life of Ipelegeng. Instead, their vulnerability to poverty will increase and their needs will have to be met through Government expansive social safety net, which ensures no one dies from hunger or malnutrition.

### 10.3 Motivation to Exit from Ipelegeng

Respondents were also asked to rank three most important factors that will motivate them from exiting Ipelegeng. The majority of the respondents (88.3 percent) indicated that they opt to search for other jobs outside Ipelegeng. Of these, 66 percent ranked it the most important option whilst 25.5 and 8.5 percent ranked it the second most and least important option, respectively. About 65 percent indicated that they will start their own businesses in order to exit Ipelegeng, of which 23.9 percent ranked it the most important option. The third option considered was the

skills training. About 53 percent of the respondents indicated that they considered skills training as a factor that will motivate someone to exit Ipelegeng. About 32 percent ranked it the most important option. It is surprising that most of the respondents do not find farming a better alternative to exit Ipelegeng; with only 22.5 percent of the responding indicating that they will engage in farming activities to exit Ipelegeng. Piece jobs ranked last as an option to exit Ipelegeng (see Figure 10.5 and 10.6).

Figure 10. 5: Options to exit IP





Figure 10. 6: Ranking options to exit IP



The incorporation of skill transfer component was also underscored by both in-depth and focus group discussion participants. They emphasised the need to provide skills to the IP beneficiaries. They pointed out that unfortunately Ipelegeng as currently designed does not incorporate a skills transfer component. The beneficiaries are engaged as unskilled laborers and there is no effort to impart skills that they could use to earn a living and graduate from Ipelegeng. Thus, Ipelegeng does not provide any survival skills but instead promote dependency on Government handouts.

This runs counter to the overall objective of poverty eradication and hence raising doubts about the relevance of Ipelegeng with respect to empowering the beneficiaries. Almost all community leaders and IP implementers called for the incorporation of skills transfer as a major component of IP. Such life skills may include: entrepreneurial skills, small business development, mentoring, counseling and psychosocial support that could prepare the beneficiaries psychologically to graduate from IP into more productive and sustainable poverty eradication programmes promoted by the Government of Botswana. It is important to point out that some of the beneficiaries may actually be sitting on assets that could earn them a sustainable income beyond the life of Ipelegeng.

The overemphasis of the IP on relief means that most of the time young people go without adequate life skills, counseling and guidance to help them face the problems and challenges of living in order to map out a better future for themselves and family. IP beneficiaries include able bodied youth and adults who may be temporarily rendered unemployed by lack of skills and the market failure to generate adequate jobs or by diseases such as HIV and AIDS. These people need greater encouragement and motivation to engage in productive employment activities after recovery. The skills transfer and rehabilitation programme for those who were de-registered from the destitute list remain largely under-resourced in terms of funds, human resources and planning. As most IP implementers pointed out, a considerable proportion of the budget for this programme [approximately 60%] goes into relief, leaving 40 percent for projects and nothing for the development of life skills, empowerment, rehabilitation and other exit programme strategies.

#### **10.4 Other income generating activities**

Clearly, as depicted by figure 10.7, the Ipelegeng participants are less involved in other income generating activities. Overall, 38.6 percent of the respondents indicated that they were involved in other income generating activities outside Ipelegeng. This low participation rate in other income generating activities may imply that there are limited opportunities outside Ipelegeng. This therefore may affect the sustainability of the programme especially that most of the participants are not intending to graduate. Regional dimension even shows a low rate in remote areas where only 20 percent of the respondents indicating that they were involved in other income generating activities. There isn't much difference with regard to gender with 39.4 percent of the females indicating that they were involved in other income generating activities compared to 35.9 percent of their male counterparts. There was no particular pattern observed for age and education with regard to involvement in other income generating activities.

Figure 10. 7: Other income generating activities by region





Figure 10.8 shows different activities currently undertaken or planned (intended) alongside Ipelegeng. Overall, 74.6 percent of the respondents who indicated that there were involved or intending to undertake other income generating activities were in small business retailing, followed by chickens (28 percent), horticulture (25.9 percent), piece jobs (14.5 percent), sewing/weaving (11.9 percent) and lastly guinea fowl (7.8 percent). However, piece jobs ranked highest in terms of activities currently being undertaken 78.6 percent, followed by small business retailing (52.1 percent), sewing/weaving (34.8 percent), chicken (24.1 percent), horticulture (18 percent) and none in guinea fowls.

Figure 10. 8: Current and planned/intended income generating activities






## 10.5 Knowledge and Skills on generating income


Overall, 39.6 percent of the respondents indicated that Ipelegeng has offered some activities to build their knowledge and skills on generating income. There were some slight differences with regard to gender, with 41.9 percent of males indicating that Ipelegeng has offered them some activities to build their knowledge compared to 38.9 percent of females. The majority of the respondents with junior certificate or less indicated that Ipelegeng has offered them some activities on generating income and the rates decline with higher levels of education with only 7.1 percent of those with certificate agreeing to the notion that Ipelegeng has offered them some income generating activities (Figure 10.9). The knowledge and skills on income generation does not seem to be affected by regional dimension or age.

Figure 10. 9: Knowledge and skills on income generating activities by education level



Respondents were further asked if they had made any initiatives to use the skills and knowledge to improve their lives beyond Ipelegeng. The results are depicted in figure 10.10. From those who indicated that Ipelegeng has offered them some knowledge and skills on generating income, 69.2 percent said that they did make some initiatives to use the knowledge and skills to improve their lives beyond Ipelegeng. There wasn't much difference across gender with 67.3 and 69.8 percent of males and females respectively indicating that they did use the skills and knowledge to improve their lives beyond Ipelegeng. With regard to education, those with lower educational attainments did use the skills learnt from Ipelegeng compared to those with higher educational attainment (Figure 10.10). None of the certificate holders used the skills learnt from Ipelegeng. The reason could be that those with higher educational attainments are temporarily engaged in Ipelegeng (only for short term sustenance) while still searching for other employment opportunities.

Figure 10. 10: Use of knowledge to improve livelihoods by education level




With regards to imparting knowledge and skills, key informants interviews and FGDs noted with concern that imparting skills to IP beneficiaries was not taken very seriously in the districts and that this is reflected by the absence of a robust skills transfer programme component for the beneficiaries. One of the councilors noted that Ipelegeng did not seem to attract significant attention from important public officers, such as the District Commissioner, save for reporting purposes.

Therefore the inefficiency, ineffectiveness of Ipelegeng coupled with the absence of skills transfer component makes the programme less sustainable at project, individual and community levels.

## 10.6 Other government economic empowerment programmes

The Government of Botswana has put in place numerous citizen economic empowerment programmes. These include among others; Livestock Management and Infrastructure Development (LIMID), Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agriculture Development (ISPAAD), Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA), Local Enterprise Authority (LEA), Youth Programmes and Poverty Eradication Initiatives (PEIs). The respondents were asked if they have heard of such programmes. Overall, 78.4 percent indicated that they have heard of other Government economic programmes. With regard to gender, 78.1 and 79.5 of males and females respectively indicated that they have knowledge of other economic empowerment programmes. The regional dimension showed that those in the remote areas were at a disadvantage as they were the least to hear about other government economic empowerment programmes (Figure 10.11).

Figure 10. 11: Hearing about government economic empowerment programmes by region



Information about the government economic empowerment programmes increases with higher educational levels. Figure 10.12 depicts that about 71 percent of those with no education indicated that they heard about other Government economic empowerment programmes compared to 92.9 percent of those with certificate. There was no observable pattern with regard to age pertaining to the knowledge of other Government economic activities.

Figure 10. 12: Hearing about government economic empowerment programmes by education level






Figure 10.13 shows the proportion of respondents who have heard about the various Government economic empowerment programmes. The majority of the respondents (65.3 percent) indicated that they heard about the LIMID programme, followed by youth programmes (56.6 percent), ISPAAD (39.3 percent) and PEIs came forth with (38.5 percent). A total of 55.8 percent have applied for the LIMID programme, followed by the youth programme with only 19.8 percent.

Figure 10. 13: Different government economic empowerment programmes



From a total number of respondents who applied for the different economic empowerment programmes, only 31.8 percent were successful. From those who did not succeed, they indicated that there were still awaiting the response (53 percent), while 42.4 percent did not meet the requirements. Lastly, 1.5 percent indicated that there were no funds to support the programme (Figure 10.14).

Figure 10. 14: Reasons for not being successful



However, despite knowledge of the above poverty eradication initiatives there was little or no attempt by the Ipelegeng Programme to link the beneficiaries with such so as to facilitate their graduation from Ipelegeng into more productive and sustainable projects. A number of concerns were raised with regards to IP failure to incorporate empowerment, rehabilitation and skills development (training) in the overall programme design. Participants noted that as currently implemented, the programme had encouraged a culture of entitlement, despondency and dependency among people who could otherwise be assisted to be income self-reliant and productive. To this end, and in terms of sustainability, it is instructive for IP to draw lessons from the Strategic Framework for Community Development (2010). The strategy provides a useful framework that the “new Ipelegeng” can build on and utilize to inform its approaches with a view to effectively deliver on its overall mandate of poverty eradication. The strategic

frameworks provide community development tools that IP can use to help poor communities realize their potential and to facilitate and support the implementation of their ideas and plans.

