Call for Board inputs
REDD+ Results-Based Payments

The GCF aims to support a paradigm shift in the global response to climate change, for which It allocates ex-ante resources to low-emission and climate-resilient projects and programmes in developing countries. RBP for REDD+ implies the allocation of ex-post resources to reward emission reductions and increased removals by forest. In the context of RBP for REDD+, the REDD+ activities will be in line with the paradigm shift that the GCF aims to support.

At the fourteenth meeting, through decision B.14/03, the Board of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) requested the Secretariat to develop "a request for proposals (RFP) for REDD+ results-based payments (RBP), including guidance consistent with the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and other REDD+ decisions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

While the UNFCCC guidance including the Warsaw Framework provides guiding pillars for REDD+, operationalization of REDD+ results-based payments at the GCF requires further analysis and discussion of elements related to technical and procedural aspects in the context of the governing instrument of the Fund and current procedures. These elements have been identified in section 4.1 of document GCF/B.14/03 and section 3 of document GCF/B.15/Inf.07. These elements have also been discussed in the GCF dialogue at the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and analyses undertaken to date on the existing UNFCCC guidance and current GCF policies, standards and procedures.

This call seeks inputs from the Board on those identified elements through a structured template which is included below. In the template, a distinction is made between those elements that relate to the GCF procedures and mandates requiring Board decisions for framing of the RFP and those elements that relate to the technical aspects of the modalities. A parallel process focused on the technical modalities only seeks inputs from relevant global stakeholders, including CSOs, Indigenous peoples' representatives, private sector and REDD+ experts.

Input from the Board will be shared publically and analysed by the Secretariat for the preparation of the first draft of the RfP.

Input requested

The Board is requested to provide input on the following key procedures and technical elements to support the development of the RfP for RBP. The template enclosed below includes guiding questions provided as reference only and can be complemented with additional questions identified by the Board.

Please provide your inputs using the template and send to fundingproposal@gcfund.org by **20th March 2017 at 23:59 Korean Standard Time with subject line "Call for Inputs REDD+ Board"**. Include in the text message: Name title and Organization; Country/constituency

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Template for receiving inputs

I. Elements related to procedures and mandates of the Fund (for the Board only)

Procedure element 1: Access modality

Issue: While the COP noted that national entities or focal points of developing country Parties may nominate their entities to obtain and receive RBF,[1] consistent with any specific operational modalities of the financing entities providing them with support, GCF resources are currently accessed through accredited entities.[2] Guidance is required regarding the access modality for channelling RBP in accordance to the Governing Instrument while following COP decisions.

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: Formally nominated national entities or focal points to receive RBPs, consistent with any specific operational modalities of the financing entities providing them with support
- Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund: Government or a government-approved entity that is authorized to enter into a legal agreement with the fund
- REDD Early Movers (REM): National and state administrations (e.g. Ministry of Environment)
- Norway-Guyana bilateral agreement: Finance channelled through the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund
- Norway-Brazil bilateral agreement: The Amazon Fund administered by the Brazilian Development Bank
- Norway-Peru agreement: Implemented by the Inter-American Development Bank

Guiding questions:

1.1: What should be the role of the REDD+ national entities or focal points to the UNFCCC in accessing RBP?

Pursuant to decision 10/CP.19, the national entities or focal points will serve as liaison with the secretariat and bodies under the Convention, including GCF, on coordination of support, and may also nominate entities to receive and obtain results-based payments. Therefore national entities or focal points should endorse requests for result-based financing/payments and designate the entities that will channel such financing/payments; national entities or focal points must also ensure compliance of request proposals with relevant REDD+ decisions at UNFCCC. The results of REDD+ activities are presented by country, being independently verified by experts designated by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, and inserted into the "Lima REDD+ Information Hub" allowing the avoidance of double accounting of REDD + results.

1.2: What should be the role of the accredited entity (AE) in the RBP process?
Accredited entities, on behalf of GCF, would be important to provide general oversight of the implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms, ensuring that they comply with environmental and social safeguards, the continuous functioning of MRV systems and that some kind of mechanism and/or arrangements for reducing risks of emission reversals are in place.

It could also provide support to ensure transparency of these processes. In other words, they would be responsible for those **residual obligations after** the payments have been made. It is however envisaged that these activities would involve significantly less administrative and technical burden to accredited entities than those in ordinary project implementation.