IP beneficiaries would rather work for Ipelegeng than engage in other productive and more sustainable activities supported by the Government. For instance, agricultural programmes meant for poverty eradication such as LIMID, ISPAAD and Poverty Eradication Initiatives were reported to be suffering most as many people leave their lands for the villages in order to work for Ipelegeng. In fact, agriculture was reported to have suffered neglect as many people now prefer to work for Ipelegeng than engage in agriculture. Income poverty for most poor households seems to be the driving force to work for IP. Clearly, three to four years later since the introduction of IP, in many communities Ipelegeng has become a household name and seem to have overshadowed other Government poverty eradication initiatives that preceded it. The energy and vigor as well as funding that is pumped into Ipelegeng have relegated other equally important or even better poverty eradication programmes to the periphery.

Overall, there was a broad consensus that as currently designed, Ipelegeng is not sustainable both in the short and long term. For it to be sustained, the participants made a **recommendation** that the beneficiaries must be empowered, rehabilitated and trained on how to survive on their own without waiting for handouts from the Government. Ipelegeng should shift its emphasis from relief and promote empowerment and capacity building initiatives. A change of mindset is required at national, district and beneficiary level with a focus on sustainable livelihoods.

## **10.7 Main Findings and Recommendations**

The sustainability of the benefits so far derived from the Ipelegeng Programme is highly questionable especially if Government support for the programme was to decline. This conclusion is premised on the following findings from the study.

- 1) It is not apparent that Ipelegeng programme design had in it the implicit and not explicit intention that beneficiaries should graduate from the programme and move to high income earning activities. Information from the participants indicates that not many of them have graduation among their objectives
- 2) The fact that not many of these beneficiaries are combining participation in IP with other income generating activities makes potential for graduation very much unlikely.
- 3) The participant's appetite for getting involved in other economic empowerment programmes seems to be very low as can be read from the high knowledge about these programmes but very few participation in terms of applications for funding from these programmes and schemes.

### ***Recommendations***

*It has already been recommended in other sections of this report that linking and drawing synergies between Ipelegeng and other Government programmes would go a long way to make this programme successful. Incorporation of education and skills development into the programme has already been recommended.*

***Recommendation 13:*** *Government should consider involving the private sector in the funding and execution of the IP. Not only will this reduce the burden on the fiscus but it will also enhance the quality and usefulness of project activity selection and implementation. For example, in urban areas partnership with the private sector to run kindergartens or play schools might be attractive to the industrial sector. Such moves will no doubt crowd -in the private sector while at the same time lessening pressure on the fiscus.*

## **Section 11: Programme Design and Institutional Issues**

### **11.1 Institutional Arrangements for Ipelegeng**

Botswana has a good mix of policies, strategies and programmes that seek to respond to poverty in all its manifestations. As indicated elsewhere in this report, the key policy that link and harmonise all anti-poverty reduction initiatives is the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR, 2003). This strategy provides opportunities for people to have sustainable livelihoods through expansion of employment opportunities and improved access to social investment and to monitor progress against poverty. However, it is important to point out that the Government of Botswana is at an advanced stage to go a step beyond poverty reduction and develop an ambitious strategy for poverty eradication.

Currently, poverty reduction initiatives are spread across the different ministries and departments but are not well coordinated such that they link together, are cumulative and build onto each other in order to achieve a common goal. However, since 2008/09 measures have been put in place to locate all poverty eradication initiatives under the Office of the President (OP) for purposes of proper coordination and monitoring. When Ipelegeng was introduced in 2009, its natural home became the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) where its predecessor – Drought Relief Programme was located. It was believed that given the decentralised nature of the MLG, this institutional arrangement would allow effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Ipelegeng Programme.

Ipelegeng at the Ministry level is supported by the Department of Local Government Development Planning. The department has responsibility for policy and strategy development, formulation and for their monitoring. In terms of the current programme design, the responsibility for the implementation of Ipelegeng is vested with the Local Authorities (district, town and city councils) at local or district level, with the central government representative (District Commissioner) playing an oversight function. Given that implementation of Ipelegeng cuts across other government departments at local level, Ipelegeng Coordinating (Multi-sectoral) Committees have been established. The committee comprises key stakeholder ministries, council departments, relevant NGOs and CBOs. The role of these committees is to oversee implementation of Ipelegeng projects and the various activities in the district. The committees meet on a monthly basis and consider progress report on Ipelegeng projects and related activities. In the spirit of partnership in development, the committee is alternately chaired by both the District Commissioner and the Council Secretary.

In terms of supervision, Ipelegeng workers are directly supervised by a member of the VDC (appointed by the VDC). Usually it is a senior member of the VDC such as the secretary or

chairperson. The beneficiaries are indirectly supervised by the Ipelegeng coordinator. Councillors and other community leaders such as Dikgosi have no or very limited role to play in the implementation of Ipelegeng. In fact, during in-depth interviews and FGDs with councillors and Dikgosi, they claimed limited knowledge on Ipelegeng activities and blamed the government for not involving them directly in the operations of IP but preferred the VDCs. This has created an information vacuum and has frustrated other key stakeholders who are central to the success of the Ipelegeng Programme.

Evidence from in-depth interviews suggests lack of synergy between the different central government and council departments in terms of coordination of the programme. There is confusion on the ground regarding responsibility for the various tasks that need implementation. In most districts visited Ipelegeng was located under the councils' Chief Executive Officers (Mainly Deputy Council secretaries, City or Town Clerks) who have in many respects appointed relevant Departments to oversee the implementation of Ipelegeng projects within their jurisdictions. As and when circumstances dictates, Ipelegeng can be placed and be coordinated under the various departments including, Department of Architecture and Buildings or Social and Community Development. However, given the primary focus of Ipelegeng since its inception, in most councils, it was convenient to place IP under the Department of Architecture and Buildings because the bulk of IP activities revolved around maintenance of Government buildings.

The other major finding that has implications on the institutional arrangements is that Ipelegeng Programmes are constituency based i.e. IP resources are allocated according to constituencies as opposed to the traditional administrative districts. This was found to create administrative problems because of the distance that had to be covered to deliver IP services. Constituencies are not aligned and do not necessarily respect district boundaries. Chobe, provide a good illustration of this problem. An IP Coordinator based in Kasane had to travel over 300 kilometers to service IP projects which are located very close to Maun administrative district (approximately 30 km from Maun). These projects could easily be administered from Maun but because of the constituency arrangement this cannot be the case. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the constituency arrangement is not cost effective and creates administrative bottle-necks, it also causes unnecessary implementation delays and may be expensive. It is thus ***recommended that Government should consider aligning IP to traditional administrative districts than constituencies. Afterall, constituencies are always in a state of flux and subject to change by the Delimitation Commission as and when circumstance dictates.***

The structural or institutional gap that exists in most councils is that officers assigned to oversee the implementation of Ipelegeng Programme are not trained in community development or implementation of social safety net programme and as such they are only concerned about maintenance of building and less about capacity building and rehabilitative components of the



programme. This means they lack the necessary competencies to provide support for those who want to graduate from Ipelegeng into other Government livelihood strategy projects. It was repeatedly stated in both in-depth interviews and FGDs that those charged with the responsibility to supervise lack the necessary competencies to do so. Some are not even aware of the existence of the various poverty eradication initiatives beyond Ipelegeng. As a result, Ipelegeng employees spend most of their time idle and in some cases sleeping on the job. The problem was compounded by lack of coordination between the project supervisors and IP coordinators. Communication breakdown were common in terms of the expectations of the programme and with the absence of standardized programme guidelines, implementation became problematic and at times chaotic.

### **11.1.1 Challenges with the Institutional arrangements**

A number of challenges that require immediate attention were identified during both in-depth interviews and FGDs. **Firstly**, the participants noted that there were no clearly laid down guidelines to compel other Government departments at district level with a poverty eradication mandate such as Agriculture, Health, Home Affairs, Trade and Industry, Transport and those with the mandate to implement Ipelegeng such as the District Commissioner's Office to assist in the implementation of Ipelegeng. The responsibility was left to the Councils or Local Authorities. **Secondly**, the absence of laid down procedures and supporting structures to facilitate communication and cost sharing among the key stakeholders made it difficult for staff to seek assistance from other departments.

It was noted that even within the Local Authorities there existed compartments that lead to fragmentation in service delivery and tension between implementers. Thus, there was very little inter-departmental cooperation and therefore the zeal to work together was lost. For example, currently, the Ipelegeng Programme forms part of the District Commissioner's Performance Development Plan (PDPs) but in terms of overall programme implementation and management, the responsibility lies with Councils. There is need to decide a permanent home for the Ipelegeng programme. If it means the programme be independent, let it be.

Overall, the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with lack of inter-departmental synergy and coordination for implementing the programme, which compartmentalizes fragments and isolates Ipelegeng from other related poverty eradication initiatives located in other government ministries or departments. For the most part, this releases other departments from direct institutional responsibility for reduction and prevention of poverty. It also limits the extent to which various departments with a poverty reduction and poverty prevention mandate can work in concert to reduce, prevent and rehabilitate with a view to contribute to the overall poverty

eradication efforts enshrined in the various policy documents such as NSPR, 2003; NDP, 10 and the Revised Policy on Rural Development of 2002.

The fragmented and disjointed nature of Ipelegeng activities (scattered all over the different government ministries and departments, local authorities and the private sector), makes it virtually impossible for MLG to monitor and coordinate IP effectively. The failure of Ipelegeng projects is attributed to fragmentation where there is lack of inter-sectoral collaboration or a holistic approach to poverty eradication.

## **11.2 Recommendations**

***Recommendation 14:*** Re-locate the Ipelegeng function to the Department of Community Development at district level. This will enable the Programme to be properly staffed with permanent staff that will provide institutional memory, capacity building in both programme planning, design and execution. This will also make it possible to establish a Monitoring and Evaluation function in the programme.

***Recommendation 15*** The Ministry of Local Government should draw a Strategic Plan as well as an Operational Plan for the programme. The process of drawing such a plan will assist IP management understand why some of the best practice PWP requirements are necessary and how they can be operationalized through programme design and implementation

***Recommendation 16:*** All line ministries and departments responsible for poverty eradication should have included in their budgets Ipelegeng votes. That will not only improve the coordination of IP activities but it will also increase the departments' commitment and accountability for IP implementation.

***Recommendation 17:*** As a strategic, nationally important project, the Ipelegeng budget must be drawn along standard district lines and not along constituency boundaries as is currently the case. This will reduce the unnecessary expenses incurred in some regions.

## **Section 12: Summary and Conclusions**

### **12.1: Ipelegeng Programme's Compliance with the Public Works Programmes best - practice Requirements**

The Conceptual Framework part of this report has already outlined best practice requirements for PWPs. The foregoing six sections have assessed this programme and have concluded that while the programme is clearly relevant it has been somewhat partly effective. The programme has however failed the efficiency and sustainability tests. There seems to have been a balance between positive and negative impacts. This section further seeks to determine what could have caused these failures and successes. What lessons can be learnt from this? What follows below is an assessment of how Ipelegeng has performed against PWP best practice requirements that were outlined in Section 2 of this report.

#### **12.1.1 Self-Selection Practice**

Public Works Programmes best practice requires that for administrative costs to be kept low, these programmes wage rate should be fixed below the market wage rate so that only the deserving job seekers will offer their services. Ipelegeng has complied with this general rule by fixing its wage rate below the official minimum wage rate. Failure to differentiate market clearing wage levels by locality and regions can however lead to spurious and counter intuitive results. For example, when the local market clearing wage rate is substantially lower than the national wage level self-selection can still fail even when the PWP wage rate is fixed lower than the national minimum wage rate. In other words, unskilled labour can still offer its services in a manner that might lead to rationing of available job spaces. Conversely, when the local market clearing rate is higher than the national market clearing rate labour there might be labour reticence to offer itself to the market. It is therefore not surprising that while other regions have experienced an oversupply of labour, Gaborone City has failed to fill its quota and had to recruit from neighbouring localities. It was on this basis that the study recommended that Government must consider varying the Ipelegeng wage rates according to the ruling unskilled labour wages in different regions.

#### **12.1.2 High Labour Intensity and high quality project outputs**

Another best practice requirement is that PWPs should have high labour intensity in order that more job seekers can be absorbed. Ipelegeng has responded very well to this requirement (maybe too well) in that the programme vote for inputs has, by design, been too restricted with most funds going towards payment for wages. Consequently, project selection has been biased toward those activities that absorb more labour and less inputs. Placing too much emphasis on labour

absorption while ignoring complimentary inputs has invariably led to poor project selection and low quality project output.

PWP best practice also requires that output from such activities should be of high quality with the potential to generate second round employment. Analysis in earlier sections suggests that the so called Ipelegeng number pushing approach has limited the programme's ability to generate employment outside of government expenditure on the programme. It was for this reason that the review recommended that Government should consider involving the civil society, the private sector and local communities in project selection and implementation. In that way, it is hoped, the "new Ipelegeng" will pay very close attention to this point and endeavour to balance high labour intensity with high project quality.

### **12.1.3 PWP value is derived from coordination and complementarity with private sector, economic empowerment and social safety-nets programmes.**

PWPs on their own do not have much effect on poverty eradication, but it is the synergy generated with other programmes that produces a significant impact. Ipelegeng as a programme does not seem to have any ties or connection with other government projects. No thought has ever been given to linking IP with the Economic Diversification Drive (EDD). This has caused substantial losses of benefits that could have been derived from this project. For that reason, it has been recommended that Ipelegeng should be linked with economic empowerment and social safety nets programmes. A case study from Ethiopia in Section 2 has shown that this can be successfully done.

### **12.1.4 PWPs perform better when they are implemented on a Multi-year basis.**

When implemented on emergency and short term basis, PWPs become reactive and fail to have robust ability to plan and handle such crisis. As alluded to in the Conceptual Framework section Multi -year or continuous implementation of PWPs enables capacity building and experience to be developed in these programmes. One would like to believe that Botswana converted the Drought Relief Programme from a temporary program to a permanent Ipelegeng programme in recognition of this best practice requirement. That notwithstanding it is surprising that despite this noble move Ipelegeng has continued to operate on seconded temporary staff and without any monitoring and evaluation function built in it. This has deprived the programme of access to institutional memory, staff motivation and dedication, all of which are necessary for proper planning and execution of such programmes. The conversion from a temporary to a permanent operation has not therefore yielded the benefits that it could have achieved. This is a clear case of a good policy that has been badly implemented.

### **12.1.5 High labour Intensity and High Quality of PWP projects**

Best practice requires that the highest number of the poor can be engaged by the programme only when there is high labour intensity in the programme. However this high labour intensity has to be accompanied by high quality projects that generate national assets and create more employment. Data analysis has already shown that Ipelegeng has gone high labour intensity without paying attention to the quality of projects that it undertakes. Another well intended policy badly implemented

### **12.1.6 The best fund flow scenario is when PWPs are funded through the main budget and not through a special budget.**

When PWPs are implemented through the Special Budget mode they tend to take a short-term perspective and issues of effectiveness, efficiency and quality tend to receive less emphasis. PWP best practice therefore requires that the programme should be budgeted for in the main national budget. Botswana has recognised this and the IP budget comes through the main national budget. However there still remains the problem that this programme's budget is not mainstreamed with other line departments' votes. Consequently this has resulted in poor inter-departmental coordination. Discussions with key informants and Focus Groups revealed that the Department of roads competes with Ipelegeng by paying for litter pickers more than double what Ipelegeng pays for the same service. These inconsistencies the consultants believe are caused by lack of budget coordination. If the Botswana Government had allocated the Ipelegeng budget on litter picking to the department of roads this kind of inconsistency would not have arisen. Centralisation of PWP budget is meant to achieve that. However providing resources to the PWP through the Central budget alone is not sufficient. Allocations have to be mainstreamed according to main ministries. Botswana has seen the bigger picture of the need to allocate resources to IP through the consolidated budget but seems not to have understood the reasons for doing it that way. More benefits could have been derived by mainstreaming the budget through line ministerial allocations. Yet another example of a well-intended policy implemented wrongly.

### **12.1.7 Strong PWPs should have strong institutional arrangements.**

Section 11 has illustrated that Ipelegeng has no clearly laid out guidelines that compel government departments at district level charged with poverty eradication mandate to assist with the implementation of Ipelegeng. This lack of coordination has no doubt limited the benefits that the nation has derived from the resource allocation to this programme.

## 12.2. Conclusion

It is evident from the above that, at a general level the Ipelegeng design is compliant with the required features of a good PWP. That IP meets the majority of these requirements at a general level is not in question. The problem arises with implementation process. For example, IP believes that self-selection is important but it is entirely oblivious of the requirements for its proper implementation. The programme is aware that it stands to operate better if it runs on continuous basis but seems unaware that capacity of building, experience generation for better planning and execution are major outcomes from this process. *To state this differently, the programme runs as if policy makers know what needs to be done without knowing how to do it or understanding why that needs to be done.* It stands to reason that before Ipelegeng is redesigned and a new programme drawn, the Ministry of Local Government should first familiarise itself with why the best practice requirements of PWPs are important. Why they need to be met and how they can be successfully operationalised and what implementation implications do they have? Bench-marking with countries that have been successful with implementing such programmes is one sure way such knowledge and understanding can be gained. In this light it is recommended that the Ministry of Local Government should undertake a benchmarking exercise with countries that have been successful in implementing PWPs. This exercise's main objective will be to enable the Ministry to understand why some of these best practices are needed. That way the Ministry will not only be able to build internal capacity to draw a robust new Ipelegeng Programme but it will also be able to draw a solid implementation plan that goes with it. The increasing strategic and national importance of this programme warrants a proper understanding of the factors that can make Ipelegeng succeed. That way Botswana will get the money's worth from the programme.

In summary and to guide the Ipelegeng re-design process recommendations that have already been derived elsewhere in the report are marshalled together in the next section for easy reference.