1.3: Should there be another access modality for RBP other than though AE?
Until more guidelines are provided under the GCF, regarding RBP, accredited entities support should be the only access modality.

1.4: Should the NDA play a formal role in the RFP proposal process besides providing a NOL, and if so, what role should that be?
Yes, NDA should review and provide a NOL, under nationally agreed procedures, requests for payment to the GCF; it should also exercise general oversight about REDD+ implementation, with support of accredited entities, and review, approve and submit performance reports to the GCF as appropriate.

In the case of Mexico, the NDA (SHCP) ensures consistency of financing proposals with national development plans and strategies and will revise all concept notes and proposals, prior to send them to the GCF. Details on the role of the NDA in coordinating these efforts shall be agreed domestically, and there is no need to establish any kind of regulations/guidance from GCF other than general guiding principles for coordination between GCF and NDAs.

1.5 Others?

[1] UNFCCC decision 10/CP.19, paragraphs 1 and 2.
[2] Except for resources for readiness and preparatory support which can be accessed by national designated authorities.

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Procedure element 2: Financial valuation of results

Issue: Guidance is required on how to determine the relationship between the Emissions Reductions results proposed and the amount of finance to be provided. For example, most initiatives set a payment per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2eq).

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: No specific guidance on methods of financial valuation.
- FCPF Carbon Fund: Subject to negotiation between the fund and the REDD program but fund participants have currently indicated a willingness to pay up to USD 5 per tCO2eq. No additional payment premium for co-benefits provided.
- REM: USD 5 per tCO2eq
- Norway-Guyana bilateral agreement: USD 5 per tCO2eq
- Norway-Brazil bilateral agreement: USD 5 per tCO2eq

Guiding q**uestions:**

2.1: How should the valuation of results (payment/tonne CO2) be estimated?

a) A single, fixed payment; if so, indicate the amount and rationale.
At this stage, a minimum price could be established and which is correlated with the cost of achieving REDD+ results (at least opportunity and implementation costs); unfortunately fixing the amount of payment will be no an easy task as participant countries' circumstances are different.

In order to determine a fair price, opportunity, implementation, administrative, transaction and stabilization costs that countries will undergo to reduce emissions must be taken into account. A methodology to determine these costs could be developed, considering other non-carbon benefits.

It must be taken into consideration that higher carbon prices will incentivize greater ambition and action in REDD+ activities in the future.

b) A payment (or volume paid) adjusted according to methodologies used (i.e. use of IPCC tier 1-3 Good Practice Guidance, uncertainty level of estimated Emission Reductions, etc.)
The GCF may consider adopting a risk management scheme in which payments are adjusted according with ranges of uncertainty in estimations; in this way uncertainty of estimated emissions reductions could be properly addressed (i.e. lower pricing for reductions in tranches with higher uncertainty). In this regard, as in all the RBP process, the principle of taking into account specific country conditions must hold.

c) Open prices submitted to the RFP
An open prices policy could likely deliver RFP with a wide range of prices, making it quite difficult to allocate available financial resources in a cost-efficient manner.

d) Other?

Procedure element 3: Size of the RFP

Issue: The Board would need to determine the overall size of the RFP in terms of funding. This decision could take into account the existing funding available, the estimated potential demand for RBP during the period of the RFP, the potential to meet the objectives of the GCF via a RBP program, and other considerations such as the length of the RFP (discussed below under Procedure element 7).

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: No guidance on funding size, but encourages GCF to collectively channel adequate and predictable results-based finance in a fair and balanced manner, taking into account different policy approaches (Decision 9/CP.19 paragraph 5).
- FCPF Carbon Fund: Around US$ 735 million in committed funding for emission reduction payments through 2025
- REM: US$ 56.5 million
- Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI): US$ 365 million/year

Guiding questions:

3.1: What should be the total amount of funds to be set aside for the RFP at this time?

According with the Stern Review US$5.0 to 15.0 billion per year would be necessary to reduce deforestation by 46% globally. Kindermann et al (2008)[3] estimated an amount of US$17.2 – 28.9 billion per year to reduce 50% of deforestation by 2030 with a cost estimated in US$10 – 21 per tonne of CO_2.

At this pilot phase and considering the availability of funds in the GCF, total amount of funds should not be less than US$ 1-2 billion (a share of 10-20% of total contributions made by countries to GCF so far).

3.2: On what basis should the GCF estimate the total amount of funds to be set aside for the RFP?