## 12.3 Recommendations

### 12.3.1 Recommendations Specific to Relevance

***Recommendation 1:** Ipelegeng objectives must be revised and be aligned to the national objective of poverty eradication. Such an alignment should portray the programme only as a part of a process that seeks to achieve poverty eradication since on its own it cannot achieve that. Such an objective should therefore place emphasis on coordinating and linking the programme with other government programmes with the view to draw maximum synergies with such programmes.*

**Recommendation 2:** *Ipelegeng must be redesigned to be result based to introduce flexible working schedules where beneficiaries will be assigned work and will work at their own time and pace and be paid on work done instead of time spent at work. Such a change should be done with the view to enable participants to get involved in other productive activities in the spirit of recommendation 12 below. Piece rate and task- based remuneration system as well as flexi-time should be introduced where feasible.*

**Recommendation 3:** *Ipelegeng must introduce a well-structured capacity building component that arms participants with production skills as well as survival skills. Such skills will assist the participants to graduate to better paying jobs*

**Recommendation 4:** *A strong and clear Communication, Education and Public Awareness Strategy for Ipelegeng must be designed. Such a strategy should place emphasis on ensuring that the programme objectives are clearly known and understood by all stakeholders. The need for participants to graduate must form a central core for such a strategy.*

**Recommendation 5:** *A cost benefit analysis of using a single national Ipelegeng wage rate to achieve self-selection must be undertaken with the view to establish whether different regional factors can be taken into account and hence vary the wage rate regionally.*

**Recommendation 6:** *The Ministry of Local Government should investigate the reasons for Remote areas having displayed very different results from the rest of the groups regarding Ipelegeng Issues. Based on the outcome of this investigation the Ministry will determine if a Special Ipelegeng Programme targeting Remote areas should be designed and implemented.*

### **12.3.2 Recommendations Specific to Effectiveness**

**Recommendation 7:** *The IP project selection should be based on the following key criteria: i ) a genuine bottom - up consultative process where community's wishes on Ipelegeng projects to be implemented will be headed to.*

*ii) the environment, natural resource endowment and skills base for the concerned areas.*

*iii) high quality projects with second round employment generation effects and the crowding-in effect on the private sector*

**Recommendation 8:** *Ipelegeng should be redesigned to take on board gender, age, health status and different group specific issues. Such a re-design would look, for example, at the needs of women in terms of their mothering and nursing roles as well as their household responsibilities. Consideration should be given to providing relevant facilities that are complementary to women's responsibilities. Work schedules would also have to consider minimizing the participation costs that both gender groups face. Use of piece-rate and task based payment must*

*be explored where feasible.*

***Recommendation 9:*** *Ipelegeng should review and upgrade its Health and Safety guidelines.*

### **12.3.3 Recommendations Specific to Efficiency**

***Recommendation 10:*** *Government must undertake a cost benefit analysis of engaging the Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations to supervise the design and implementation of some Ipelegeng projects.*

***Recommendation 11*** *New comprehensive guidelines for the programme should be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, including Ipelegeng beneficiaries*

### **12.3.4 Recommendations Specific to Impact**

***Recommendation 12:*** *Re-design Ipelegeng in a manner that enhances complementarity between this programme and other programmes and other Economic Activities. In a properly designed Ipelegeng, Agriculture should not compete with Ipelegeng for labour. Proper time scheduling for Ipelegeng should make it possible for labour to be shared between economic activities and these sectors.*

### **12.3.5 Recommendations Specific to Sustainability**

***Recommendation 13:*** *Government should consider involving the private sector in the funding and execution of the IP. Not only will this reduce the burden on the fiscus but it will also enhance the quality and usefulness of project activity selection and implementation. For example, in urban areas partnership with the private sector to run kindergartens or play schools might be attractive to the industrial sector. Such moves will no doubt crowd -in the private sector while at the same time lessening pressure on the fiscus.*

### **12.3.6 Recommendations specific to Institutional Framework**

***Recommendation 14:*** *Re-locate the Ipelegeng function to the Department of Community Development at district level. This will enable the Programme to be properly staffed with permanent staff that will provide institutional memory, capacity building in both programme planning, design and execution. This will also make it possible to establish a Monitoring and Evaluation function in the programme.*



**Recommendation 15:** *The Ministry of Local Government should draw a Strategic Plan as well as an Operational Plan for the programme. The process of drawing such a plan will assist IP management understand why some of the best practice PWP requirements are necessary and how they can be operationalized through programme design and implementation*

**Recommendation 16:** *All line ministries and departments responsible for poverty eradication should have included in their budgets Ipelegeng votes. That will not only improve the coordination of IP activities but it will also increase the departments' commitment and accountability for IP implementation.*

**Recommendation 17:** *As a strategic, nationally important project, the Ipelegeng budget must be drawn along standard district lines and not along constituency boundaries as is currently the case. This will reduce the unnecessary expenses incurred in some regions.*

#### **12.4 An Illustrative example on how these recommendations can be implemented**

The above listed recommendations are linked and can be used jointly to produce specific results. This section seeks to give a brief illustrative example of how this can be done. In the above set of recommendations Rec. 7 calls for a special Remote Area Programme while Rec. 8 says a bottom up approach should be used in project selection and Rec. 10 refers to a one-size-fits – all approaches must be avoided but instead design projects using an approach that takes into account specific resources and skills endowments as well environmental of specific localities. Rec. 12 calls for special circumstances of participants to be taken into account by utilizing flexible work scheduling. Rec. 10 suggest that the civil society fraternity and the private sector should be involved in the supervision of projects while Rec. 17 says this group might even be involved in project selection and funding of the selected projects. The question then is: ***If Government was to accept all these recommendations how would it go about implementing them? What is given below is one menu out of many options.***

The first action that government would have to take would be to establish the special features of the concerned settlement. Using the Poverty Map it would have to determine the acuteness of poverty in the settlement with the view to determine whether that settlement deserves special attention. Socio-economic data such as HIV prevalence, the socio-economic demographics of the household, literacy rates etc. would have to be determined. These would be done with a view to determine the type of projects that can be handled by the settlement. For example, there would be no wisdom in planning for an IP school based project in a settlement that has an extremely low literacy rate. But a home based care IP project might make sense in a high HIV prevalence rate community.

The preparatory stage for the project for launching the special project should have Government draw an inventory of all possible projects that are based on the resource, skills endowment of the area that can be undertaken. For example, where there is a mine or one being planned potentially related IP projects should be identified. Similarly, for tourism areas, IP project with the potential to link up with this sector should be identified. In that way the “one-size-fits all” approach would be avoided by taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the various localities.

The next preparatory step that Government would have to undertake would be to identify all possible stakeholders in these special programmes. Such a list should include the community itself as well as its leadership. Active civil society groups and the private sector operating in the area would have to be identified. Some mines may have, through their corporate social responsibility programmes, resources they want to use to partner with government in such IP programmes. Some may want to have direct supply of services from the settlement that may be offered through an IP based model. This may be the case with tourism organisations. A clear distinction between those organisations that can be used to supervise IP projects and those that can be directly involved should however be made. Literature on private sector collaboration with Governments in implementing PWPs abounds. Latin American countries and our neighbor, South Africa, have used this approach even to grow the small and medium scale private sector. This resonates well with Botswana’s EDD on the service sector side. Besides, lessening the burden on the fiscus, this approach will also address government limited implementation capacity, particularly with the imminent public sector workforce downsizing exercise.

Armed with this data, Government can then approach the settlement leadership and request it to come up with a proposal on the kind of IP projects that it wants. A stakeholder workshop may be held where the community will present its wishes and Government would guide using information it has already gathered. The end result of such a process would be an agreed action plan.

The implementation phase would then factor in such aspects as how should individuals offer their services to specific IP projects. Recommendation 12 suggests that instead of IP insisting that all workers should work for six continuous hours there should be provision for some flexibility in terms of beneficiaries providing their services to IP. Participants may, among other options, be engaged on task-based payment system. In South Africa, this has been used with households, instead of individuals, being the contracting party. This has assisted poor households to have a steady flow of income in that when one member takes ill other members step in to fill the gap.

For Botswana this approach will be useful in that those participating in IP projects will not be stopped from accessing other available economic empowerment programmes. The flexi time approach will enable the beneficiaries, among other programmes, to buy and manage LIMID sponsored goats and still participate in IP. Fighting poverty on these several fronts might take us

beyond just providing relief but eradicating poverty. The importance of combining PWPs with economic empowerment programmes was demonstrated by the Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PNSP) as reported in the literature review section.

As already recommended, the drawing of an IP Strategic Plan might come up with more creative ways of implementing these recommendations.

### Section 13: An Indicative Plan of how the given Recommendations will be addressed.

Initially ToR 7: required the consultancy to provide plans, budgets and timelines for the recommended actions. However, after discussions with the client, it was agreed that if such an exercise was to be properly done, it would be more involving than the programme review itself. It was therefore agreed that “only an indication of what is needed for the detailed plan to be produced” and would thus be presented by the consultancy. It is in that light that for each recommendation that the consultancy has made, the objectives of the recommendation and key activities to be undertaken are given. This is then followed by the stating of milestones that would indicate that the recommendation will have been implemented. The lead body in the execution of the concerned recommendation is identified and an indicative time frame stated. A short-term time frame indicates that the processes for implementing the recommendation are not very involving and that there may not be much by way of resource requirements. Medium term is relatively more involving but the resource requirements may be within the Ministry of Local Government’s jurisdiction and control. A long-term time frame indicates processes may be very much involving and long-term budgeting from the Central Government might be required. The Indicative Plan is given in Matrix form below.

Recommendation	Objectives	Expected Results	Key Actions required	Lead and collaborating agency	Time frame
<b><i>Recommendation 1: Ipelegeng objectives must be revised and be aligned to the national objective of poverty eradication.</i></b>	To underscore the fact that IP alone can only provide relief but in synergy with other Government programmes it can contribute to poverty eradication	A new clause in the guidelines that captures this sentiment	Revision of the objective clause in the current guidelines	MLG	Short-term
<b><i>Recommendation 2: Ipelegeng must be redesigned to be result based to introduce flexible working schedules where feasible.</i></b>	i) To enable IP participants to participate in other economic empowerment programmes as well their own routine chores ii) To make it	i) Widespread use of piece rates, task-based assignments as well as special job assignments to such groups as families as well as ii) Production of	i) Identification of how different projects will be treated in terms of time scheduling. ii) Production of how each IP	MGL	Medium Term

	possible for different IP participants to be assigned tasks that fit their gender, health and age status	prevalent use of substitution of participants by family members	activity will be handled in terms of whether each activity will be handled through groups, individuals and family groups		
<b><i>Recommendation 3: Ipelegeng must introduce a well-structured capacity building component that arms participants with production skills as well as survival skills.</i></b>	i)To assist IP participants graduate from the programme ii) To increase the quality of programmes and services offered by IP iii) To improve the skills of the national labour force	ii)Emergence of an Ipelegeng graduate cadre that undertakes well-paying jobs in both the formal and informal labour markets	i)Developing of training plans for all IP activities	MLG	Long term
<b><i>Recommendation 4: A strong and clearCommunication Strategy for Ipelegeng must be designed.</i></b>	i)To ensure that IP participants understand and appreciate that they are supposed to graduate from the programme. ii) To assist all IP stakeholders understand the programme and know the role they need to play to make the programme a success. iii) To ensure that there is sufficient and smooth information flow to all	i)Informed stakeholders at all levels ii)Free flow of information concerning IP from the top-bottom to the bottom-top approach	Drawing of a strategy after a detailed consultative process that will have identified areas that need to be addressed.	MLG	Short term

	stakeholders				
<b>Recommendation 5:</b> <i>A cost benefit analysis of using a single national Ipelegeng wage rate to achieve self-selection must be undertaken with the view to establish whether different regional factors can be taken into account and hence vary the wage rate regionally.</i>	To enable a re-designing process of the programme to that will ensure that there are no pockets of the population that are not fully benefitting from the IP on account of reasons related to their geographical location.	findings generated from the study	conduct a cost benefit study of whether different geographical areas benefit differently from the IP programme	MLG	Medium Term
<b>Recommendation 6:</b> <i>Investigate the reasons for Remote areas having displayed very different results from the rest of the groups regarding Ipelegeng Issues.</i>	To ensure that the most vulnerable category of Batswana is getting the highest possible benefits from IP programme. <i>Based on the outcome of the investigation determine if a Special Ipelegeng Programme targeting Remote areas should be designed and implemented</i>	findings generated from the study	Undertake a study to understand the special needs of remote areas with the view to determine how these needs can be met.	MLG	Short-term
<b>Recommendation 7:</b> <i>IP project selection should be</i>	i)To increase effectiveness and to enhance impacts of the	Existence of a diversified set of high quality IP projects that	i)Determination of an inventory of regional resource	MLG	Long Term

<p><i>based on the following key criteria: i) genuine bottom - up consultative process where community wishes on Ipelegeng projects to be implemented will be heeded to should be adopted.</i></p> <p><i>ii) IP projects selection should be based on the environment, natural resource endowment and skills-based for the concerned areas.</i></p> <p><i>iii)High quality projects with second round employment generation effect and the crowding-in of the private sector</i></p>	<p>projects through high quality projects</p> <p>ii)To increase relevance of the projects through ownership and buy-in into IP projects</p> <p>iii)To increase efficiency through the proper utilisation of local resource endowments.</p>	<p>are creating second round employment and attracting the private sector into the concerned areas.</p>	<p>endowments that can affect IP project offerings</p> <p>ii) develop guidelines on the design of regional specific programs based on a consultative process</p>		
<p><b><i>Recommendation 8</i></b></p> <p><b><i>Ipelegeng should be redesigned to take on board family responsibilities of different gender categories, the disabled age, health status and different group specific issues, where feasible.</i></b></p>	<p>To ensure that special needs of different Ipelegeng beneficiaries are catered for. That way IP will have a felt impact on the different dimensions of poverty</p>	<p>An IP programme with differentiated programme activities.</p>	<p>i) Draw an inventory of the different potential IP beneficiary groups identifying their special needs.</p> <p>ii) develop guidelines for projects designed to accommodate these groups.</p>	MLG	Medium Term

<b><i>Recommendation 9 Ipelegeng should review and upgrade its Health and Safety guidelines.</i></b>	To avoid health hazards negative externalities arising from efforts to address income poverty through Ipelegeng.	Smooth implementation of IP with no health and safety related problems.	i)Identify all health and safety related problems as well as strategies to address them ii)Identify work place related labour issues and strategies needed to address them	MLG in partnership with Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour & Home Affairs	Short Term
<b><i>Recommendation 10: Government must undertake a cost benefit analysis of engaging the private sector and Civil Society Organisations to supervise the implementation of some of Ipelegeng projects.</i></b>	i)To achieve proper,efficient and effective implementation of high quality IP projects that have a strong impact on the livelihood of the poor ii)To grow the small contractor sector of the Private Sector	Production of a feasibility study that pronounces on whether the two should be engaged and on what basis	i) Undertake the cost benefit analysis ii)Design of a collaboration model between the Government and these stakeholders. iii)Selling of the model to the Private Sector and Civil Society	MLG	Short-term
<b><i>Recommendation 11: New comprehensive guidelines for the programme should be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, including Ipelegeng beneficiaries</i></b>	To capture emerging issues and redesign IP	A comprehensive set of IP guidelines	Gather data through a nation-wide consultative process	MLG	Short term
<b><i>Recommendation 12: Ipelegeng must be re-designed to</i></b>	i)To draw IP's untapped potential	i)All Government supported	i) Drawing of an inventory list of all Government	-MLG & OP -Local Authorities	Short to medium term



<i>generate strong synergies with all other government economic empowerment programmes as well as safety-net programmes.</i>	contribution towards poverty eradication through synergies that the programme can generate in tandem with other Government initiatives.	economic activity related programmes demonstrate a link with IP & other poverty eradication programmes  ii) All safety net programmes are linked to IP.	supported programmes that are related to IP  ii) Production of a strategic framework that shows how these relations will be converted into benefits iii) <i>align Ipelegeng to the national objective of poverty reduction (see Rec 1 above)</i>	-Relevant Ministries and Departments hosting those programmes that are related to IP	
<b>Recommendation 13</b> <i>Government should involve the private sector in the funding and execution of the IP.</i>	To enhance the sustainability of the IP programme and to reduce pressure on the fiscus caused by the IP.	An IP that is jointly funded by Government and Private Sector	i) Draw different possible models through which this partnership can be effected. ii) Initiate discussions with the sector & share with them possible benefits that can arise from this collaboration.	MLG in collaboration with BOCCIM	Long Term
<b>Recommendation 14:</b> <i>Re-locate the Ipelegeng function to the Department of Community Development at district level.</i>	To ensure proper planning, staffing, monitoring and evaluation of the programme	An independent Division within MLG with a M&E function	Preparation of a detailed proposal for the establishment of a fully-fledged Division	MLG	Medium term to long Term
<b>Recommendation 15:</b> <i>The Ministry of</i>	i)To assist the Ministry	A robust re-designed	A bench marking process	MLG	

<b><i>Local Government should undertake a benchmarking process with countries that have experience in executing PWP with the view to gain experience to draw and implement a new robust Ipelegeng Programme</i></b>	appreciate and understand the Best Practice requirements of Public Works Programmes ii)To enable the Ministry to operationalize the recommendation given in this report	Ipelegeng programme that pays attention to the rationale for best practice requirements. Such a programme will thus be accompanied by a solid implementation plan.	followed by the re-designing of the Ipelegeng programme		
<b><i>Recommendation 16: All line Ministries and Departments involved in labour intensive PWPs should have Ipelegeng votes included in their budget.</i></b>	To increase coordination, ownership and accountability for the implementation of the IP programme	A District specific IP budget.	Make a request to the MFDP for the change in the budget allocation process	MLG in collaboration with MFDP and all affected ministries	Long term
<b><i>Recommendation 17: The Ipelegeng budget must be drawn along standard district lines and not along constituency boundaries as is currently the case.</i></b>	To enhance cost-effectiveness of IP implementation.		Consult with MFDP and other concerned stakeholders on the issue.	MLG in collaboration with MFDP	Medium Term

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## ANNEX 1 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

**Instructions:** This Household survey questionnaire is to be used for BENEFICIARIES of the Ipelegeng Programme. It is administered by the enumerator.