Taking into account the share of global emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (i.e. 14-29% depending on the source). This figure can be adjusted to reflect the potential for removals by forest sinks.

3.3: How should the funds be channeled in a fair and balanced manner?

- **a) An initial RFP for a limited number of countries with an equal cap per country.**
- b) An initial RFP for a limited number of countries without a cap
- c) An initial equal cap per country allowing transferability of funds among countries
- d) A regional allocation of the overall funding available
- **e) Other?**
  An initial RFP with an equal cap per region and per country, allowing transferability of unallocated financing resources to other regions and countries until the total allowable financing is allocated to eligible countries. This transferability should be responsibility only of the GCF.

Procedure element 4: double financing

Issue: The current REDD+ finance landscape provides finance through a range of bilateral and multilateral funding sources. There is also a potential overlap of finance provided for a country to generate emission reductions through ex-ante finance which could later pursue ex-post payments. This could take place from different sources of funding as well as from the current finance provided by the GCF under the regular project cycle and through RBP.

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: Risk of double finance is not mentioned in the COP decisions. Nonetheless, paragraph 9 of Decision 9/CP.19 establishes the information hub aiming to increase transparency of information on results-based actions, and the corresponding payments.
- FCPF Carbon Fund: Requirement that emission reductions sold and transferred to the Carbon Fund are not used again by any entity for sale, public relations, compliance or any other purpose. An ER transaction registry is required to offer insurance against double counting and provide transparency to the public that there is no double claiming of the environmental benefit, in respect of the GHG emission reductions or removals.
- REM: REDD+ partner countries should have a mechanism, such as a registry, in place that prevents double counting as well as payments or the use of these ERs as offsets.

Guiding questions:

4.1: In what instances may double financing of results generate a concern? How could this concern best be addressed?

Concerns would emerge if there are RBP arrangements over the same emission reductions (by geography and REDD+ activity). To avoid this, it is critical that proper reporting and systematization mechanisms exist.

Results-based payment from any kind of international sources (Carbon Fund, voluntary, philanthropic, etc.) should be reported and systematized, including information on the project/area where emissions reductions are being achieved.

The results of REDD+ activities are presented by country, being independently verified by experts designated by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, and inserted into the "Lima REDD+ Information Hub” allowing the avoidance of double accounting of REDD+ results. The use of national registries (or any Data Administration Systems) is key to avoid the risk of double financing and double counting.

[3] Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2483236/pdf/zpq10302.pdf.

Financing for REDD+ preparedness should not be considered as RBP, unless otherwise specified by participant parties.

4.2: How should the GCF take into account the ex-ante finance provided either by the GCF regular project cycle or other sources of finance?
To ensure transparency, countries should be encouraged to disclose relevant financing for supporting REDD+ preparedness (ODA, UNREDD, FCPF and others) in addition to RBP.

The use of RBP approaches does not exclude other funding or ex ante investments to the development of activities that generate results.

The ex-ante finance is for realizing transformations that contribute to the reduction of emissions. Therefore, the result of the reduction on emissions can be subject to the payment for results.

4.3: Should GCF create or utilize an existing registry to track GCF-funded Emission Reduction tonnes in some way, in addition to the UNFCCC information hub?
No need, provided that the information hub has the ability to track funded emissions reduction, with information to identify country, area, year and amount of emissions reductions funded by GCF and other sources. However, putting in place national registries should be encouraged.

4.4: Other?

Procedure element 5: Use of proceeds
Issue: The Board may need to consider if any restrictions are needed on how the GCF RBPs are subsequently used, for example for activities implemented that do not contradict the results achieved or more broadly contradict the objectives of the GCF. This is also related to Operationalization of the 'Cancun Safeguards' discussed below.

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: Use of proceeds is not mentioned in the UNFCCC decisions
- FCPF Carbon fund: Programs to provide a description of the benefit-sharing arrangements including a benefit sharing plan
- REM: Programmatic benefit-sharing and investment plan are set in bilateral agreement; Requires that at least 50% of RBP reaches local level.
- Norway-Indonesia bilateral agreement: Transparent and equitable benefit-sharing mechanism required.

Guiding questions:

5.1: Should the GCF place any conditions or restrictions on the use of RBPs? If so, what kind of conditions would that be?
Proponents might adhere to a benefit distribution plan in their RFP in which the use of the requested financing is described, including financing arrangements/mechanisms to put in place for delivering payments at the field level, so as to continue supporting implementation of REDD+ activities, aimed to achieve its sustainability in the long term and reducing risks of reversals.