0.1: Enumerators Name: \_\_\_\_\_

0.2: Respondent code number

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

**Instructions:** Please circle completed answers where necessary.



## Profile

0.3 District \_\_\_\_\_

0.4 Name of Locality \_\_\_\_\_

0.5 Type of area (*Tick*) City \_\_\_\_\_, Town \_\_\_\_\_, Urban Village \_\_\_\_\_, Rural \_\_\_\_\_, Remote \_\_\_\_\_

0.6: date: \_\_\_\_\_

0.7 Time: Started \_\_\_\_\_ Time Finished \_\_\_\_\_

0.8 Checked by: \_\_\_\_\_[signature]

0.9 House Number/census number (2011): \_\_\_\_\_

## Household Issues

### A1 Demographic Issues

#### 1. Demographic Issues

HH member	Sex 1=M 2=F	Age	Marital status	Education Level	Current Occupation	Relation to HH	Relation to Respondent	Ever held any type of employment before If yes what type?	Ever worked for IP and when	Gov. Social Safety Net currently being received
1										
2										
3										
4										
5										
6										
7										
8										
9										
10										
11										
12										
13										
14										
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										
20										

### Menu for Question 1

Marital Status	Education	Occupation	Relation to HH	Relation to Res	Govt SSNs
1=Single 2=Married 3=Separated 4=Divorced 5= Widowed 5=Living together	1=None 2=Primary 3=JC 4=O' level 5=Certificate 6=Degree 7=PGDE 8=Masters 9=PhD	1=Unemployed 2=Herder 3=Domestic worker 4=Own business 5=Industrial class 6=Clerical 7=Shop assistant 8=White collar job 9=Piece job 10=Ipelegeng 11=Other (specify	1= Head 2=Spouse/Partner 3=Son/Daughter 4= Step Child 5= Grand child 6= Parent 7= Parent in law 8= Brother/Sister 9= Nephew/niece 10= Other relative 11= Not related	1= Respondent 2=Spouse/Partner 3=Son/Daughter 4= Step Child 5= Grand child 6= Parent 7= Parent in law 8= Brother/Sister 9= Nephew/niece 10= Other relative 11= Not related	1= Old Age Pension 2= WWII 3= Orphan Care Program 4= Destitute Program 5= CHBC 6= Ipelegeng 7= Other (specify)

2. Household labour Market Participation Issues								
Household Adult	Skills possessed 1=None( just labourer) 2=Artisan 3=Clerical 4=End level professional 5=Middle level professional 6=Higher level professional 7=Other (specify)	Job held in the 1st quarter ( Jan-Mar)	Job held in the 2nd quarter ( Apr-Jun)	Job held in the 3rd quarter ( Jul-Sept)	Job held in the 4th quarter ( Oct-Dec)	Total months worked in the last 12 months	More than 12 months ago	Are you looking for a job? 1=Yes 2=No
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								

## A2: Household Ipelegeng Issues

3.

	Have You or any member of your household ever applied for IP? 1=Yes 2=No	If no why have you/they never applied?  1= I have a better job 2= IP is too inferior for me 3= There is too much competition 4= Pay is to low 5= I am better off doing farming 6= Other reasons (specify) 7= Don't know	If yes did you/they take the offer? 1=Yes 2=No	If yes did you/they work throughout the offer period? 1=Yes 2=No	If no why did you/they leave before the offer period lapsed?  1= Work was too demanding relative to pay 2= Work was too strenuous 3= Work schedule did not fit my house hold activities 4= Felt my health was at risk 5= I was fired
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

### A.3 Household Income

4. From each of the following sources, how much have you made in the last 12 months?

SOURCE	Amount per month	Total Amount (Annual)
Piece jobs		
Petty Trade		
Farm produce sale		
Livestock sale		
Rental income		
Remittance from family members		
Old Age Pension		
World War II Veteran		
Destitute Programme		
Ophan Care Programme		
CHBC		
Ipelegeng payment		
Other (specify)		

### A.4 Household Expenditure

5. What quantities are consumed and how much is spent by the household on the following items per month?

What quantities are consumed and how much is spent by the household on the following items per month?		
Expenditure Item	Amount spent per month	Total Amount spent per year (Office use)
Food		
Alcohol		
Clothes		
Rent		
Transport		
Education related expenditures		
Toiletries		
Utilities		
Medical Expenses		
Other (Specify)		

### A5: Household Capital Asset ownership

6. Does your household own any of the following assets?

Type of Asset	Number	Held since when	Means by which acquired  1=Purchased 2=Inherited 3=Gift 4=Other (Specify)
Cattle			
Goats			
Sheep			
Chicken			
Donkeys			
Scotch Cart			
Radio			
Bicycle			
Borehole			
Ploughing fields			
Business shop			
Semau			
House			
Vehicle			
TV			
Tractor			
Cellphone			
Other (specify)			

## **A6: Household Wealth Accumulation**

7. Has the household or any member of this household acquired any of the following assets in the past 12 months?

Asset	Amount or number	Sources of Funds
Cattle		
Goats		
Sheep		
Chicken		
Donkeys		
Scotch Cart		
Radio		
Bicycle		
Borehole		
Ploughing fields		
Business shop		
Semau		
House		
Vehicle		
TV		
Tractor		
Cellphone		
Other (specify)		



## **B: PARTICIPANTS' RESPONSES TO IPELEGENG ISSUES**

### **B1: ISSUES OF RELEVANCE**

8. The Botswana Government has tried to use The Ipelegeng Project as poverty Eradication Project. Do you feel that the project has assisted you to improve your situation?

1=Yes

2= No

9. If Yes how do you think this has assisted you address your poverty situation

1= Now can feed my family

2= Now can feed and clothe my family

3= Now can feed and educate my children

4= Now can feed and house my children

5= Now can feed, clothe and educate my children

6= Now can feed, cloth, house and educate my children

7= Now I can afford the above and even save or invest

8= I can now afford luxury good that I could not afford before

9= Other (Specify)

10. If no explain why.

1= Payment lower than if I work on my fields or take care of my cattle

2= Payment lower than if I do piece jobs

3= Payment could be okay but the fact that it is only for a limited period of time does not help me much

4= Payment too low and too temporary

5= Other (Explain)

11. The Botswana Government also hopes that beyond poverty eradication, participation in Ipelegeng can assist you gain some skills that can assist you enter the formal job market. Do you think your participation in Ipelegeng can assist you achieve this?

Yes = 1

No= 2

12. Does IP have a structured training?

1= Yes

2= No (if No go to Q14)

**13.** If Yes what skills have you learnt?

- 1= Grass cutting
- 2= Drift fencing
- 3= Road construction
- 4= Dam construction
- 6= Other (specify)

**14.** If No explain why you are saying it does not have a structured training?

- 1= Ipelegeng has no structured training programme
- 2= What they teach at Ipelegeng is too basic and cant benefit me in any way
- 3= There is no training & the environment is such that you can't learn anything from anyone
- 4= Other (Explain)

**15.** It is also the hope of Government that through your participation in Ipelegeng you may want to establish your own business drawing from the entrepreneurial skills, work experience and contacts all of which you are most likely to derive from Ipelegeng. Do you agree with this?

- 1= Yes
- 2= No (if No, go to Q17)

**16.** If Yes explain

- 1= I am already selling a few things to my co-workers at Ipelegeng
- 2= I have already started saving in preparation for starting my own business
- 3= Other (Explain)

**17.** If No explain

- 1= No saving can be generated from Ipelegeng to enable anyone to venture into any business
- 2= No experience can be derived from IP to prepare any one for Business
- 3= Savings are too low and there is no experience derived from IP to assist establish any business
- 4= Other (Explain)

18. The Botswana Government also believes that by giving you the opportunity to work for Ipelegeng it is also assisting you to gain self dignity through self empowerment by providing for yourself. Do you agree with this?

1= Yes

2= No (if No, go to Q20)

19. If Yes explain

1= I feel respected by my family and acquaintances

2= I am even approached for loans & assistance in the village since i started working for IP

3= As a person I really feel dignified

4= Other (Explain)

20. If No explain

1= My friends & acquaintances laugh at me and despise me

2= I keep it a secret from my friends that I work for Ipelegeng

3= Ipelegeng is less dignified than doing piece jobs

4= Other (Explain)

21. Do you believe that Ipelegeng should be reformed?

1= Yes

2= No (if No, go to Q23)

22. If yes, rank in order of priority the three (3) most important reforms that should be changed about Ipelegeng (1 being the highest).

	Rank
Increase salary	
Provide protective clothing	
Provide leave	
Other (specify)	

**B2: EFFICIENCY ISSUES**

**23.** State the type of Ipelegeng Activity you are currently involved in.

1= Community Infrastructure construction

2= Environmental Policing

3= Litter collection

4= Crime Fighting

5= Building constructions

6= Bush clearing along roads

7= Dam & storm drain desliting

8= Other (Specify)

**24.** Which of the above activities best suite your expertise and capabilities? \_\_\_\_\_

**25.** When you were allocated this task, were your personal circumstances such as being not very healthy or having a young baby taken into account?

1= Yes

2= No

**26.** Is your current output in this activity the same as would be if you were doing a paid piece job or doing it for yourself?

1= Yes

2= No

(If yes go to Q28)

**27.** If no what is the most important reason for this difference in output?

- 1= Bad supervision leading to high absenteeism and shirking
- 2= Mob psychology causes less productivity
- 3= Our skills and areas of strengths are not properly harnessed
- 4= Failure of the system to take into account health and safety measures
- 5= Other (Specify)

**28.** In your Ipelegeng activity are there any inputs that you feel are used carelessly /inappropriately or misused?

- 1= Yes
  - 2= No
- (If No move to Q30)

**29.** State the type of inputs and equipments that are used carelessly/inappropriately or misused in your Ipelegeng activity:

Type of Input or equipment used inappropriately.	How exactly is the input or equipment being abused
1)Labour	
2)Hand tools	
3)Heavy equipment	
4)Machinery	
5)Building Material	
6)Other (Specify)	
1= Always stolen 2= Always borrowed for personal used 3= Badly maintained 4= Roughly handled 5= Idle 6= Over-utilized 7= Other (explain)	

**30.** In your Ipelegeng activity are there any inputs or equipment that you feel are not appropriate for the kind of activity that you are doing as a group?

- 1= Yes
- 2= No

(If No go to Q32)

31. If yes explain as follows

Type of in appropriate input or equipment	Why do you think it is inappropriate?	What would you recommend instead?
1)Labour		
2)Hand tools		
3)Heavy equipment		
4)Machinery		
5)Building Material		
6)Other (Specify)		
<b>Codes:</b> 1= Unnecessarily expensive 2= Too obsolete 3= Health hazard to workers 4= Not readily available 5= Other (Specify)		

32. Efficient use of time is always the key to high productivity in any production activity. In your line of Ipelegeng do you feel that time is efficiently used and respected?

1= Yes

2= No

(If yes go to Q34)

33. If no why do you think time is not efficiently utilized?

1= Workers come late

2= High absenteeism

3= Time lost especially during pay collection time

4= Workers deliberately take long take long to take simple jobs

5=The IP office is always delaying progress by not delivering materials on time

6= Other (Specify)

### **B3: EFFECTIVENESS ISSUES**

**34.** How long have you been in the Ipelegeng Programme?

\_\_\_\_\_

**35.** Regarding your sustenance needs do you believe the programme has made a positive change to your life?

1= Yes

2= No

(If yes go to Q37)

**36.** If no why do you believe you have not benefitted from the IP?

1= Programme does not only cater for the poor but also caters for the well off

2= IP pays too low

3= Other (Specify)

**37.** As a man or woman do you think the Ipelegeng project is adequately designed to meet the specific needs of your gender?

1= Yes

2= No

(If Yes go to Q39)

**38.** If no what issues specific to your gender have been left out from the project design?

1= Project does not take into account that women take care of babies and have to be given special consideration

2= Project does not consider that women are less suitable for physically demanding jobs

3= Project does not consider the fact that men are responsible for such other household responsibilities as clearing fields for ploughing and looking after livestock

4= Other (Specify)

39. Besides the Ipelegeng project's main objective of addressing poverty reduction by providing paid employment to individuals, the project also aims at providing infrastructure and services that benefit community's livelihood at large. In your view for each of these activities what would be your judgement in terms of meeting this objective:

<b>Ipelegeng Project</b>	Strongly Agree: 1	Agree: 2	Neutral: 3	Disagree:4	Strongly Disagree: 5	Don't know:6
Road Bush Clearing						
Green Scorpions						
Dam and Drain desilting						
Crime fighting						
School feeding Programme						
Other (Specify)						

40. Do you believe that Ipelegeng has actually targeted employing the poorest and most deserving people in your village?

1= Yes

2= No

(If Yes go to Q42)



- 41.** If no who do you think should be targeted? Rank your answers in order of priority with 1 being the most preferred and 3 being the least preferred

	Ranking
1) Members of poor households with no working members	
2) Unemployed youth especially orphans	
3) Female headed households	
4) Deregistered able bodied destitute persons	
5) Other specify	

- 42.** How did you get enrolled in the Ipelegeng Programme?

- a. I was looking for a job
- b. I was referred by a social worker (deregistered as an able bodied destitute)
- c. I was referred by a member councilor
- d. I was referred by a member of the VDC
- e. Other [specify]\_\_\_\_\_

- 43.** Do you think the selection process is fair?

Yes: 1

No: 2

(If Yes go to Q46)

- 44.** If No, what do you think can be done to make the selection process fair?

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- 45.** What do you think should be done to increase the effectiveness of Ipelegeng on poor households: Please rank your answers in order of priority with 1 being the most preferred and 3 being the least preferred

	Ranking
1) Employ beneficiaries on full time basis	
2) Increase Ipelegeng wages	
3) Teach beneficiaries production skills	
4) Do means testing	
5) Other Specify	

**B4: IMPACT ISSUES**

- 46.** Do you know the objectives of Ipelegeng?

Yes: 1

No: 2

- 47.** If yes list the objectives.

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- 48.** If yes where did you get the information from?

1= Social Worker

2= VDC member

3= Chief/Headman

4= Councillor

5= Other:

- 49.** Do you think Ipelegeng has been able to achieve its poverty eradication objectives?

1= Yes

2= No

3= I don't know

**50.** Do you know of any poor persons who benefitted from Ipelegeng and are now better off?

1= Yes

2= No

**51.** Do you know of any able bodied destitute previously registered in the destitute persons who are working for Ipelegeng?

1= Yes

2= No

**52.** What do you use earnings from Ipelegeng for?

1= Buy food for myself

2= Buy food for myself and family (household)

3= Pay rent

4= Pay school fees, pot fees and school uniform

5= Save to build a house

6= Buy tobacco and alcohol

7= Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

53. Some people argue that Ipelegeng has had some intended and unintended good effects as well as intended and unintended bad effects. What would be your view about the following?

Effect	Strongly Agree:1	Agree:2	Neutral:3	Disagree:4	Strongly disagree:5	Don't know:6
Intended and unintended Ipelegeng Good Effects						
1) Ipelegeng stops people from migrating to urban areas						
2) Ipelegeng helps the village economy grow as people are able to buy from local shops						
3) Activities provided by Ipelegeng facilitate productive processes in the village						
4) Other Goods effects						
	Strongly Agree:1	Agree:2	Neutral:3	Disagree:4	Strongly disagree:5	I don't know: 6
Intended and unintended Ipelegeng Bad Effects						
1) Ipelegeng has killed the spirit of self reliance						
2) The programme has killed willingness to undertake arable farming						
3) Ipelegeng has led to a serious shortage of herders						
4) Now that Ipelegeng includes urban areas it will cause more rural urban migration						
5) Drunkenness in village will increase as people earn more money						
6) Rural crime has increased as more people earn cash						
7) Other negative effect						

## **B5: SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES**

**54.** Do you intend to graduate from Ipelegeng?

1= Yes

2= No

(If No go to Q56)

**55.** If yes, what are the three (3) most important factors that will motivate you to exit the programme?

	<b>Ranking</b>
Skills training	
Searching for jobs outside of Ipelegeng	
Start my own business	
Consolidate on my farming activities	
Doing piece jobs	
Others specify	

**56.** Are there any other income generating activities that you are currently undertaking alongside with Ipelegeng or intending to undertake?

1= Yes

2= No

(if No go to Q58)

- 57.** If yes indicate below with 1 for activity or intended activity in the area and 2 for none or none intended activity in the area

	Currently Involved	Planned (intended)Involvement
Horticulture or vegetable garden		
Chickens etc		
Guinea fowl production		
Sewing, weaving etc		
Small business retailing		
Other specify		

- 58.** Has Ipelegeng done or offered any activity to build your knowledge and skills on generating income?

1= Yes

2= No

- 59.** Did you make any initiative to use the knowledge and skills to improve your life beyond the life of Ipelegeng?

1= Yes

2= No

- 60.** Have you heard about other government economic empowerment programmes?