However, there should be no restrictions/limitations on the use of RBP, in order to respect national sovereignty. The mechanism should be robust enough to ensure that the incentives will generate transformative effects.

It is important to note that the results on which the payments are made are consistent with the GCF objectives, by virtue of the way in which REDD is designed, but the subsequent use of those payments should be flexible.

5.2: Other?

Procedure element 6: Ownership, legal title and implications for NDCs
Issue: The COP decisions do not provide any guidance regarding transfer and legal title of emissions reductions that result from REDD+ activities for the financial mechanisms like the GCF. Board would need to consider providing clarity on the status of Emission Reductions paid with GCF funds (may also apply for ex-ante finance).

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: REDD+ in the UNFCCC is referred to as "policy approaches and positive incentives". Also, decision 2/CP.17, paragraphs 66 and 67, refer to both appropriate market-based approaches and non-market-based approaches could be developed to support the results-based actions by developing country Parties. While the COP decisions do not mention title creation and transfer, article 6 of the Paris Agreement envisions the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes on a voluntary basis as authorized by participating Parties through a mechanism established under the authority and guidance of the COP (rules, modalities and procedures are yet to be defined).

- FCPF Carbon fund: Requires transfer of ERs, formalized through emission reduction payment agreements (ERPAs)
- REM: No transfer of ERs; ERs are retired and cannot be used for offsets, but recipients may report ERs to UNFCCC
- NICFI: No transfer of ERs.

Guiding questions:
6.1: Should there be any legal title or transfer of ownership associated with the payments? If so, should the GCF-funded Emission Reductions be fungible with other mechanisms?
No, decisions agreed under the REDD+ framework do not considerate transfer of ownership of emission reductions, therefore under the GCF there shouldn't be a transfer of such titles. Furthermore the contributions to the GCF by donors were not made expecting to buy emission reductions.

6.2: Should GCF "pay" for results without claiming any emission reductions? If so, would there be any obligation from the recipient country in relation to the "paid" emission reductions?
Yes, the GCF should pay for emission reductions without claiming ownership titles. It must only condition receiving countries to ensure the permanence of emissions reduced and/or the use of mechanisms to reduce the risk of reversals.

The payment for results that the GCF does is an incentive for countries to reduce their emissions therefore there is no room for claiming any emission reductions, and none obligations for the recipient since is the result of different investments made for the country to get the result.

6.3: What are the implications for reporting in a country NDC from GCF-funded Emission Reductions?
There shouldn't be implications, as mention before, the payment for results is an incentive and the country gets the payment after it achieves the result.

The GCF-funded Emission Reductions should be accounted within the conditioned goals, taking into account the reference period of those emissions to avoid double counting.

6.4: Other?

Procedure element 7: Eligibility date for payments and length of the RFP

Issue: Under the current UNFCCC REDD+ decisions, Parties, when constructing their national (or subnational) forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level, may choose their own baseline. This flexibility results in various reference and accounting periods that vary by country. The Board may need to set a starting date from which it will operationalize financing for results achieved by countries. This will be linked to the overall length of the RFP.

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: no reference to eligibility date for payments.
- FCPF Carbon Fund: payments can be made for emission reductions during the term of the Emission Reduction Payment Agreement (ERPA).
- REM: varies by country, in the case of Acre-Brazil emissions reductions are accounted from 2012 to 2015 while in Colombia from 2013-2017.

Guiding questions:
7.1: What should be the starting date for considering eligible results for RBP?
It is considered that RBP should, in principle, be linked to the period of deliberate REDD+ actions that the country has implemented, specifically from relevant milestones (such as policy changes, implementation of important programs/projects, changes in legal and programmatic frameworks, and others). This period is one of the most important factors that should determine the FREL/FRL period.

In any case, the emission reductions accounting period and methodologies must be fully consistent with the FREL/FRL submitted to the UNFCCC and assessed by this Convention (Decision 13/CP.19). However, there are other factors that determine the FREL/FRL period: (i) inputs available in the country, and (ii) the status of development of the National Forest Monitoring Systems (for MRV functions). These two factors depend on the specific conditions of each country. Therefore, the

Board should apply the principle of flexibility. The readiness process for REDD+ (and even the first steps of implementation) are improving the inputs and methodologies of the National Forest Monitoring Systems for MRV and FREL/FRL, so there should be enough flexibility to consider these updates (both in the quality of the estimates, as in the FREL/FRL period).