1= Yes

2= No

(If No go to Q65)

- 61.** If yes, which particular ones have you heard about?
- 1= ISPAAD  
 2= LIMID  
 3= Youth Programmes  
 4= Back yard gardening  
 5= Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 62.** If you have heard about other government economic empowerment programmes, have you applied for any of them?
- 1= Yes  
 2= No
- 63.** If yes which one have you applied for?
- 1= ISPAAD  
 2= LIMID  
 3= Youth Programmes  
 4= Back yard gardening  
 5= Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 64.** Were you successful?
- 1= Yes  
 2= No
- 65.** If no, what were the reasons?
- 1= I didn't meet the requirements  
 2= I didn't have down payment  
 3= I'm still waiting for a response  
 4= Other (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_
- 66.** With the impending global recession which might affect Botswana diamonds negatively and the Botswana Government might be forced to substantially scale down on Ipelegeng. Do you believe that when that happens there will be drastic reverse on progress so far made in poverty alleviation through Ipelegeng?
- 1= Yes  
 2= No

67. If yes rank the following in order of priority with 1 being the most important reason and 3 being the third most important

	Rank
1.Ipelegeng wages too low to warrant savings to generate investment to enable participants to sustain themselves independently	
2.Absence of skills training in the programme makes it difficult for participants to do anything on their own	
3.None permanent rotational participation makes ipelegeng benefits none sustainable	
4.Ipelegeng as a project has killed the spirit of self reliance and so it is difficult to imagine people making it without Government assistance	
5.The Botswana economy is growing in a manner that makes it difficult for the very poor to survive without Government support	
6.Other Specify	

\*\*\*\*\*THANK YOU\*\*\*\*\*



## **ANNEX 2 FOCUS GROUP GUIDE**

### **Relevance**

- A.). What are the benefits of Ipelegeng? Explain
- B.). What do you use earnings obtained from IP for?
- C.). In your view, do you think Ipelegeng is helpful to yourself, family and household? How?
- D.). What are the strengths and weaknesses of Ipelegeng?
- E.). Do you think IP is relevant for the development of the country? Explain?
- F.). Do you think IP is relevant for the development of the country? Explain?

### **Efficiency**

- A. What are the objectives of Ipelegeng
- B. Do you think the government of Botswana is able to achieve the objectives of Ipelegeng, especially poverty eradication?
- C. What is your understanding of poverty eradication? Is Ipelegeng a good strategy for poverty eradication in your community?
- D. Do you think Ipelegeng projects are well planned, coordinated and delivered on time and without waisting government funds?
- E. Please indicate the advantages and disadvantages of Ipelegeng
- F. What issues do you have with respect to delivery of IP? Explain

### **Effectiveness**

- A.) Please indicate the activities that have been carried so far under the Ipelegeng. Have these activities achieved the desired results?
- B.) Do you think the IP has met its intended objectives? In particular, poverty eradication?
- C.) Has the economic situation of Ipelegeng beneficiaries improved as a result of their employment or participation in Ipelegeng?
- D.) Are households who has a member working for Ipelegeng better of than those without such members?

### **Impact**

- A.). What is the impact of Ipelegeng on the lives of beneficiaries and household members?

Probe for:

- Micro level impacts

- Noticeable change in standard of living e.g. has there been any improvement/betterment or no improvement at all at household and individual level?
- Change in consumption patterns for those working for the Ipelegeng Programme (can afford to buy food instead of relying on destitute handouts and eat food of high nutritional value)
- migration (lands, cattle post to villages to work for Ipelegeng or rural – urban migration)
- increased spending on basic needs (due to increased purchasing power)
- Improvement in the local economy e.g. local shops make more business during from Ipelegeng beneficiaries?

B.). What have you used Ipelegeng earnings for? Explain

C.). Has IP transferred any skills to you? Explain

### **Sustainability**

- A.) Do you think IP should be continued and if so, why?
- B.) What in your view are the successes of the Ipelegeng Programme with respect to the overarching objective of poverty eradication?
- C.) What are the challenges of Ipelegeng?
- D.) Have you learnt any skills from IP? Explain
- E.) If you have learnt any skills any skills, how do you want to use them to improve your livelihood?
- F.) Do you intend to graduate from IP? If so what would assist you to graduate?
- G.) Have you heard of government economic empowerment schemes? Explain the ones you know of.
- H.) Have you benefitted from other economic empowerment schemes? Please state them.
- I.) Would you like to benefit from other economic schemes in order to graduate from Ipelegeng? Please explain.

\*\*\*\*\*The end\*\*\*\*\*

### **ANNEX 3: KEY INFORMANTS GUIDE** (Policy Makers, Policy Implementers and Community Leaders)

**Total Participant Time required: 1 hour**

#### **Introduction, Explanation and Interview Process (5 minutes)**

A. Interviewer introduces her/himself and explains the purpose of the study.

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_, I am a consultant/researcher with BIDPA, a local consultancy firm. My assistant is \_\_\_\_\_.

We are working on a project for the Ministry of Local Government in collaboration with UNICEF on the Review of the Ipelegeng Programme. For the purpose of this study you have been purposely selected as a key informant for the study. You have been asked to join us here because of your position in the ministry or local authority (Policy Maker or Implementer), or a community leader (i.e. Member of Parliament (MP), Councillor, Kgosi, and VDC member). We would like to thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. The information will be used to assess the effectiveness, relevance and impact of the Ipelegeng Programme as a strategy for poverty reduction and employment creation in Botswana. Please share as much information as you can so that issues of concerns regarding the Ipelegeng Programme could be known with a view to make recommendations on the way forward.

B. Explain the Interview Process

I am going to ask you some questions on the impact of the Ipelegeng programme on the lives of the programme beneficiaries. You are not been asked questions about whether you like Ipelegeng or not, but rather your views about the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and impact of the programme as a social safety net and a strategy for poverty reduction and employment creation in Botswana.

The interview will be recorded and pictures may be taken with your permission. This will allow me to go back and listen, take notes, and then write a short summary of our discussions. I want to reassure you that all your comments will remain anonymous. Your names will not be directly linked to anything that you said during the interview.

## **QUESTIONS**

### **Relevance**

#### **Question 1**

- A.) What are the objectives of the Ipelegeng Programme? To what extent are these objectives consistent with the intended beneficiaries' needs and aspirations?
- B.) To what extent are the objectives of IP consistent with the needs, national policies and priorities of the country, as well as regional and global agenda e.g. MDGs.
- C.) Does IP fit within the current government policies and plans
- D.) Are the target group for Ipelegeng clearly defined and appropriate?
- E.) What are the strengths and weaknesses of IP implementing institutions (i.e. in terms of structure, resources, skills and funding)
- F.) Was there a study conducted prior to the establishment of Ipelegeng upon which the project was based and implemented
- G.) To what extent did IP design take into account economic, social and cultural realities as well as the various geographic locations
- H.) Are the projects undertaken under IP relevant for the needs of the country and communities? Explain.
- I.) Could they be better options? Explain
- J.) In your view, what are the successes of the Ipelegeng Programme with respect to the overarching objective of poverty eradication?  
Probe for success on programme beneficiaries?
  - General impact on households with a member in the programme
  - Programme beneficiaries (women and the youth)
  - Impact on the Remote Area Dwellers
  - Creation of employment opportunities
  - Labor issues

### **Efficiency**

#### **Question 2**

- A.) In your opinion, do you think the government of Botswana is able to achieve IP objectives in the most economical and cost-effective way (i.e. in terms of time, resources, expertise etc?)
- B.) Do you think the IP is well coordinated and services delivered on time and budget?
- C.) Is the planning of IP comprehensive and realistic i.e. Have activities been timely implemented and delivered or implemented. If not, what impact have delays had on resources, time and inputs as well as outcomes of the projects

- D.) Has IP built effective partnerships and collaborating institutions to efficiently deliver its poverty eradication projects?
- E.) What are the strengths and weaknesses in management and coordination (communication, information, human resources, budgeting, financial management and targeting intended beneficiaries and project coverage)
- F.) Does the IP have an inbuilt monitoring and evaluation framework (both internal and external) with clear indicators, targets and baselines?

### **Effectiveness**

#### **Question 3**

- A.) In your opinion, do you think the IP has met its intended objectives? If Yes or NO please explain your answer?
- B.) Please indicate the activities that have been carried so far under the Ipelegeng. Have these activities achieved the desired results?
- C.) To what extent do the results so far achieved contribute to the overall objective IP of poverty eradication?
- D.) Have you ever had reason to complain about the manner in which IP was implemented? What challenges exists in the implementing the Ipelegeng Programme? For example, the need to sort out labor issues. Is Ipelegeng employment by ILO and Botswana Labor Standards, If so, What are the implications?
- E.) What do you think can be done to close the gaps and/or improve the implementation of the Ipelegeng Programme in Botswana

### **Impact**

#### **Question 4**

- A.). In your opinion, what do you think has been (or is) the major impact of the Ipelegeng Programme on households (beneficiaries) in Botswana?
- B.). What has been happening to the lives of the beneficiaries since they started working for Ipelegeng. Any notable change or improvement in their standard of living?
- C.). Has Ipelegeng produced any tangible impacts so far? Is it on the right track to produce the expected impact consistent with its mandate of poverty eradication?

Probe for:

- Positive and negative impacts
- Primary and secondary impacts
- Long term effects (directly or indirectly; intended or unintended)

D.). How has the IP programme impacted on communities?

### **Sustainability**

#### **Question 5**

- A.) What is the likely sustainability of Ipelegeng with respect to economic, social and financial sustainability?
- B.) What are the challenges of IP
- C.) Do you think IP should be continued and if so, why?
- D.) If you were to advise the Government of Botswana on how to improve or make the current Ipelegeng and effective strategy for poverty eradication, what would you say or say to the Government?
- E.) What other government economic empowerment programmes are people benefitting from? Explain

#### **Conclusion**

- What other pertinent issues have you observed that you think should be considered in the implementation of the Ipelegeng Programme in Botswana in order to make the programme sustainable?
- What Lessons learned in the implementation of Ipelegeng?