Besides, it is recommended to use a similar approach to the FCPF in relation to the establishment of FREL/FRL.

7.2: Should the starting period be the same for all countries or defined on a case by case basis?
Regarding the previous answer, starting period should be adopted on a case by case basis. This is in line with the principle of taking into account specific country conditions.

7.3: What should the payment period be – over what timeframe? i.e., when should it end?
It is considered that the payment period should depend on: (i) Period of the International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) of the Biennial Update Report (BUR) (or the correspondent assessment of the Technical Annex), and (ii) Any consideration of Procedure element 5: Use of proceeds. Payments should be made every 2 years, after a report that matches the BUR is delivered, as a part of an agreement spanning 6 to 10 years.

7.4: Other questions?

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II. Elements related to technical modalities (for the Board and REDD+ stakeholders)

Technical element 1: Scale of implementation

Issue: UNFCCC provisions request forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level (FREL/FRL) and measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) to be national with some flexibility for subnational scale as an 'interim measure'. Guidance is required for defining the scale of implementation for countries requesting RBPs. The GCF needs to state in the RFP what scale of implementation is acceptable in proposals; while being consistent with UNFCCC guidance on FREL/FRL and MRV. The GCF should also contemplate whether and how the existing REDD+ initiatives at different scales and approaches can be considered in the RFP.

UNFCCC mandates and existing practices of key initiative funds:

- UNFCCC: Requires national FREL/FRL or, if appropriate, as an interim measure, subnational FREL/FRL, in accordance with national circumstances (Decision 1/CP.16 paragraph 71).
- Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund: Allows for national and subnational (jurisdictional) level. Most programs are subnational.
- REDD Early Movers Program (REM): Allows for national and subnational. So far the experience has been subnational.
- Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI): Mainly national level agreements with national governments, although implementation occurs at subnational scales in some countries.

Guiding questions

1.1: What scale of implementation (national, subnational, nested) should be considered for the RFP?

Both scales should be considered. It is considered that the national scale should have a higher priority level. Similarly, a REDD+ initiative at a subnational or local level carries more weight if it is nested and aligned with national efforts.

1.2: Should the GCF provide detailed guidance for defining the scale of eligible proposals?

Instead of providing guidance aimed to define the scale of proposals, some priority criteria should be adopted aimed to favor national level initiatives over subnational/local level initiatives.

1.3: Other questions?

Technical element 2: Forest reference emissions levels (FREL)/forest reference levels (FRL)

Issue: Warsaw Framework for REDD+ articulates modalities for the development and technical assessment of FRELs/FRLs, and for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emission reductions achieved through REDD+ activities. Under the current UNFCCC REDD+ decisions, Parties, when constructing their national (or subnational) forest reference emission level and/or forest reference level, may choose their own baseline. This flexibility results in various reference and accounting periods that vary by country. The GCF needs to consider ways to link these procedures with RBF while considering specific countries' circumstances.

Existing practices of other funds:

- FCPF Carbon Fund: Follows UNFCCC requirements of using historical averages and adjustment but it only allows limited adjustment for "high forest low deforestation" (HFLD) countries with justified changes in deforestation trends and puts in place further requirements on the historic averages by requiring that the historic period considered is about 10 years before the end date which should be the most recent date prior to two years before the start of the draft ER Program Document assessment.
- REM: Historical average rates
- Norway-Guyana bilateral agreement: Mean value of historic average rate and developing country average, with downward adjustment option
- Norway-Brazil bilateral agreement: Historical average rates, updated every 5 years

Guiding questions:

2.1: How should the GCF take into account the different approaches used for defining FREL/FRL and translated into verified REDD+ results?

The following principles should be considered when analysing the approaches used by countries to define the FREL/FRL and to estimate emissions reductions:

1. Consider the specific circumstances of the countries.
2. Apply a principle of flexibility. This is especially important if the recent REDD+ preparation process in countries is being considered as improving the approaches, inputs and methodologies used by national forest monitoring systems (including FREL/FRL). Therefore, flexibility criteria are defined to update and/or improve the FREL/FRL, including the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of emission reductions, which is the mean to ensure verifiable REDD+ results.
3. The principles for the development of GHG Inventories and for the establishment of FREL/FRL according to the IPCC should be followed: transparency, consistency, comparability, completeness, and accuracy.

2.2: Is there a need for additional GCF-specific criteria for FREL/FRL and MRV? If so, what type criteria should that be?
At the technical level, the criteria and guidelines of the UNFCCC, as well as other initiatives such as the FCPF Carbon Fund, are considered sufficiently robust.

2.3: How should the GCF take into account the results of the analysis of the REDD+ technical annex[4]? What process and review criteria, if any, in order to make funding decisions?
Consideration of national circumstances, flexibility, equality and transparency are some of the principles that become even more relevant when making financing decisions. Some of the criteria that the GCF should take into account to make financing decisions are:

1. Degree of legal/programmatic alignment and institutionalization of REDD+ preparation processes at the national level (notably the National Forestry Monitoring System and the National Strategy or Plan of Action)
2. There should be enough flexibility to consider evolution and improvements in MRV processes and updates in FREL/FRL (both estimates and period), which implies improvements in the measurement of emission reductions.
3. Level of countries' progress for the implementation of REDD+ at national level: financial architecture (including projects and programs under way or already implemented), alignment of REDD+ multi scale implementation (between national, sub-national and local level: Both in terms of MRV and FREL and in the implementation of REDD+ activities), alignment of REDD+ between sectors, etc.

2.4: Should a description of how alignment of subnational FREL/REL to national-scale FREL/REL be required?
Completely. Alignment, nesting and methodological consistency at different scales are considered to be critical for MRV and FREL/FRL. This contributes decisively to the IPCC reporting principles of consistency and comparability. A National Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System can be considered as the key of a country to access the Results-Based Payments, and as one of the bases for the planning of REDD+ actions on the territory, so the multi scale alignment should be a priority criterion.

2.5: Other questions?

Technical element 3: Operationalization of the 'Cancun safeguards'

Issue: The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ and earlier COP decisions contain seven safeguards[5] that are required to be addressed and respected in all phases of REDD+. The GCF needs to consider how these relate to the existing GCF policies, procedures and reporting requirements, in particular how they can be reconciled with the interim safeguards of the GCF (IFC Performance Standards). The GCF also needs to decide if additional guidance is required on REDD+ RBP-specific considerations in order to operationalize RBP. Such guidance could be warranted, for example, to address the risks of reversals of Emission Reductions achieved, or information may be required to ensure GCF's ESS, fiduciary standards, and gender policy are upheld in activities that produced ERs being rewarded.

Existing practices of other funds:

- FCPF Carbon Fund: World Bank safeguard policies and processes (Strategic Assessment and Management Framework); Benefit Sharing Plan
- REM: Cancun REDD+ Safeguards; KfW safeguards; BMZ human rights guidelines
- Norway-Guyana bilateral agreement: World Bank, IDB and UNEP safeguards
- Norway-Brazil bilateral agreement: Safeguards of the Brazilian Development Bank

Guiding questions:

[4] Decision 14/CP.19
[5] Appendix I to UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16.

3.1: How should the GCF assess the implementation of the Cancun Safeguards in addition to the IFC performance standards (interim GCF ESS)? The GCF should consider the progress of each country in designing its Safeguards Information System under a national approach consistent with its legal framework and with its National REDD+ Strategy. These national developments, which in turn are aligned to decisions on REDD+ safeguards in the UNFCCC, should be the basis on which the GCF builds the review on addressing and respecting safeguards. In that regard, the GCF could consider the country's Safeguards Information System and the summary of information on how safeguards are addressed and respected as sufficient to demonstrate compliance with safeguards in REDD+ activities. It may also consider other national documents or publications that complement the implementation of the Cancun Safeguards and those of the IFC, such as: interpretation according to the national context of the Cancun Safeguards, analysis of the legal framework and governance for addressing and respecting safeguards, environmental and social risk management documents by other initiatives, among others. 3.2: Should the GCF develop additional guidance for the reporting on how the Cancun Safeguards are being respected? No, it is not considered necessary to develop additional guidelines for the implementation or reporting of the Cancun Safeguards. Decisions regarding the respect and addressing of safeguards established in the UNFCCC, as well as the safeguards or operational policies requirements of each initiative, organization or donor are sufficient to consistently report on how each country is addressing and respecting the Cancun Safeguards in its REDD+ activities. 3.3: Other questions?
Any additional issues/comments